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These words, translated by Arthur Waley, open the classic sixteenth-century novel Journey to the West, a 
masterpiece of Chinese literature. This is the 
story of the monk Xuanzang’s pilgrimage to 
India to collect Buddhist sutras for the court 
of the Tang emperors. One of his escorts is 
the Monkey King—Sun Wukong, ‘Aware-
of-Vacuity’—a mischievous and ambitious 
character born out of a primordial stone. At 
the beginning of the journey, Sun Wukong 
is nothing but a failed rebel. Having taken 
offence at not being assigned an office high 
enough in the heavenly hierarchy, he had 
dared to challenge the supreme divinity of 
the Chinese pantheon, the Jade Emperor, 
creating disturbances in his celestial palace. 
For this reason, he had been imprisoned 
under a mountain for five hundred years, 
until Buddha had decided to give him a 
chance at redemption: he was to accompany 
and protect Xuanzang in his travels. Even 
then, the Monkey King proves unruly and 
‘There was a rock that since the creation of the world had been worked upon by the pure 
essences of Heaven and the fine savours of Earth, the vigour of sunshine and the grace of 
moonlight, till it one day split open, giving birth to a stone egg, about as big as a playing ball 
which then turned into a stone monkey.’
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the only way to control him is to trick him 
into wearing a magic metal headband that 
causes him terrible pain whenever he does 
not obey the orders of his master.
According to the traditional Chinese 
zodiac, 2016 was the year of the fire 
monkey. What better character than Sun 
Wukong to inspire this inaugural volume 
of the Made in China Yearbook? In this past 
year, Chinese workers and rights activists 
from all walks of life have struggled under 
heightened repression by the Chinese party-
state, but showed remarkable endurance 
even under these dire circumstances. With 
their fights, however small or short-lived, 
they repeatedly challenged the message 
of ‘harmony’ of the Chinese authorities, 
creating ‘disturbances’ in the imaginary 
heaven engineered by the party-state. All of 
this is nothing else but proof of the survival 
of the monkey spirit in Chinese society. 
Even when trapped under a mountain 
of repression, or in terrible pain due to 
the curse of the magic headband of state 
control, the monkey still manages to briefly 
wriggle free, reminding us that not all is 
well and not everything is predictable.  
However, what happened in 2016 leaves 
little room for optimism concerning the 
future of the labour and rights movements 
in China. Although the Chinese government 
has never been reluctant to repress dissent, 
in this past year we have witnessed an 
authoritarian drift that only a few years 
ago would have been unthinkable. Not only 
have labour activists fallen victim to more 
regular and severe forms of intimidation 
by the party-state, but new laws and 
regulations have also been passed in order 
to curtail civil society space by, among 
other things, restricting international 
sources of funding for labour and rights 
NGOs while at the same time limiting their 
abilities to register as social organisations 
or charities and raise funds domestically. 
This happened in concomitance with an 
economic slowdown, prompting local 
governments to erode labour protection 
by freezing minimum wages and lowering 
the rate of social security contributions 
shouldered by companies in order to 
prevent capital flight. However, Chinese 
workers have continued to be restless, as 
they see their very livelihoods threatened 
by these new developments, but in absence 
of any meaningful representation they have 
been largely unable to resist these trends.
This Yearbook aims at tracking the 
changes that have been taking place in 
the realm of labour and civil society in 
China in the past year. All chapters have 
already appeared during 2016 either in 
the open-access journal Made in China: A 
Quarterly on Chinese Labour, Civil Society, 
and Rights, or in the Essays section of the 
website Chinoiresie.info, but they have been 
updated to reflect recent developments 
and references have been included. The 
whole project—journal, website, and book—
stems from a belief in the need to bridge 
the gap between academic research and 
the general public. We also believe that 
recent developments in China call for 
more serious analysis from both scholars 
and practitioners, as well as for critical 
engagement with a broader international 
audience interested in forging international 
solidarity. More pragmatically, we were 
compelled to re-edit this material and 
compile this volume because we think 
that such a book will be a useful reference 
for a wide audience—especially scholars, 
activists, unionists, policy-makers, and 
students—with an interest in Chinese 
labour and civil society. 
Besides a series of ‘briefs’, in which we 
summarise some of the most important 
events that took place in China over the 
past year, we have regrouped the chapters 
into five general sections. The first 
section, ‘Steer Your Way’, focuses on the 
relationship between the party-state and 
workers, offering some perspectives on 
how the Chinese authorities have navigated 
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the uncharted waters of labour politics in 
a time of global economic uncertainty. It 
opens with three chapters that deal with 
the reform of the state industry and its 
impact on the Chinese working class. In 
the first, William Hurst invites readers 
to consider the fractured and segmented 
history of the Chinese working class, as 
well as its rapidly homogenising present, 
and emphasises the need to refrain from 
too-facile comparisons with other foreign 
experiences; in the second, Kevin Lin 
looks into the new wave of mass layoffs 
announced in the state coal and steel sector 
and outlines similarities and differences 
with the previous massive restructuring 
of the state economy in the late 1990s; 
in the third, Nicholas Loubere, offers an 
analysis of the political and ideological 
implications of resorting to microcredit to 
promote entrepreneurial activity among 
laid-off workers. The section also includes 
an article by Beatriz Carrillo, in which she 
describes the trajectory of China’s welfare 
system towards the inclusion of migrant 
labour and highlights the challenges posed 
by the economic slowdown, and a forum 
in which labour scholars Anita Chan, 
Kaxton Siu, and Sarah Swider discuss how 
precarisation has impacted the Chinese 
workforce in key sectors of the economy.
In the second section, ‘Hammer to 
Fall’, we focus on grassroots organising by 
Chinese workers, activists, and farmers, 
describing some instances of resistance 
in front of increasing repression. In it, 
Ivan Franceschini describes how Chinese 
labour NGOs have evolved in recent years 
and argues that the latest crackdown by 
the party-state might also open some small 
window of political opportunity; Anita 
Chan highlights the historical importance 
of the recent struggle of Walmart workers 
in China and dissects the factors that led 
to its ultimate failure in spite of much 
initial optimism; and Luigi Tomba analyses 
the protests that recently took place in 
Wukan village, challenging some widely-
held assumptions about the political nature 
of such land-related social movements 
in the Chinese countryside. To conclude 
the section, we publish a compendium 
of the highly controversial Law on the 
Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities 
within Mainland China that came into force 
in January 2017 edited by Ivan Franceschini 
and Elisa Nesossi, and a forum in which 
international labour activists Ellen David 
Friedman, Kevin Slaten, and May Wong 
discuss the implications of the new 
legislation for labour NGOs in China.
In the third section, ‘Eye in the Sky’, we 
look into the ambiguous role of the law as 
a tool of social control. The section opens 
with three chapters related to the labour 
law. First, Elaine Sio-ieng Hui reflects on 
the role of labour law in China as a vital 
vehicle through which the Chinese party-
state has constructed capitalist hegemony 
with regard to state-capital-labour 
relations in the country; Ivan Franceschini 
then discusses the ‘rights awakening’ of 
Chinese workers, challenging some widely 
held assumptions regarding the rights 
awareness and legal knowledge of the 
Chinese workforce; finally Aaron Halegua 
delves into the challenges that Chinese 
workers face when they seek to enforce 
their rights through the legal system. We 
also included a chapter by Thomas DuBois 
in which he analyses the new Religion 
Law in China within the context of the 
debate on ‘universal values’ and offers 
his take on the relationship between 
academia and activism; and a forum, edited 
by Elisa Nesossi, in which legal scholars 
Joshua Rosenzweig, Ewan Smith, and Sue 
Trevaskes put the concept of the rule of 
law in China into a wider historical and 
political perspective, deconstructing its 
multiple dimensions and specificities.
In the fourth section, ‘Heart of Darkness?’, 
we look into Chinese labour and investment 
in Africa, offering a series of thought-
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provoking perspectives with a focus on 
two countries—Zambia and Ghana—where 
conflicts related to Chinese capital and 
labour inflows have recently emerged. 
Mukete Beyongo Dynamic examines the 
claim that Chinese investments in Zambian 
copper mines have led to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ in labour standards, criticising this 
view as overly simplistic in that it doesn’t 
take into account the agency of local actors. 
Regarding Ghana, Nicholas Loubere and 
Gordon Crawford investigate the media 
discourse and popular depiction of Chinese 
miners in Ghana as stealing resources from 
marginal sectors of local society, revealing 
that in fact we still do not know much 
about who these people actually are, or 
the labour relations that exist between the 
miners themselves. Finally, Jixia Lu draws 
from her fieldwork in Ghana’s agricultural 
sector to challenge both the western 
narrative that frames China’s expanding 
presence in African countries as a project 
in empire building, and the narrative of the 
Chinese authorities depicting engagement 
as a form of South-South cooperation that 
is beneficial to the local populations. 
Finally, in the fifth section entitled ‘Soul 
Sacrifice’, we do some soul-searching 
through a series of essays in which the 
authors review artistic works or intellectual 
trends that offer insights into the impact of 
modernity on the inner life of the Chinese 
people. First, Christian Sorace reviews Zhao 
Liang’s Behemoth, a recent documentary 
on the environmental and social tragedy 
behind China’s economic miracle. Ivan 
Franceschini then discusses The Cow and 
the Goat Descend the Mountain, an album 
of ancient Chinese poems set to music 
by folk singer Zhou Yunpeng, taking an 
opportunity to reflect on the role of poetry 
as a form of resistance. Finally, in the face of 
much loneliness and pressure experienced 
by Chinese citizens today, not least migrant 
workers, Gerda Wielander considers the 
role of happiness in the ‘Chinese dream’ 
and looks at the different options from 
the field of psychology and psychotherapy 
available to Chinese citizens for achieving 
happiness, as well as at the role of the state 
in choosing between these.
All of these chapters have been written 
with the aim of reaching as wide an 
audience as possible. For this reason, in 
them you will not find the theorising typical 
of much academic literature on labour and 
civil society. Similarly, we have tried to go 
beyond parochial divisions by including 
writings by contributors coming from 
different backgrounds and disciplines, such 
as labour scholars, legal scholars, activists, 
and lawyers. We have also welcomed essays 
by writers who hold generally optimistic 
views about the future of the Chinese 
labour movement, and others who remain 
definitively sceptical. In such difficult 
times, it is only through such a dialogue 
that we can take the discussion forward, 
not only gaining a better understanding of 
the challenges that Chinese workers and 
citizens are facing today, but also giving 
credit to the Chinese authorities wherever 
this is deserved. Such understanding is 
a necessary precondition to build those 
bridges of international solidarity and 
mutual comprehension so important in the 
period of global turmoil that we all now face, 
as the whole world seems to be descending 
into provincialism, xenophobia, and worse. 
It is in times like these that we need more 
than ever to keep alive the monkey spirit 
that resides inside each and every one of us.
Ivan Franceschini
Canberra, 11 January 2017
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China Arrests Labour Activists 
amid Crackdown on Human 
Rights Defenders
Ningxia Officials Address 
Migrant Workers’ Back Pay 
After Bus Attack
In early January, five Chinese labour activists detained 
since early December 2015 were formally arrested 
in Guangdong province. China’s slowing economy 
has led to a surge in labour disputes and made 
organised labour a particularly sensitive issue and a 
target of state repression. Zeng Feiyang, Director of 
the Panyu Migrant Workers Centre in Guangzhou 
and a prominent labour activist, was charged with 
‘disrupting social order’. Three other activists of 
the same organisation, Meng Han, Tang Huanxing, 
and Zhu Xiaomei, were arrested on the same charge, 
with Zhu subsequently released on bail. He Xiaobo, 
Director of Nanfeiyan, a labour group based in the 
neighbouring Foshan, was arrested on a charge of 
embezzlement. Among the arrested activists, Zeng 
Feiyang was the target of a concerted smear campaign 
in the Chinese official media. The official Xinhua News 
Agency and the China Central Television accused Zeng 
of embezzling funding, of promoting himself as a ‘star 
of the labour movement’ without regard for workers’ 
interests, and of sexual misconduct. Nanfeiyan and the 
Panyu Migrant Workers Center both sued the Xinhua 
journalist for libel over his report.
 
(Sources: Radio Free Asia, Reuters, Xinhua)
On 5 January, Ma Yongping, a migrant construction 
worker angry about unpaid wages, set a public bus 
on fire, killing seventeen people in Yinchuan, the 
capital of the northwestern province of Ningxia. Ma 
had complained on social media about non-payment 
of his wages, but his grievances had been ignored 
by local officials. A government report revealed that 
in the first ten months of 2015, the capital city of 
Ningxia, Yinchuan, recorded more than five hundred 
cases of unpaid wages, 22.3 percent more than in the 
same period of the previous year, involving about 
ten thousand migrant workers who were owed 1.48 
billion yuan. In response, the Ningxia provincial 
government identified twenty-seven construction 
companies that had delayed the payment of salaries, 
subjected them to criminal punishments allowed by 
the recently amended Chinese Criminal Law (fines 
and jail terms of up to seven years), and forbade them 
to bid on future government projects. It also launched 
a campaign to ensure that companies pay migrant 
workers on time before the Chinese New Year. On 19 
January, the State Council released a strongly worded 
new opinion on the non-payment of wages for migrant 
workers, aiming to establish a regulatory regime 
that ‘keeps the problem of unpaid wages for migrant 
workers fundamentally in check’ by 2020. 
(Sources: Caixin, State Council, Wall Street Journal)
PC: XINHUA
Remains of a public bus set on fire 
by a migrant construction worker in 
Yinchuan, Ningxia
PC: XINHUA
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Grassroots Worker Elected to 
Top Trade Union Leadership
Chinese Blogger Demands 
Answers over Funding to Help 
‘Left-Behind Children’
Ju Xiaolin, a technician and former migrant worker 
from Shaanxi province, was appointed Vice Chair of 
the official All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU). Ju is the first migrant worker to hold such 
a high post within the ACFTU. A technician with only 
a high school diploma, Ju has worked for China CREC 
Railway Electrification Bureau Group since 1987 and 
in 2014 was elected to the National People’s Congress 
as a deputy. After the appointment, official media 
featured several stories on Ju actively promoting 
migrant workers’ interests by submitting policy 
proposals during the National People’s Congress held 
in March. This move reflects the central government’s 
attempt to make the ACFTU more appealing in the 
eyes of the rank-and-file workers, especially migrants 
like Ju himself. However, Lu Hui, an Associate 
Professor in sociology at Peking University, cautioned 
that ‘institutional reform is needed at the lower level 
of trade unions to attract and retain more experienced 
migrant workers.’ It is unlikely that a migrant Vice-
Chair will affect such institutional changes, as trade 
union reforms are stalling. 
(Source: China News, Xinhua 1, Xinhua 2)
Zhou Xiaoyun, a well-known blogger, took legal 
action against the governments of Bijie city and 
Guizhou province, demanding that they reveal what 
happened to a one hundred and eighty million yuan 
provincial fund established to help ‘left-behind 
children’ (liushou ertong), a term that generally 
refers to children currently living in the Chinese 
countryside without the daily care of their parents, 
who have migrated to other areas for work. The 
government of Bijie established the fund in 2012, 
after the death of five boys who had tried to shelter 
form the cold in a trash container had sparked a 
public debate over whether the local authorities were 
doing enough to help these disadvantaged children. 
The fund should have been used toward improving 
the living conditions and medical care of left-behind 
children. However, when four more Bijie children 
killed themselves in June 2015 by drinking pesticide, 
blogger Zhou Xiaoyun decided to file a request to 
the local government to disclose details about how 
the fund had been used. After being told that such 
information did not exist, Zhou filed another request 
and again the government only provided general 
figures. Zhou’s additional demand that the Guizhou 
provincial government intervene to ask the Bijie 
government to publish documents about the fund was 
similarly dismissed. Finally, in late December 2015, 
Zhou filed an administrative lawsuit against the two 
governments at the Guiyang Intermediate People’s 
Court. The lawsuit was accepted and the case was 
heard in court in June 2016, but Zhou’s request was 
denied. In mid-February, the State Council released 
a guideline on the protection of left-behind children, 
requiring local governments and village committees to 
pay close attention to the situation of these children 
and ensure they are properly taken care of. 
(Sources: Guiyang Wang, Sina.com, South China 
Morning Post, Xinhua)
PC: SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
Ju Xiaolin, new Vice-Chair of 
the ACFTU. 
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Labour Contract Law Under 
Attack for Harming Flexibility
Mass Layoffs Announced in the 
Coal and Steel Industries
Charity Law Passed by the 
National People’s Congress
On 7 March, during the National People’s Congress, 
Minister of Finance Lou Jiwei criticised China’s 
Labour Contract Law for harming the flexibility of 
the labour market, constraining productivity, and 
harming workers by reducing job opportunities. Lou 
stated that the Labour Contract Law restricts the 
ability of companies to fire their employees and is thus 
discriminatory towards people entering the workforce. 
Earlier, on 29 February, Minister of Human Resources 
and Social Security Yin Weimin had announced that 
the Ministry is investigating the possibility of revising 
the Labour Contract Law to tackle the inflexibility of 
the labour market and high labour costs. With the 
slowing economy, the Chinese government is also 
trying to rein in wage increases, favouring business 
interests at the expense of increasingly discontented 
workers. China’s Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security recently urged ‘steady and cautious 
control’ over minimum wages and proposed a formula 
change that would slow wage increases. Meanwhile, 
in March, Guangdong province, one of China’s main 
manufacturing hubs, announced a two-year freeze on 
minimum wages. 
(Sources: Caijing, Caixin, Daily Mail, Wall Street 
Journal, Zhongguo Xinwen Wang)
According to Yin Weimin, Minister for Human 
Resources and Social Security, 1.8 million workers 
in the coal and steel industries will be laid off as 
part of the government’s efforts to curb industrial 
overcapacity and pollution. However, other sources 
say as many as five to six million workers could lose 
their jobs. The so-called ‘zombie’ state firms will be 
the main target of the restructuring, with the Chinese 
government attempting to cut capacity gluts in as 
many as seven sectors, including cement, glassmaking, 
and shipbuilding. This is likely to become China’s 
most significant industrial retrenchment since the 
restructuring of state-owned enterprises and mass 
layoff of state-sector workers in the late 1990s. The 
Chinese government will spend one hundred and fifty 
billion yuan to deal with the social and economic 
consequences of this latest wave of layoffs in the next 
few years.  
(Sources: Quartz, Reuters, Sina)
(Left) Lou Jiwei, China’s Minister 
of Finance. (Right) Yin Weimin, 
Minister for Human Resources 
and Social Security.
On 16 March, the National People’s Congress passed 
a landmark Charity Law. While the new Law will 
make it easier for Chinese nonprofit groups to obtain 
a legal registration and raise funding, it also includes 
strict regulations to prevent fraud and impose tighter 
supervision. The legislators introduce tax incentives 
to encourage enterprises and wealthy people to 
donate to charities, a move aimed at boosting an ailing 
internal donation market. The new Law mandates that 
charities should be recognised by authorities before 
they solicit public donations, with organisations 
raising funds from the public without a license risking 
fines of up to twenty thousand yuan. According 
to official data, at the end of June 2016, in China 
there were about six hundred and seventy thousand 
registered social organisations, including more than 
five thousand foundations.
(Sources: China Daily, NGOs in China, The Wall 
Street Journal, Xinhua)PC: WSFF.COM PC: TIANYIBAO WANG




China’s working class dwarfs those of all 
other countries. It has undergone several 
rounds of momentous and wrenching change 
over the past hundred years—from early 
industrialisation and urban growth, through 
the Japanese invasion and the Second World 
War, to the 1949 Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) takeover and Maoist Era mobilisation, 
the advent of reform and 1980s growth, 
globalisation since the mid-1990s, and 
adjusting to a ‘new normal’ in the aftermath 
of the world financial crisis of 2008. But what 
has this all meant for interest intermediation 
or political representation for labour in 
China?
In order to address these questions, we 
must accept and understand the fractured and 
segmented history of the Chinese working 
class, as well as its rapidly homogenising 
present. We must also refrain from too-facile 
comparisons with European or other post-
socialist or developing countries, if we are to 
make the most accurate possible predictions 
about what might emerge in terms of class 
compromise or incorporation, and how far 
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Mining Brightness: The Real Story of Migrant Workers.
China’s working class has undergone several 
rounds of momentous and wrenching change 
over the past hundred years. But what has 
this all meant for interest intermediation or 
political representation for labour in China? In 
order to address these questions, we must accept 
and understand the fractured and segmented 
history of the Chinese working class, as well 
as its rapidly homogenising present. We must 
also refrain from too-facile comparisons with 
European or other post-socialist or developing 
countries.
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retirements, lay-offs, and firm bankruptcy 
(Hurst 2009). Just as SOEs were beginning to 
stabilise and new and improved social welfare 
and assistance programmes for the unemployed 
were being rolled out in a meaningful way, 
the 2008 world financial crisis hit, causing 
Chinese exports to plunge sharply. Export 
processing manufacturers laid off as many as 
thirty million migrant workers in a little over 
six months, precipitating massive social and 
economic disruption across the countryside. 
Much of this sector has yet to fully recover 
as of late 2016. Other countries in South 
or Southeast Asia or in Africa are proving 
cheaper destinations for off-shoring from 
advanced industrial economies, or even from 
China itself. Labour-intensive manufacturing 
on the scale that appeared so ascendant in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s may never 
revive. Throughout, depressed incomes and 
lack of job security have precluded the rising 
consumption necessary to boost services to a 
higher level.
As I have outlined elsewhere (Hurst 2015), 
what had long been one of the world’s most 
fragmented working classes—in terms of how 
it came into being, the conditions of work, 
forms of incorporation into the polity, etc.—has 
since 2008 become increasingly homogenised. 
While SOE workers enjoyed rising fortunes 
from the government’s massive injection 
of capital aimed at forestalling recession, 
migrants’ prospects declined. As state sector 
employment has become much less secure 
and benefits have continued to erode, basic 
social protections and job security for those 
in the private sector (including migrants) 
have improved markedly.
Though their historical origins and 
‘conditions of proletarianisation’ may remain 
strikingly different, the various segments of 
China’s working class have come to share 
rhythms of working life, similar places 
on the social ladder, precarious economic 
livelihoods, and political mobilisation in the 
face of repression to a remarkable degree. 
On the one hand, we may see this change as 
Conventional wisdom has always held 
the Chinese working class to be among the 
most profoundly and multiply segmented in 
the world. Divided in the pre-1949 period 
by cleavages of native place, skill level, 
and urban versus rural status—as well as 
region—the proletariat began life as a kind 
of compound organism. During the Maoist 
Era, the cellular boundaries of the work 
unit (danwei) system and the relatively 
impregnable ramparts dividing city and 
countryside that the household registration 
(hukou) system provided, helped reify and 
intensify this segmentation. With more than 
a touch of irony, the world’s largest workers’ 
state managed to eviscerate its working 
class as a unified political and social actor. 
Following the advent of reform, changes have 
been more complex.
During the 1980s, workers began to 
stream into cities from rural China, at first 
on temporary assignments, but gradually as 
longer-term migrants and residents. At the 
same time, new industrial sectors sprung up, 
notably in small-scale manufacturing and 
services, as well as newly resurgent rural 
enterprises. By the mid-1990s, when monetary 
reform opened the Chinese economy in 
earnest to globalisation, there were at 
least three distinct and important sectors 
employing significant numbers of workers 
outside rural areas (where local enterprises 
had already begun to wane): old-line state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), export-oriented 
manufacturers (both domestic and foreign-
owned) employing mainly rural migrants, and 
smaller self-proprietorships and local firms 
concentrated in services and some smaller 
manufactures. Each of these sectors was to 
experience its own form of crisis in turn. 
As early as the 1980s, but especially in the 
years after 1997, the state sector lost roughly 
half of its workforce to attrition, early 
From Segmentation to 
Homogenisation
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a decline for a once-vaunted leading element 
in Chinese society. But, on the other, we must 
recognise recent shifts as having produced 
a far more unified and potentially assertive 
Chinese proletariat than has existed for at 
least the last several decades.
A simplistic knee-jerk answer to this 
question might be, ‘to be crucified again’. But 
such an answer would assume that China’s 
continuing economic development and 
social change must rely upon maintenance 
of working classes repression if the CCP is 
to achieve political stability. It also assumes 
that the fragmentation and quiescence that 
has characterised much of the Chinese 
working class in recent years will endure. 
Recent structural shifts undermine both 
assumptions, and suggest that the road ahead 
may well be paved with greater mobilisation 
and potentially even seismic changes in the 
forms and functions of workers’ interest 
representation across the Chinese economy.
Indeed, it may well be that the only way 
to cement the sort of changes Xi Jinping and 
the rest of the Chinese political leadership 
have called for—especially a bold move into 
higher value-added industries and toward a 
greater reliance on consumption, as opposed 
to exports, for boosting GDP—would be for 
China finally to break out of its ‘insurgency 
trap’ in labour relations (Friedman 2014). 
As Eli Friedman has explained, the lack 
of genuine representation by independent 
unions or other vehicles for workers’ interest 
intermediation has left China vulnerable to an 
incomplete double-movement (Polanyi 1944). 
Unable to provide institutionalisation and 
genuine political incorporation to workers 
left socially dislocated by the advance of the 
market, the CCP and the Chinese state are 
forced to contend with workers’ ongoing 
mobilisation and increasingly radical 
activism. In such a context, progress up the 
product cycle or toward a more consumption-
based economy appears unlikely.
This places Chinese workers in a 
potentially powerful yet uncertain position 
and leaves the state with unpalatable and 
risky response options. Workers can choose 
to continue with disunited activism in hopes 
of at least maintaining stasis or perhaps 
advancing some new social protections. 
They can work proactively with the state 
and Party to forge a new role for official 
unions or, more likely, develop some new 
template for institutionalisation of class 
compromise and incorporation of workers 
into the polity. Or they can press forward 
with bold unified mobilisation in support 
of independent unions or other vehicles of 
representation. The state and Party, in turn, 
can choose to promote independent unions 
(which appears incompatible with basic CCP 
principles and thus ideologically anathema), 
to remain trapped in a cycle of repression 
and accommodation in response to workers’ 
fragmented mobilisation (which risks the 
rise of a united and destabilising labour 
movement, repression of which could prove 
unwieldy at best), or develop a proactive 
strategy for some alternative form of working 
class incorporation.
At present, I am optimistic that workers 
and their state interlocutors can avoid 
protracted or broad-based class conflict that 
could result from unified activism or too 
ham-fisted generalised repression. I even see 
some reason to hope for an innovative long-
term solution, from which a new formula of 
institutionalisation and incorporation may 
yet emerge. But I fear that the short term is 
likely to see continuing confrontation on the 
shop floor and persistent stalemate at the 
macro-level. Such an unhappy equilibrium of 
slow-burn conflict may well take hold even 
more deeply than it already has, if no way out 
can be found within the next several years.
Quo Vadis, Chinese 
Proletariat?
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What happens in China has obvious and 
direct effects on workers the world over. 
China is also, on its own terms, a critical 
case, worthy of study as representative of a 
number of types, in addition to its intrinsic 
importance. Yet, few have examined the 
implications of Chinese labour politics or 
potential class compromise for the rest of 
the world or even outlined how their unique 
contours might be seen in a comparative 
light. To do this well, we must first dispense 
with any assumption that in China one might 
be able to discern any reflection of Europe’s 
past.
Indeed, traditional comparative analysis 
of labour politics has tended to accept 
axiomatically certain truisms—notably that 
the experiences of working class formation, 
mobilisation, and incorporation throughout 
the world have been broadly similar to those 
of Western European countries between 
roughly 1848 and 1945, even if they have 
diverged in important respects. If we, 
however, allow for a sort of Lobachevskian 
geometry of comparison, suppositions of 
similarity in the absence of strict congruence 
fall away for the analysis of labour politics 
as surely and quickly as they do for the 
study of triangles. China’s future may thus 
not resemble anything Polanyi could have 
predicted or that might be read from the 
annals of European history. It may also 
provide new insights that could travel further 
afield, but not necessarily to the countries 
that may seem obvious comparators.
Specifically, if a genuinely new and 
innovative method of institutionalisation or 
accommodation of working class mobilisation 
can be found that does not involve the creation 
of independent unions or mechanisms 
of interest intermediation, this would be 
innovation indeed. It would represent not just 
a true form of ‘responsive authoritarianism’, 
but a fundamentally different kind of 
corporatism or class compromise than has 
been seen anywhere before. Like those 
other modes of incorporation that sprang 
forth during the first half of the twentieth 
century, it may also provide an exemplar for 
other countries well beyond the set of large 
developing or post-socialist countries we 
might be tempted to think of. A first step in 
making good guesses about how such a new 
bargain might be struck or how far beyond 
China it might travel would be nailing down 
much more specifically the proper universe 
of comparison for Chinese labour politics 
(something well beyond the scope of this 
essay). When we know what mirrors to hold 
up to China, we will be much better able to 
analyse its changing face and gauge how far 
and in what directions its reflection might 
radiate or refract.
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In the first quarter of 2016, a week-long 
strike at an ailing state-owned steel factory in 
Guangzhou (Denyer 2016a), a street protest 
by miners in Heilongjiang denouncing the 
governor for a misleading remark about their 
wages (Buckley 2016), and a symbolically 
powerful convergence of coal miners in the 
once revolutionary area of Anyuan in Jiangxi 
(Denyer 2016b), have raised concerns that a 
new wave of protests is likely to take place in 
the state sector in China.
It has been more than a decade since the 
last major wave of protests by state workers 
subsided. Between 1997 and 2003, the state 
sector shut down and privatised a large number 
of state factories, leaving between twenty-
five and forty million workers temporarily or 
permanently unemployed, decimating entire 
working-class communities, and prompting 
tens of thousands of workers to take to the 
street (Hurst 2009). 
Recent protests by state workers are once 
again raising concerns about an increase in 
labour unrest in the state sector in China. The 
current surge is reminiscent in many ways 
of the tumultuous protests that took place 
at the turn of the century, when the Chinese 
authorities carried out a drastic restructuring 
of the economy. The similarity is striking, and 
the eerily familiar images of protesting state 
workers only add to the sense of déjà vu. But is 
history really repeating itself ?
Remoulding the 
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However, right around the time when 
China’s rural migrant workers in the export-
oriented manufacturing sector started 
to grow restless and more organized in 
the early 2000s, the resistance of state 
industrial workers to the marketization of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) suffered a 
historical defeat (Philion 2009). This was 
due to a combination of outright suppression, 
selective compensation, and the gradual 
winding down of the marketization process. 
The current upsurge in many ways evokes 
memories of the tumultuous wave of protests 
in the state sector at the turn of the century. 
The similarity is striking: in the face of falling 
profitability and a bloated labour force, state 
workers once again demanded to be paid their 
proper wages or an adequate severance in the 
case of layoff. The eerily familiar images of 
protesting state industrial workers only add 
to the sense of déjà vu. But is history really 
repeating itself? 
In many respects, the state sector today has 
been deeply transformed (Hsieh and Song 
2015). Decades of reform have converted 
China’s command economy into a modest but 
strategically significant state sector. The very 
process that led to the shutting down and 
sale of factories also brought about a radical 
restructuring of labour relations and the 
production process, creating the conditions 
for a decade of rapid recovery and expansion. 
This, in turn, has remade SOEs into some of 
the largest conglomerates in their respective 
industries, ensuring a decade of relative 
industrial peace.
 However, early signs of stress appeared 
soon after the global financial crisis. For a few 
years, the decline in the growth rate of profits 
in the state sector was non-threatening. Still, 
an ideological battle was fought around the 
idea that further reforms were necessary and 
desirable (Lin 2013). International financial 
institutions, mainstream economists, and 
foreign chambers of commerce, amplified by 
the media, harshly criticised the inefficiency 
and corruption of the SOEs and repeatedly 
advocated for the withdrawal of state subsidies 
and a further downsizing of the state sector. 
For a period in late 2015, state sector reforms 
seemed to be back on the agenda (Bland 2015). 
However, to the disappointment of critics, 
the aim of the reforms was to strengthen the 
sector rather than further privatisation (Wei 
2015).
Recently, China’s economic predicament 
has begun to precipitate a widely anticipated 
crisis of industrial overcapacity (The 
Economist 2016). Profit margins in the steel 
industry are surprisingly low, and workers’ 
wages and conditions are very poor at what 
has been described as zombie economy 
(Wildau 2016). Steel factories and coal mines 
are reported to have not been paying wages for 
months and many workers have already been 
laid off. When I visited a steel plant in the 
southern city of Kunming in 2012, I found a 
factory that was barely surviving on a meagre 
profit and where workers worked long shifts 
and earned just above the minimum wage.
After the Global 
Financial Crisis
Miners at Lao Ye Temple Mine, Datong, Shanxi
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In the last couple of years, there have already 
been several cases of protests in the state 
sector (Wong 2015). But it is only now that 
we are seeing the full extent of the industrial 
overcapacity and declining profitability in 
the steel and coal sectors, and the toll that 
these conditions are taking on the workers. 
It is, therefore, no wonder that workers are 
taking collective action. Yet, is this likely to 
become a repeat of the wave of protests of the 
late 1990s? 
In terms of the scale of the layoffs, whereas 
in the late 1990s the Chinese authorities 
targeted SOEs across the board, the current 
layoffs seem to affect mostly two sectors: 
steel factories and coal mines (Buckley and 
Hernandez 2016). There is no evidence that 
the party-state is interested in an overhaul of 
the entire state sector like it did two decades 
ago. The projected layoffs range from 1.8 
million workers (about ten percent of the 
steel workforce and twenty percent of the coal 
miners) to five or six million (Lim et al. 2016), 
which are in themselves devastating figures 
but still pale in comparison to the twenty-
five to forty million workers who lost their 
jobs during the previous wave of reforms. In 
fact, today the entire state sector—excluding 
public services such as schools and hospitals—
employs less than forty million workers. 
In any event, 1.8 million workers will still 
be a considerable source of social instability. 
Moreover, by its very nature the protests in 
the state sector pose a more direct challenge 
to the party-state than those in the private 
sector. To deal with this threat, the Chinese 
authorities seem to have learned their lessons 
from the past. They have pre-emptively 
allocated one hundred billion yuan (about 
fifteen billion US dollars) to resettle and help 
laid-off workers find alternative employment. 
Yet, although these funds have already been 
earmarked to compensate laid-off workers, 
if the recent protests are any indication, 
managerial irresponsibility and recklessness 
are a more likely scenario than peaceful 
settlement. Conflicts at the factory level may 
still be unavoidable. 
Will the layoffs spread to other sectors as 
a consequence of the deepening economic 
crisis? This cannot be ruled out. The steel and 
coal sectors are not the only industries with 
overcapacity, and there is a chance that the 
Chinese economy may sharply contract. But 
thanks to state subsidies, access to state-bank 
credits, and industrial protection, China’s 
SOEs today are much better equipped than 
two decades ago to absorb shocks and losses 
(Zhang 2013). Furthermore, the Chinese state 
is likely to the fiscal resources to support the 
state sector and to contain the layoffs to only 
the designated sectors.
But the protests of state workers are also 
happening at a particularly fraught time, 
when tens of thousands of migrant workers 
in the export sector have been mobilising 
(Tang 2015), a factor that was much less 
significant in the late 1990s. This surely has 
the potential to render the situation more 
explosive. However, the location of the state 
sector protests may not significantly overlap 
with that of the struggles in the export sector. 
While a recent strike of steel workers did take 
place in Guangzhou, coal mines and large 
steel plants tend to be concentrated in inland, 
northern and north-eastern China instead 
of the southern coastal regions, a rustbelt/
sunbelt distinction that has remained 
unchanged for the last two decades (Lee 
2007).
Perhaps one of the biggest uncertainties 
is the disposition of state workers. Who are 
they? How do they differ from the Maoist 
state workers? Are they more likely to protest? 
Over the last two decades, the generations 
who had any memory of and sentimental 
attachment to Maoism and who witnessed the 
wave of layoffs in the 1990s have been largely 
Another Social Volcano 
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replaced by a younger labour force. As a result 
of this generational break, state workers may 
no longer use the Maoist discourse, which 
was a pivotal part of the protest repertoire for 
state workers in the earlier waves of unrest. 
But state workers today are confronting 
their own challenges. Two decades of labour 
intensification, lengthening working hours, 
and a rising salary gap between workers 
and management has bred resentment and 
deep dissatisfaction. As a consequence of 
the labour reforms, blue-collar state workers 
may begin to identify themselves with 
colleagues in the private sector than their 
predecessors. Perhaps this will become a 
basis for state workers to begin connecting 
with their counterparts in non-state sectors, 
thereby developing a class-consciousness 
and bridging the labour divide between state 
and private sector (Hurst 2015; see also the 
chapter by William Hurst on pp. 16–19 in the 
present book).
Whether history will repeat itself remains 
unpredictable. The actions of the Chinese 
government both at the national and 
provincial levels will play a fundamental 
role in shaping the response of the workers. 
Recent developments such as the attempts to 
freeze minimum wages and roll back social 
insurance at the discretion of the provinces 
and municipalities, as well as the possibility 
of a watering down of the ‘overly protective’ 
Labour Contract Law (see the brief on p. 13 in 
the present book), will most likely accentuate 
the damaging effects of the restructuring on 
workers and possibly ignite more and angrier 
protests. 
For the reasons discussed, this time we 
are likely to see dynamics at play that are 
very different from those that characterised 
the last wave of labour unrest. This should 
be seen as a positive development. For all of 
the courage and determination of the state 
workers involved in these earlier rebellions, 
it is important to recognise the limitations 
of these mobilisations. It is undeniable that 
this will be another difficult time for China’s 
state workers, but the new challenges are 
also infused with opportunities for the 
development of a stronger and unified labour 
movement.
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When the news broke earlier this year that 
Chinese state-owned steel and coal companies 
would be laying off anywhere between 1.8 to 
6 million workers over the next two to three 
years, the government quickly moved to provide 
assurances that the socioeconomic fallout 
would be mitigated through one hundred and 
fifty million yuan in assistance for the newly 
unemployed (see the chapter by Kevin Lin on 
pp. 20–23 in the present book). On 15 April 
2016, the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security, along with six other national 
government agencies, jointly issued guidelines 
broadly outlining the ways in which the laid-
off workers will be supported (Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security 2016). 
While the guidelines do not provide details 
of how much funding will be allocated to the 
different types of assistance, or which agencies 
will be responsible for their implementation, 
the document does specify four key measures 
aimed at reducing the negative outcomes of 
the restructuring: career counselling and 
retraining for laid-off workers; the facilitation 
of early retirement for eligible individuals; 
information sharing across regions to facilitate 
the movement of workers to areas where they 
are needed; and support for laid-off workers 
who wish to engage in self-employment 
through entrepreneurial pursuits. 
The government’s strategy, therefore, can 
be seen as having two distinct objectives. 
The first seeks to streamline the current 
system of government employment through 
redistribution and retirement. The second 
is aimed at redefining what constitutes 
‘normal’ employment in China through a re-
orientation towards entrepreneurship and 
self-employment. The guidelines state that 
this second objective will be achieved through 
tax relief for new enterprises, and subsidised 
loans for the laid-off workers who initiate 
them. This column critically examines some 
of the implications that arise from replacing 
large-scale wage employment with credit to 
promote entrepreneurial activity. In particular, 
it shows that the promotion of micro-
Nicholas Loubere
In early 2016, the Chinese government 
announced that state-owned steel and coal 
companies would be restructured, resulting in 
the loss of 1.8 to six million jobs. In April, seven 
government agencies jointly release a set of 
guidelines outlining a strategy for mitigating 
the fallout from this latest round of mass 
layoffs. One of the key elements of this strategy 
is the encouragement of entrepreneurial activity 
through tax relief and subsidised ‘microcredit’ 
for laid-off workers. Does the promotion of 
entrepreneurship and self-employment have 
the potential to meet the needs of the newly 
unemployed? Or is this strategy actually 
part of a wider ideological project aimed at 
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entrepreneurship as a ‘solution’ for mass 
layoffs shifts responsibility for livelihoods and 
welfare from the state to marginal individuals 
and groups, while, at the same time, reducing 
the capacity for collective action by organised 
labour (Bateman 2010). The column also 
questions—at a fundamental level—the ability 
of individual entrepreneurship to fill the 
gaping hole (in the economy and society) left 
by mass layoff events.
This is not the first time that targeted 
credit for micro-entrepreneurship has 
been identified as a means of dealing with 
socioeconomic problems in contemporary 
China. In the 1980s and 1990s, various 
government ministries established or 
supported microcredit programs targeting 
poverty and ‘underdevelopment’ in rural areas. 
In the wake of the large-scale restructuring 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the late 
1990s and early 2000s—which, according to 
some estimates, resulted in twenty-five to 
forty million workers being made redundant 
(Hurst 2009)—the government established the 
‘Employment Microcredit Program’ (xiagang 
shiye zaijiuye xiao’e danbao daikuan) in urban 
areas most affected by the retrenchment. 
The program provides small loans at zero 
percent interest in an effort to allow the 
newly unemployed to unleash their ‘natural’ 
entrepreneurial abilities and spark ‘bottom 
up’ employment opportunities (People’s Bank 
of China 2002).
After being piloted for a few years, 
the Chinese government considered the 
Employment Microcredit Program to be a 
policy success and it was scaled up nationwide. 
Initially, microcredit was only available in 
cities to those who could provide formal 
documentation proving their laid-off worker 
status. This formal documentation was not 
always forthcoming, however, as navigating 
the bureaucracy often took certain types 
of knowledge and connections, and many 
SOEs did not even establish re-employment 
centres. In 2006, the program was extended 
to rural areas, with the target group being 
expanded to include migrant workers laid off 
from urban enterprises who wished to return 
to their rural origins to start businesses. 
Currently, the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security administers the program. 
It recommends borrowers to local branches 
of state-owned banks and organises for the 
Ministry of Finance to pay the interest on 
the loans. In most localities loans of one 
hundred thousand yuan are provided to 
individuals for up to one year. Borrowers do 
not need collateral, but should instead have a 
‘trustworthy’ guarantor. 
The Employment Microcredit Program is 
conceived of as reducing the negative impacts 
of retrenchment by creating an alternative 
to large-scale wage employment. This 
fundamental reshaping of how livelihoods 
are produced is one of the ideological goals 
of the microcredit movement. In the words 
of Muhammad Yunus, the founder of the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the most 
prominent advocate of microcredit globally: 
‘One of the significant social impacts of the 
microcredit movement has been the realization 
that the key to alleviating poverty is often not 
the creation of ‘jobs’—that is, salaried work 
for large corporate employers—but rather 
the encouragement of self-employment for 
all individuals…’ (Yunus and Jolis 2001, 85). 
In other words, the microcredit movement 
considers self-employment as a valid (and 
even superior) alternative to large-scale wage 
employment, and sees entrepreneurship 
as being a universal human quality that, if 
nurtured, has the potential to allow individuals 
to provide for themselves.
An Entrepreneurial 
Solution
Shifting Responsibility for 
Livelihoods and Welfare
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Therefore, the promotion of microcredit 
as a response to layoffs should be understood 
as involving a transfer of responsibility for 
livelihoods and social welfare from the state 
to households and individuals. Indeed, for 
the majority of workers laid off in the 1990s 
and early 2000s, microcredit was offered 
as a replacement for the ‘iron rice bowl’ 
(tiefanwan)—i.e. stable life-long employment 
in a state ‘work unit’ (danwei) that included 
a salary and benefits. While most workers 
that will be affected by the impending 
retrenchment no longer enjoy ‘iron rice bowl’-
style employment, they will, nevertheless, 
be saddled with the burden of seeking out 
entrepreneurial ways of earning a sufficient 
income for survival (and repaying their loans). 
And failure to successfully take on these new 
responsibilities comes with dire consequences. 
This rewriting of the social contract is not 
only significant because it represents an 
individualisation of responsibility, but also—
and more crucially—because this responsibility 
is being devolved to individuals who are 
relatively marginal and lacking in resources, 
such as low-level SOE employees and migrant 
workers living from pay-check to pay-check. 
What does this rewriting of the social 
contract entail for labour relations in China? 
In addition to devolving responsibility 
from the state to individuals, the provision 
of microcredit in an attempt to foster 
entrepreneurship implicitly necessitates the 
fragmentation and atomisation of labour. 
While Ivan Franceschini’s chapter in this 
volume (see pp. 84–87) highlights the fact 
that many Chinese workers do not have a 
clear conception of what ‘collective rights’ 
or ‘collective action’ actually entail, the goal 
of microcredit to redefine ‘the household 
as a production unit and self employment 
as a natural way for people to make a living’ 
(Yunus and Jolis 2001, 54) effectively renders 
these concepts meaningless. The industrial 
proletariat—with all their collective ambitions 
and grievances—are replaced by marginal (and 
indebted) micro-entrepreneurs struggling in 
competition with each other for their very 
survival.
Ultimately, therefore, the provision of 
microcredit to laid-off workers is about 
more than simply unleashing pent-up 
entrepreneurial spirit and allowing people 
to provide for themselves. Rather, it is a 
key element in a wider project engaged in 
systemically transforming labour relations in 
China. After all, there is no solidarity between 
competing micro-entrepreneurs. Nor is any 
labour negotiation possible, as it is the intangible 
‘invisible hand’ of the market that determines 
working conditions and remuneration for the 
self-employed entrepreneur. In this way, the 
shift from large-scale wage employment to a 
society of atomised micro-entrepreneurs is 
part of a strategy to deal with the spectre of 
organised labour unrest, which is one of the 
Chinese government’s major preoccupations 
(see the chapter by Ivan Franceschini on pp. 
46–49 in the present book).
There are also other critical questions 
that need to be raised with regard to 
the fundamental ability of individual 
entrepreneurship (financed through 
microcredit) to fill the employment gap left by 
industrial retrenchment. For one, this strategy 
neglects the fact that, even in the best of cases, 
many entrepreneurial endeavours fail. In the 
case of the most recent round of layoffs, most 
of the newly unemployed micro-entrepreneurs 
will be from just two industries: steel and coal. 
Moreover, if past rounds of retrenchment are 
any indication, they will be comparatively less 
educated/skilled, approaching middle age, 
and predominantly female with a substantially 
higher load of family responsibilities. They 
Labour Relations in a 
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will, therefore, primarily have the same skill 
sets and will probably engage in the same 
types of entrepreneurial activity. This suggests 
a sudden influx of certain kinds of business 
in a highly competitive and unforgiving 
market—i.e. a ‘race to the bottom’ undertaken 
by a new, and increasingly desperate, ‘micro-
entrepreneurial class’ composed of the newly 
unemployed. While some will undoubtedly be 
successful, many others will fail and, as such, 
will be pushed further to the margins as they 
default on their debt and have no access to the 
livelihood resources previously provided by 
their employers.
It is also important to point out an implicit 
paradox in how microcredit is envisaged as 
assisting the unemployed. On the one hand, 
microcredit programs are conceived of as 
promoting a type of ‘grassroots’ or ‘bottom-up’ 
development that is separate and autonomous 
from the wider structural contradictions in 
the economy that produced the unemployment 
in the first place. However, in order to 
achieve this development, the would-be 
entrepreneurial beneficiaries of microcredit 
must become incorporated into the ‘modern’ 
socioeconomic system through integration 
into the market where they will sell their wares 
or services. In other words, there is really no 
escape from the socioeconomic processes that 
put these microcredit borrowers out of work. 
Their entrepreneurial pursuits do not exist in 
some alternate dimension; instead, they are 
intricately linked to the dominant market-
oriented system operating in contemporary 
China that has created the conditions 
requiring mass layoffs. For example, in one of 
the townships were I conducted fieldwork the 
local economy appeared to be thriving, with 
122 small and medium businesses operating 
in the township centre. However, over 
thirty-one percent of these businesses were 
directly related to the housing construction 
industry, which relies on the sustained flow 
of remittances from migrant workers in urban 
areas back to the township to build new 
houses for their ‘left-behind’ family members. 
In short, this was no ‘grassroots’ economy, but 
was instead an economy fully dependent on 
the system of domestic migrant work—often 
through employment in the large urban SOEs 
now engaged in mass layoffs—for its continued 
existence.
Ultimately, the issues raised in this short 
piece suggest that microcredit and the 
promotion of entrepreneurship for laid-
off workers should be seen as an ideological 
re-orientation, rather than a ‘solution’ to 
the social and economic problems resulting 
from a sudden increase in unemployment. 
Restructuring SOEs and encouraging laid-off 
workers to become entrepreneurs through 
the provision of subsidised credit shifts 
responsibility for livelihoods and welfare 
from the employer (in this case the state) 
to the individual, while fragmenting labour 
relations and collective identity. Microcredit 
is also an objectively flawed response 
to retrenchment, as it is not possible for 
individual entrepreneurship to sufficiently 
meet the need for employment created by 
the mass layoffs. Instead, microcredit for 
entrepreneurship is a smokescreen that serves 
to temporarily obscure the fact that China 
is (and has been) undergoing a sustained 
social, cultural, and economic transformation 
that is fundamentally rewriting the social 
contract in order to devolve responsibility to 
the individual, while simultaneously eroding 
the possibility for individuals to contest 
these developments through solidarity and 
collective action.  
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Social welfare in China has emerged 
as a major cause of migrant workers’ 
discontent. Reforms of the social 
welfare system in China since 2002 have 
expanded coverage and protection of 
vulnerable populations, but structural 
problems remain for migrant workers 
to access and receive the full benefits of 
the social safety net. How has the social 
welfare system evolved, and what are the 
challenges facing migrant workers? How 
can the system be made more sustainable?
Migrant Labour and 
the Sustainability 
of China’s Welfare 
System
Beatriz Carrillo
Social welfare in China has emerged in 
recent years as a major cause of migrant 
workers’ discontent and collective action. 
Reforms of the social welfare system in 
China since 2002 have expanded coverage 
and protection of vulnerable populations, 
but structural problems remain for migrant 
workers to access and receive the full benefits 
of the social safety net. How has the social 
welfare system evolved, and what are the 
challenges facing migrant workers? How can 
the system be made more sustainable?
Social welfare—understood broadly 
as encompassing public services, social 
insurance, and social relief—has long 
been primarily the privilege of the urban 
population. From the inception of the People’s 
Republic in 1949, urban citizenship—defined 
by people’s household registration (hukou) 
status—provided urban residents with access 
to employment, housing, education, and 
social insurance not available to rural hukou 
holders. China’s rural-urban divide has, thus, 
in many ways been defined by this gap in 
welfare provision. 
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The traditional ‘iron rice bowl’ (tiefanwan) 
system, based on work units (danwei), 
provided urban workers with ‘cradle to 
grave’ employment, services, and security, 
but—perhaps more importantly—it also 
gave these workers an identity and a sense 
of entitlement. This perception of having a 
right to state provisions was not developed 
among China’s vast rural population, since 
they received very limited or no state funding 
for welfare provision. With the start of the 
reform era, workers’ identity and sense of 
entitlement had implications for the demands 
for provision they made on the state, but 
also with regard to whose benefits the state 
decides to maintain or cut. 
By the late 1990s, for example, China’s 
previously privileged old working class was 
laid-off in the millions from state-owned 
enterprises—the majority left without 
welfare benefits (see also the chapter by 
Kevin Lin on pp. 20–23 in the present book). 
In the meantime, up until 2015, civil servants 
had largely retained their superior social 
insurance benefits, funded in their entirety 
by the state. In contrast, having had limited 
or no experience of state support, most rural-
to-urban migrant workers had not had a sense 
of entitlement to urban goods and welfare, 
not least because in most cases their rural 
hukou continues to deny them membership 
in the cities. And yet, among the second 
generation of rural migrants—born after 1980 
and with weaker links to the countryside—
that has begun to change (Pun and Lu 2010). 
These workers are demanding better pay and 
working conditions. Their reaction to, and 
demand for, social insurance entitlements, 
however, has been less enthusiastic. This is in 
part due to the shortcomings and limitations 
of the social insurance system itself.  
 
China’s social insurance system is highly 
fragmented. While hukou differentiation 
may be the more obvious element of that 
fragmentation, other factors related to the 
way in which these insurance programmes 
are funded, managed, and implemented have 
perhaps had more serious implications for 
A Fragmented System
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their provision. Like economic policy, social 
policy implementation in China is highly 
decentralised, and thus dependent upon 
local state capacity, particularly financial 
well-being. The more developed and wealthy 
provinces of the east coast have thus been 
better able to meet policy mandates from the 
central government around the delivery of 
public goods, social insurance, and welfare 
benefits, and have often even surpassed the 
level of benefits established by the centre. 
In contrast, having no revenue to match 
their welfare responsibilities, many local 
governments in the central and western parts 
of China offer, at best, very patchy provision. A 
longitudinal study on the social determinants 
of health, for example, found region (where 
a person lives) to have the strongest effect 
on an individual’s health status (gender 
and age being the other two most important 
determinants) (Baeten et al. 2012). 
This decentralisation, including the fact 
that funds for social insurance are pooled 
locally, has meant that funds accrued in 
individual worker accounts have not been 
transferable between jurisdictions. This 
lack of transferability is one of the biggest 
disincentives for migrant workers to enrol 
into the social security system, even when 
special insurance programmes for migrant 
workers have been created, as has been the 
case in Shenzhen and in other cities (Mou et 
al. 2009; Watson 2009). Furthermore, these 
social insurance programmes for migrants 
usually provide lower benefits than those 
covering formal urban employees, and there 
have been various well-publicised cases of 
employers not paying their contributions 
into those schemes (China Labour Bulletin 
2016). Rural migrant workers are thus—
understandably—reluctant to join a system 
that will result in less cash-in-hand and 
limited benefits only available in situ. 
In order to allow for the transferability 
of funds accumulated in individual workers’ 
social insurance accounts, since 2008 the 
central government has promoted the 
‘harmonisation’ of rural and urban social 
insurance programmes, with the aim of 
creating a unified national social security 
system (Cai 2011; Shi 2012). In practice, 
however, this rural-urban harmonisation 
has thus far tended to result in local welfare 
protectionism, whereby the more prosperous 
provinces are unwilling to share their larger 
fund pools with workers from outside 
their jurisdiction. Chongqing’s municipal 
government, for example, has successfully 
unified its rural and urban social insurance 
programmes for those with a local hukou, but 
those from outside the municipality remain 
left out (Shi 2012). Given that rural migrant 
workers are now more likely to be working 
outside their home province, in the short to 
medium term the rural-urban harmonisation 
process is likely to only benefit a minority of 
migrant workers. 
The policy and rhetoric coming from the 
centre, however, has continued to promote 
the inclusion of rural migrant workers into 
the urban social security system, as evidenced 
by the latest iteration of the Social Insurance 
Law, passed in 2011, which made the 
enrolment of migrant workers into the urban 
social insurance programmes compulsory. 
Local governments have nonetheless not 
been too keen to police the implementation of 
this law, for fear of upsetting local businesses 
and industry. Employers in China have 
indeed faced some of the highest employee 
insurance contribution rates in the world, 
with rates of up to forty percent of employees’ 
wages (KPMG 2016). In some provinces and 
municipalities, contributions into the old age 
social insurance alone have stood at more 
than twenty percent of the payroll (CCTV 
2016). This serves to explain the prevalence 
Attempts at Harmonisation
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of casual and informal employment without 
benefits, in which the majority of rural 
migrant workers are involved.  
China’s economic slowdown is likely to 
result in yet fewer employers willing to enrol 
migrant workers into the social insurance 
schemes mandated by law. In response to 
this, earlier this year the central government 
reduced employer contribution rates for 
pension and unemployment insurance, and 
for the housing provident fund (Ministry 
of Finance 2016). Nevertheless, the central 
government is likely to continue to put 
pressure on sub-national governments to 
enrol rural migrant workers into the social 
insurance system, because it now realises that 
the financial sustainability of the system will 
depend on bringing in more contributions 
from the working-age population. As a 
cohort, rural migrant workers are, on average, 
younger than their urban counterparts; 
these younger worker’s social insurance 
contributions are hence necessary to sustain 
the needs of China’s ageing population and 
the sustainability of the pension system 
(Frazier and Li 2017). 
The first generation of rural migrant 
workers is also ageing and has begun to 
demand access to medical insurance and to 
a pension. More generally, the needs and 
demands of rural migrant workers for public 
services and social security are also changing. 
For example, the number of migrants 
travelling with their families has increased 
substantially over the last couple of decades 
(Wen and Hanley 2016). These migrant 
families have different housing needs, their 
children need access to local child care 
facilities and schools, play areas, medical 
services, and so on.  
While workers’ movements, strikes, and 
demonstrations have, in several instances, 
won rural migrantst workers better working 
conditions and pay, the expansion of social 
insurance and welfare programmes has 
largely been a top-down affair. More recent 
demands by migrant workers over social 
insurance payments, such as in the case of the 
2014 strike at Yue Yuen—a shoe manufacturer 
and Adidas and Nike supplier—have also 
served to influence the government’s decision 
to expand rural migrant workers’ social 
insurance rights (Schmalz et al. 2016).  
Again, the concern over a reduced worker/
pensioner ratio and the burden that this 
will place on China’s social security system 
is likely to maintain the commitment of 
the centre to expand coverage to include 
rural migrant workers. Some provincial 
governments, as stated earlier, are likely to 
continue to delay that process. Apart from 
financial considerations, Mark Frazier has 
also argued that it would be unwise for the 
Chinese government to retreat from the 
politics of inclusion and access to social 
policies introduced as part of Hu Jintao’s 
campaign to build a ‘Harmonious Society’ 
(hexie shehui) and continued under Xi 
Jinping’s ‘Chinese Dream’ (zhongguo meng) 
(Frazier 2014). Rather, what economic 
slowdown might bring about is a reduction 
in the level of benefits that employees 
receive, as signalled by the recent cutback to 
mandated employer contributions into social 
insurance programmes (Ministry of Finance 
2016). Universal coverage may well soon be 
achieved, but at a very basic level of coverage. 
Whether this will constitute a real safety net 
for all remains to be seen. 
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The struggle and activism of Chinese 
workers has been a topic of primary interest 
since the beginning of the reform era. Still, 
expectations have never been higher than in 
the past few years, with an unending stream 
of media articles and academic papers 
hailing the new-found rights awareness of 
Chinese workers—especially the so-called 
second generation of migrant workers—as a 
critical development with the potential to 
disrupt the very foundations of the Chinese 
industrial and political system. This 
narrative describes a boom in strikes, sees 
social media as a revolutionary mobilisation 
tool, and portrays younger workers as eager 
to fight for their rights. Amid the euphoria, 
is such optimism warranted?
In fact, significant literature in both 
Chinese and English has argued that 
the discontinuity between the old and 
new generation of migrant workers has 
been exaggerated. However, these voices 
have been subsumed under the catchier 
narrative. In a recent article, Ching Kwan 
Lee has critiqued the work of fellow labour 
scholars for adopting an excessively 
optimistic view of labour activism in China 
(Lee 2016). In particular, Lee has identified 
and challenged four claims advanced 
by the supporters of what she calls the 
‘empowerment thesis’: the idea that 
Chinese workers are increasingly active and 
motivated to mobilise; the assertion that the 
new generation of migrant workers is more 
class and rights conscious than the first; 
the alleged maturation and radicalisation 
of labour activism, with workers’ demands 
changing from defensive to offensive; and 
the claim that consistent increases in wages 
in China should be considered as evidence of 
workers’ effectiveness and empowerment.
Arguing that such claims have scarce 
factual basis and that they overlook 
structures of inequality and power 
imbalances that lead to precarity, she 
launched an appeal to her peers: ‘In this 
day and age of global precarisation, it 
has become ever more important that 
labour scholars, of China or elsewhere, 
resist the temptation of subjectivism and 
voluntarism, and recall Gramsci’s famous 
motto: pessimism of the intellect and 
optimism of the will’. Heeding this advice—
and in order to gain a better understanding 
of precarity and its effects on the Chinese 
workforce—we have invited three labour 
scholars who have researched precarious 
labour in its various manifestations in 
the Chinese labour market to offer some 
insights based on their experience in the 
field.
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What form has precarity and informal 
labour taken in the industries that you have 
researched, and what effects has it produced 
in the labour force? 
Kaxton Siu: Over the past decade, I have been 
researching Chinese workers in toy, garments, 
electronics, and sanitary industries. Some 
of them work inside factories, while others, 
like street cleaners, work out in the open. 
The forms of precarity and informality, as 
well as their impact, differ from one industry 
to another. For workers in factories, major 
forms of precarity are still in the domain of 
working conditions, such as excessively long 
working hours, unpaid overtime, low wages, 
wage arrears, and occupational hazards. As 
for workers in the service industry such as 
street cleaners, most of them do not have 
stable jobs. Many of them just engage in 
irregular casual work, become part-timers, 
do not have regular working schedules, and 
receive very low wages, etc.  
Sarah Swider: My research has mostly 
focussed on the construction industry, which is 
characterised by a bifurcated workforce. Most 
professional, managerial, and administrative 
jobs are full-time, stable, include benefits, 
and are filled by urban workers. In contrast, 
field positions, which are on jobsites, are 
mostly informal jobs filled by peasant workers 
from the rural areas who face precarity in 
their work and lives in the cities. They work 
under several different kinds of employment 
configurations, which shapes their precarity 
and vulnerabilities. I have documented 
three prominent employment configurations 
in this industry: mediated, embedded, and 
individualised. Many peasant-workers toil 
under mediated employment, named this 
way because their employment relationship 
is mediated by middlemen; usually large 
contractors who bring them into the city, 
house them, feed them, and pay them only 
at the end of year-long (informal) contracts. 
Others work in embedded employment, using 
social networks to find work, which embeds 
their work into these social networks, and in 
turn regulates the employment relationship. 
Finally, some workers toil in individualised 
employment. These jobs are found through 
street markets, and employment relations are 
highly despotic as unrestrained employers 
use violence, or the threat of violence, to deal 
with workers. These varied arrangements 
of precarious and informal work capture 
the increased fragmentation that makes it 
difficult to build solidarity. However, as 
informal workers, they tend to engage in 
struggles for recognition as workers and/or 
as citizens rather than struggles for increases 
in wages, benefits, and traditional worker/
union demands. In general, formal precarious 
workers engage in struggles to increase 
wages; informal precarious workers engage in 
struggles to get paid at all. Formal precarious 
workers struggle for better benefits and 
representation; informal workers must 
struggle to be recognised as workers, and 
therefore, to be deserving of benefits.
Anita Chan: Many scholars have focussed 
their attention on industrial relations in 
the labour-intensive export sector in South 
China, but there have been few studies of 
capital-intensive industries such as the 
automotive industry. Back in 2011, I carried 
out a questionnaire survey with several 
hundred workers from five auto-assembly 
plants—note, not auto-supplier plants—all 
joint ventures with German, American, and 
Japanese partners. To my surprise, I found 
that the disparity between regular workers 
and agency workers is not big; in fact, it is 
remarkably small. For instance, not only the 
difference in length of contracts between the 
two groups tended to be small, but also the 
gap in their take-home wage was relatively 
little, with agency workers receiving on 
average 80.8 percent of the salary of their 
regular peers. The gap was further mitigated 
through annual bonuses. There was also no 
significant difference in work hours—both 
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categories worked around nine and a half 
hours a day—and, even more importantly, all 
of them maintained almost the same neutral 
to positive attitudes towards management. 
The only significant difference concerned 
union membership: while sixty-eight percent 
of the regular workers were members of 
the company union, only 28.4 percent of 
the agency workers declared themselves as 
being union members. The reason behind 
this is that, from a managerial perspective, 
satisfying workers’ material needs and 
keeping a stable and motivated workforce are 
of paramount importance in this industry. For 
this reason, agency workers have to be made 
to feel that they are having a fair if not equal 
deal compared to regular workers. And, let’s 
be honest, companies can easily afford this! 
Alongside reports of precarious labour 
conditions, in the past decade a notable 
shift in the narrative of Chinese labour has 
occurred. While in the past Chinese workers 
were often described as being ‘under 
assault’ by their employers and the forces of 
globalisation, now there is much emphasis 
on their so-called ‘rights awakening’, 
especially among the youngest generation 
of migrants. Looking at the sectors you 
research from a long-term perspective, do 
you think that workers’ consciousness has 
changed significantly? And, does workers’ 
consciousness and agency play a measurable 
role in shaping their labour conditions 
today?
Kaxton Siu: In recent years, much research 
has been done on the collective actions 
of Chinese workers and the impact of 
such mobilisations on workplace labour 
conditions, as well as on the responses of the 
Chinese state (for instance, experiments of 
types of collective consultation). However, 
from a long-term perspective, it seems that 
the discourses about the younger generation 
of migrant workers and Chinese workers’ 
‘rights awakening’ have been overstated. 
On the one hand, it has been seen that the 
sudden rise of Chinese workers, witnessed 
for instance during the famous Honda strike 
of the summer of 2010, could not be sustained 
and turned into a significant political 
force influencing the labour policy of the 
Chinese government. On the other, various 
initiatives of the Chinese state, such as 
various ‘collective consultation’ experiments 
in different localities, diverged in their 
outcomes. Particularly, in some industries—
such as the sanitary industry—where workers 
are more informal and precarious in terms 
of their working conditions and workplace 
bargaining power vis-à-vis employers, these 
official initiatives still cannot improve 
the livelihoods of vulnerable workers. 
As for workers’ consciousness, despite 
what I mentioned above, from a long-term 
perspective, we indeed have witnessed some 
development of working-class consciousness 
among Chinese workers over the past 
twenty years. As many studies and factory 
ethnographies have documented, in the early 
1990s, not only did Chinese migrant workers 
lack any sense of class consciousness; they 
also had a very fatalistic outlook. Their 
migrant worker identity, especially for 
young female migrant workers (dagongmei), 
was primarily constructed as an outcome of 
particular socio-economic and institutional 
structures, namely: the Chinese household 
registration system, the Chinese patriarchal 
structure, and the managerial domination 
by foreign capital inside factory workplaces. 
However, since the mid 2000s, we have 
seen some strike cases that demonstrate 
significant development in workers’ 
consciousness. Not only have workers started 
to demand wages above the legal minimum, 
but workers have also started to organise 
themselves with fighting spirit and solidarity 
in the face of massive police suppression 
and violence. That being said, the majority 
of present-day Chinese migrant workers are 
still waging isolated uncoordinated rights-
based protests and strikes. Only a few have 
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gone beyond rights-based demands to an 
interest-based level in requesting more than 
what is stipulated in current Chinese labour 
law. Only very few Chinese migrant workers 
are conscious enough to ask for setting up 
or re-electing workplace trade unions, or to 
organise strikes beyond individual factories 
at regional and country-wide levels.
Sarah Swider: This narrative of Chinese 
labour has been largely based on the experience 
of manufacturing workers. The number of 
factory workers who are still working under 
secure ‘iron-rice bowl’ conditions established 
under state socialism is dwindling. At the 
same time, there is an increasing number of 
peasants that have left the fields, but kept 
their land, and entered the factory to become 
‘peasant-workers’. These two groups have 
very different social positions within society, 
different relationships to land and capital, 
and both are changing. As such, for each group 
a different worker consciousness emerges 
under marketisation. This is coupled with a 
generational shift characterised by younger 
workers who only have experience with 
state-led capitalism. However, construction 
workers are quite different. The construction 
industry has always relied heavily on peasant 
workers. These peasants were disadvantaged 
under the state-socialist system of the past, 
excluded from partaking in the ‘iron rice 
bowl’. Today, under marketisation, they play 
an important role in urbanisation, but they 
are still disadvantaged, excluded from the 
benefits of urbanity and modernity. In other 
words, there has been no shift in their social 
position or their relations to land and capital. 
However, their changing environment does 
have an affect on them, and this is leading to 
a shift in worker subjectivity. Despite their 
continued connection to the land, many of 
these migrants are now spending most of 
their lives in the cities, which in many cases 
exposes them to other workers and protests. 
Thus, the paths that they imagine are possible, 
the number of potential avenues of protest, 
and the targets and the goals of the protests 
have grown and changed over time. Protests 
among construction workers, especially 
those focussed on wage arrears, are likely to 
be ‘public drama protests’ in which workers 
use drama to gain attention from the public, 
local and state officials, and other employers 
in the contracting chain to apply pressure so 
that they get their wages paid (Chun 2005). 
These protests are usually collective actions, 
they are dramatic and creative so as to draw 
attention, and while they may publicly blame 
the contractors, they often indirectly target 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or the 
companies further up the contracting chain, 
depending on the money flows. These protests 
are often successful because: a) they are 
sporadic so the government cannot predict or 
prevent these actions; b) they gain attention 
from the public and media that increases the 
costs of squashing the protests; and c) they 
garner symbolic power rather than power 
from disruption, which is more likely to gain 
support from different groups.
Anita Chan: Some scholars believe that agency 
workers and student interns in the automotive 
industry in China are second-class industrial 
citizens who harbour deep grievances due 
to this discrimination. In their opinion, this 
engenders labour activism. Personally, I 
think that this is an overstatement. Through 
my research, I found that the treatment these 
agency workers receive and their attitudes 
and aspirations are not decidedly different 
from regular workers, and certainly do 
not provoke a sense of injustice and anger. 
After all, for a whole decade since the mid-
2000s there has been no big protest in 
China’s auto assembly plants. My survey 
points to an overwhelming unwillingness 
to seek collective representation, less still 
to take militant action. For instance, when 
I asked the workers how would they solve a 
grievance, 44.9 percent of agency workers 
and 49.2 percent of regular workers said that 
they would go to their supervisor; 24.7 of 
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agency workers and 21.3 percent of regular 
workers said that they would not ask anyone; 
and 13.6 of agency workers and 13.3 percent 
of regular workers said that they would 
just look for another job. Only 4.4 percent 
expressed a choice that entailed publicising 
their grievances beyond the workplace and 
soliciting external help, with as little as 0.4 
percent of the respondents willing to go on 
strike. On the contrary, I found that both 
groups of workers were quite responsive to 
the paternalism of the company, with seventy 
percent of the agency workers and a slightly 
higher percentage of regular workers feeling 
let down if they did not receive festive gifts 
or money through the union or management. 
We also have to take into account the fact 
that compensation in the automotive industry 
is relatively high—in the companies in my 
survey the average basic wage was about 
double the local legal minimum wage and 
the take-home pay for both types of workers 
ranged from two to four times that of the 
local minimum wage. 
Since the early 1990s the Chinese authorities 
have been adopting an increasingly complex 
body of labour laws and regulations, much 
of it quite favourable to workers. Is this turn 
to the law a sign of a genuine commitment 
by the authorities to protect worker rights 
against precarity? Have the Chinese labour 
laws limited or fostered precarisation?
Kaxton Siu: The 1994 Labour Law was the 
first comprehensive labour legislation passed 
in China since the founding of the People’s 
Republic. The passage of the law stirred up a 
debate among government bureaucracies. At 
that time, the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU) fought to ensure that the 
spirit of the law was advantageous to workers. 
However, the law did induce a change in 
workers’ awareness, and migrant workers in 
the Guangdong region gradually began to use 
the law as an instrument to ‘protect rights’ 
(weiquan). Note that these rights refer to legal 
rights and not to inalienable human rights. 
The social discourse on ‘rights protection’ 
entails acceptance of prevailing laws as 
the standard by which work conditions and 
wages should be set. With the passage of the 
1994 Labour Law, many Hong Kong labour 
NGOs, usually staffed by a few people, began 
setting up offices across the border, mostly 
in Shenzhen. These organisations played a 
significant role in popularising the idea of 
‘rights protection’ among Chinese migrant 
workers in the area. Their programme 
focused on raising awareness among migrant 
workers of the details of the Labour Law and 
other regulations related to workplace health 
and safety. They taught migrant workers 
how to read their pay slips and pointed out 
where the payment and work hours fell 
short of legal requirements. They helped 
injured workers to seek compensation, which 
requires an expert understanding of how 
to assess grades of injuries and litigation 
procedures. Their persistence paid off within 
the space of a decade. Most migrant workers 
today in this part of China know about the 
legal maximum overtime, about the region’s 
official minimum wage, and about industrial 
injuries compensation. Taking bosses to court 
for underpaying, going to the authorities to 
lodge legal claims for back pay, and suing 
for compensation for workplace accidents 
have become commonplace. Litigation is a 
legitimate form of protest. From a historical 
perspective, the passage of various labour 
regulations by the Chinese government 
has had positive impacts in protecting 
workers against further precarisation. 
However, we should note that the 1994 
Labour Law was passed not because workers 
had been collectively making demands on 
the government, but because there was a 
consensus within the political elite that social 
stability had to be maintained by having a law 
to regulate industrial relations.
Sarah Swider: The law is contradictory in 
nature. In the process of defining ‘workers’, it 
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leaves many out of the category (Huang 2013); 
in the process of carving out protections, it 
creates unprotected activities and spaces 
(Xu 2008-2009); in defining some actions 
and activities as legal, it makes others illegal 
(Portes et al. 1989). Furthermore, the law is 
often intentionally ambiguous, leaving it to 
local and national leaders to interpret. Finally, 
laws and interpretations are only as good as 
the enforcement (Gallagher et al. 2015), which 
requires a different set of institutions and 
resources than those required to make laws 
(Gallagher and Dong 2011). Thus, laws are not 
an adequate tool for limiting precarisation 
or limiting worker vulnerability, and this 
holds true across different national contexts. 
However, the multitude of complex labour 
laws that have been instituted in China still 
matters for workers. In some instances, the 
laws have become another tool in a worker’s 
arsenal to deal with industrial conflict, and 
in other cases, the laws hold symbolic power, 
sending a message to local-level government 
and international capital to pull back on 
exploitation (Lee 2002). In sum, laws make a 
difference but sometimes in unexpected and/
or complex ways. 
Anita Chan: There is indeed a problem of 
implementation, as the law has substantially 
failed to control the growing number of 
agency workers and abusive work practices. 
While not all auto assembly plants use agency 
workers—for instance BYD and Hyundai 
in Beijing do not—the five joint ventures in 
my sample do, even for up to half of their 
workforce. But the length of contracts of 
the two types of workers are both short. 
The average length of contracts for regular 
workers was about three years, whereas 
for agency workers it was about two years. 
There is a chance for agency workers to 
become regular workers, and regular workers 
having signed two short contracts can get a 
permanent contract, but this is quite rare. In 
this sense, even regular workers’ employment 
is quite precarious. They are aware that in 
times of recession, they may be laid off as 
well. If we consider that these companies are 
all joint ventures in which one of the partners 
is an SOE at the provincial or city-level, it may 
appear paradoxical. But in reality the SOEs 
are the ones that employ the largest number of 
agency workers. There is a historical legacy to 
this. In the late 1990s, when millions of state 
workers were laid off, SOEs were required to 
set up employment agencies to find work for 
the laid-off workers. When it was discovered 
that agency workers can serve as buffers to 
the vagaries of the market, they were used in 
a big way, and they still are. 
What is your assessment of the field of 
Chinese labour studies today, in China as 
well as abroad? In your opinion, is there any 
empirical and/or analytical gap that still 
needs to be filled and what should be done to 
address it?
Kaxton Siu: Due to the rise of China as a 
global powerhouse over the past twenty 
years, there is a great wealth of research 
about Chinese labour today. However, there 
is a tendency to consider the development of 
China and the making and remaking of the 
Chinese working class over the past decades 
as unique and exceptional. But is the Chinese 
experience really that exceptional? To answer 
this question, we should compare China to 
other similar socialist countries, such as 
Vietnam. Unfortunately, not much research 
has been done to compare labour conditions, 
industrial actions, trade union reforms, as 
well as modes, sequencing, and trajectories 
of economic reform in China and these 
countries. Another empirical gap is related to 
the recent household registration reform and 
the parallel change in the urbanisation process 
happening in China. Since the mid-2000s, 
a growing number of migrant workers have 
moved with their spouses and children from 
the countryside to industrial cities. In 2014, 
this phenomenal shift in migration patterns 
has led the Chinese government to reform 
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their household registration systems. Now, 
thanks to the reform, it is said that it is easier 
for migrant workers to stay in the urban areas 
where they work. There, they are encountering 
new modes of housing arrangements, new 
forms of community relations, integration 
into new social networks in cities, and new 
household organisation strategies. Exactly 
how this process of integration happens and 
how the mobility of the families of migrant 
workers affects workers’ outlooks on their 
working and family lives are worthwhile 
topics for further research. Yet these major 
shifts have barely been studied, nor has there 
been research done on how the new surge in 
married migrant couples with children affects 
labour relations inside the factories. 
Sarah Swider: In China, some of the most 
interesting labour questions are about 
the relationship between labour politics 
and regime stability, especially given the 
significant rise in labour protests in the last 
few decades (Chan et al. 2010). Authoritarian 
regimes are generally believed to be unable 
to tolerate political mobilisation and 
protest (Tilly 2001), but China’s variant 
of authoritarianism has encouraged, and 
sometimes stimulated and directed it. Some 
studies suggest that China’s regime longevity 
has been because of, not despite, social 
protests, as it contributes to legitimacy, 
creates a carefully managed outlet for 
anger, and shapes and exploits cleavages 
among groups (Perry 2007; Tang 2016). This 
compels us to ask, under what conditions is 
this less likely to happen? What segments of 
labour are more difficult to control or more 
likely to push the boundaries? What issues or 
subjectivities are more likely to allow groups 
to overcome cleavages and fragmentation, 
and what forms of organising and protest are 
less likely to be controlled/co-opted? More 
generally, the rise of precarious work and 
the persistence of informal work across the 
globe means that most of the world’s workers 
are beyond the formal economy and outside 
of state welfare and protections. We need a 
new paradigm to understand this reality and 
it will require us to rethink the relationships 
between the state and the economy, between 
production and redistribution, and between 
the productive and reproductive spheres; all 
of which might prove to be fertile ground for 
reimagining work, labour politics, and the 
future(s) of workers. 
Anita Chan: In the past couple of decades, 
Chinese labour studies outside China have 
expanded rapidly, from only a handful of 
scholars working on the issue to a few dozen. 
However, there is an over-concentration 
on the study of migrant labour, with an 
overwhelming focus on Guangdong province. 
This imbalance has led to an excessive 
emphasis on labour resistance because a 
disproportionately large percentage of labour 
protests have been taking place in the South. 
In my view, it is time that we begin to branch 
out to explore new areas, new sectors, and 
new locations where labour protests are 
not that prevalent. In the instances where 
we find that workers in different places are 
more compliant, then it would be our task to 
explain why. 
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Wukan villagers during clashes with the 
local police. PC: Foreign Policy
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He Xiaobo Released on 
Bail, Zeng Feiyang’s Mother 
Attempts to Sue Official Media
New Foreign NGOs Law Passed
PC: CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN
On 8 April, He Xiaobo, one of the labour activists taken 
into custody in early December 2015, was released 
on bail after being charged with embezzlement. A 
forty-two-year-old former migrant worker, He is 
the director of the Nanfeiyan Social Work Service 
Centre, an NGO based in Foshan, Guangdong, that 
specialises in providing legal aid to victims of work-
related accidents and occupational diseases. Another 
two labour activists, Zeng Feiyang and Meng Han, of 
the Panyu Migrant Workers Centre, an NGO based 
in Guangzhou, remained under detention with the 
charge of ‘disrupting social order’. In late December, 
Chinese state media publicly accused Zeng of having 
embezzled money from factory workers, having affairs 
with several female workers, and writing ‘vulgar’ 
messages to women online. His mother Chen Wenying 
later attempted to sue the official Xinhua News Agency 
and China Central Television, demanding one million 
yuan in compensation for defamation, but in April she 
dropped charges due to the unrelenting pressures she 
and her family had been subjected to in the wake of 
the lawsuit. 
(Sources: Guardian, Quartz, South China Morning 
Post, Xinhua)
On 28 April, the National People’s Congress, China’s 
legislative body, passed the long-awaited Law on 
the Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities within 
Mainland China. The new Law, which comes into 
effect on 1 January 2017, fills a grey area in the 
Chinese legal system, stipulating that any foreign 
group wishing to operate in China must register with 
the public security authorities. This means that the 
Ministry of Public Security and its local branches 
down to the county level will formally be in charge 
of supervising all activities of foreign NGOs in 
China. The passage of the Law signifies increasing 
restrictions on the activities of foreign NGOs (see 
also the Compendium on pp. 60–67 in the present 
book). Not only will they be barred from engaging in 
political or religious activities, or acting in a way that 
damages ‘China’s national interests’ or ‘ethnic unity’, 
but criminal measures can also be taken against 
individuals who are suspected of having engaged 
in activities that violate these broadly-worded 
principles. As most foreign NGOs operating in China 
do not have any official registration, no official data 
are available on their numbers. However, according to 
one estimate, more than seven thousand international 
organisations are active in the country today. In light 
of this widespread presence, the Chinese authorities 
have argued that such regulation is long overdue, 
with an op-ed published in the People’s Day on 4 May 
rhetorically asking: ‘If you do not violate the law, 
what are you afraid about?’ Still, critics maintain that 
the laws amount to a crackdown. 
(Sources: BBC, China Law Translate, Guardian, 
People’s Daily)
(Left) Labour activist He 
Xiaobo. (Right) Policemen 
patrolling a street in China.
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Henan Local Regulations Forbid 
Workers from Resorting to Extreme 
Measures to Pursue Back Pay
Walmart Employees 
Campaigning against Flexible 
Scheduling
PC: XINHUA
On 22 April, the local authorities of Zhengzhou, 
Henan province, released a set of ‘Draft Regulations 
on the Construction Market’, giving the public 
one month to provide feedback. The Regulations, 
which aimed at ‘standardising the management of 
the construction market, protecting the order of 
the construction market, and guaranteeing the legal 
rights and interests of the actors involved’, attracted 
public backlash because in their initial formulation 
they included provisions calling for the punishment 
of those construction workers who adopted ‘extreme 
measures’ when fighting to claim unpaid wages. 
In particular, this early draft explicitly prohibited 
acts such as climbing on cranes or buildings and 
threatening to jump—relatively common occurrences 
in the construction industry in China—saying 
offenders would be handed over to the judicial 
system. It also banned workers from using force or 
money to convince others to join protests. A draft 
subsequently released for public comment in May no 
longer included such provisions. 
(Sources: Caixin English, Caixin Chinese, People’s 
Daily, Dahe.cn, Zhengzhou People’s Congress 
Website)
On 16 May, Walmart announced a new flexible 
scheduling system—the so-called ‘comprehensive 
working hour calculation system’—to be implemented 
across its retail stores in China, and asked its 
employees to sign a written declaration in which 
they agree to the new system. In contrast to the 
current standard eight-hour working day for full-
time workers, with the new system Walmart will be 
able to schedule any number of hours, as long as they 
add up to 174 hours per month. Not only would the 
new system reduce workers’ overtime payments, but 
it would also introduce an erratic work schedule. 
The Jinan Daily quoted a Walmart worker as saying: 
‘We are comfortable with the eight-hour working 
day. After switching to the new scheduling system, 
if management requests us to work twelve hours 
today and four hours tomorrow and if we sign the 
agreement, then we cannot refuse. This system will 
bring extreme uncertainty.’ Walmart has previously 
attempted to implement this scheduling system but 
failed due to the resistance of its employees. The 
current opposition against the new scheduling has 
been led by an unofficial Walmart Chinese Workers 
Association (WCWA) founded by several current and 
former Walmart workers in 2014. With the hope of 
securing the support of the All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU), on 28 May the WCWA sent 
an open letter to the ACFTU co-signed by more than 
eight hundred Walmart workers. On 14 June, the 
Guangdong branch of the ACFTU issued a statement 
in which, without naming Walmart, it reiterated that 
the use of the comprehensive work hour calculation 
system in the retail sector is inconsistent with the 
existing regulations, and any labour dispute caused by 
the implementation of such a system must be reported 
to the union for timely intervention. For further 
details, see Anita Chan’s chapter on pp. 50–55 in the 
present book.
(Sources: Jinan Daily, Sixth Tone, The Nation)
A Chinese construction worker.
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Social Media Archivists of 
Protests in China Detained
Mine Murders Uncovered in 
Mongolia
PC: TILL MOSLER PC: VOICE OF AMERICA
(Left) Miners pushing a cart of coal. (Right) 
Bloggers Li Tingyu and Lu Yuyu.
On 16 June, Lu Yuyu and his partner Li Tingyu, 
chroniclers of protests in China on their website 
Wickedonna, were detained in the southwestern city 
of Dali, Yunnan province, where they lived. They are 
accused of ‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’, 
a charge that is often used to silence activists in 
China. Since 2012, the couple has been gathering 
and posting text and images from Chinese social 
media, such as Weibo and Baidu Tieba, to document 
protests in China—providing what is arguably the 
most comprehensive daily updates of social upheavals 
across the country, including many labour protests. 
After dropping out of university, Lu became a migrant 
worker and in 2012, while in Shanghai, he had his 
first taste of political activism, publicly showing his 
support for five young people who were arrested in 
Guangzhou for holding up placards that called for 
president Hu Jintao to disclose his assets. At the 
time, Lu held up a similar poster in one of Shanghai’s 
busiest shopping districts, until the police intervened 
and expelled him from the city. Over the years, he 
continued to be harassed by state security for his 
activism and documentation work. His accounts on 
Chinese social media have been deleted more than one 
hundred times. In a profile published by The Week, Lu 
was quoted as saying: ‘As long as I am not in jail, I will 
continue to do it.’ Amnesty International has called 
for the couple’s immediate release.
(Sources: The New York Times, The Week, Amnesty 
International, Wickedonna)
On 31 May, prosecutors in Inner Mongolia announced 
the indictment of seventy-four  people for the killing 
of seventeen mine workers. The killings were for 
the purpose of faking mining accidents in order to 
blackmail mine owners running unlicensed operations 
into paying compensation. The compensation 
payments ranged from five to eight hundred thousand 
yuan. In a scheme that brings to mind the plot of the 
movie Blind Shaft, directed by Li Yang, these suspects 
lured victims from poor villages, and paid them a higher 
than average daily wage to work in the coalmines. The 
victims were then murdered within days. The actual 
number of victims is likely to be higher, as corpses 
were quickly cemented and disposed of. The killing 
of these seventeen people was discovered in January 
2015, when the police were investigating a mining 
accident and found that some of the victims were 
actually alive. Newspapers have reported on similar 
schemes in the past. For instance, in 2009 the police 
discovered that several people from a village in Leibo 
county, Sichuan province, were involved in buying or 
kidnapping people with severe mental problems only 
to sell them as slaves or to kill them in the mines in 
order to get compensation. 
(Sources: China News, Caijing, The New York Times)




In the past decade scholars have put forward 
several scathing criticisms of Chinese labour 
NGOs that go well beyond the usual concerns 
about the lack of transparency and internal 
democracy. Some have criticised them for 
being nothing less than ‘anti-solidarity 
machines’ that, by putting too much emphasis 
on an individualistic view of rights, hinder 
the development of a labour movement among 
Chinese migrant workers (Lee and Shen 2011); 
others have noted how these organisations 
are also working for the benefit of the party-
state, which they assist by minimising social 
conflict and orienting reforms in a way 
acceptable to the authorities (Froissart 2005). 
In a previous article, I myself joined the 
ranks of the critics, highlighting how Chinese 
labour NGOs suffer from a substantial lack of 
‘social capital’, due not only to their strained 
relations with the party-state, but also to the 
considerable difficulties they face in gaining 
the trust of the workers (Franceschini 2014). 
Although these criticisms could be deemed 
ungenerous given the difficulties that these 
NGOs face under the constraints of the 
Chinese political system, they were grounded 
in years of observation and participation in 
the daily operations of these organisations. 
Still, the time may be ripe for a reassessment 
of Chinese labour NGOs.
Ivan Franceschini
In the past decade, scholars have put forward 
several scathing criticisms of Chinese labour 
NGOs that go well beyond the usual concerns 
about the lack of transparency and internal 
democracy. Still, many things have changed 
in the past few years and now the time may 




Labour NGOs: Some 
Grounds for Hope?
Wu Guijun, a worker and NGO volunteer, was 
detained for over a year in 2013. PC: HKCTU
MADE IN CHINA - HAMMER TO FALL
Since their appearance in China in the mid-
1990s, in spite of their minimal size and lack 
of coordination, labour NGOs have always 
had to face the suspicions of the party-state. 
Already in 2009, an internal document by the 
Guangdong Politics and Law Committee of the 
Communist Party categorised labour NGOs as 
civic agents who intensify labour conflicts, 
carry out covert investigations of factories, 
and receive funding from overseas entities 
to intervene in the ‘contradictions among the 
people’ (renmin neibu maodun), endangering 
social stability, the security of the state, and 
even the international image of the country 
(China Labor News Translation 2010). More 
recently, in February 2015, Li Yufu, Vice-
President of the official union, stigmatised 
labour NGOs for their connections with 
foreign donors (Lin 2015). Noting that ‘the 
trends in the field of industrial relations 
are complex and intricate, and labour 
contradictions have already entered a phase 
of intensification and multiplication,’ he 
denounced the fact that ‘the interferences by 
hostile foreign forces are getting stronger, in 
the futile attempt to use industrial relations 
to break through.’ According to Li, these 
forces ‘resort to some illegal “weiquan” labour 
organisations and individuals to vie with the 
unions for workers, and so doing they break 
the solidarity of the working class and the 
unity of the unions.’
As Jude Howell has noted, what we have 
witnessed in recent years is a paradoxical 
development in which the party-state has 
pursued the ‘incorporation’ of some NGOs for 
welfaristic purposes, while simultaneously 
repressing others (Howell 2015). If the 
attempts at incorporating Chinese labour 
NGOs seem to have been a feature more of the 
latest years of the Hu and Wen administration 
than of the current leadership, repression has 
indeed intensified, reaching a climax last 
December. In the past few years, Chinese 
labour NGOs have been increasingly exposed 
to a wide array of threats and intimidations by 
the state security apparatus. This repression 
has taken many forms. Besides the usually 
non-confrontational praxis of inviting labour 
activists to ‘have a cup of tea’ (he cha), public 
and state security officers have often put 
pressure on landlords to repeatedly evict 
NGOs from their premises and have not 
refrained from liaising with other branches of 
the state (family planning offices, tax offices, 
social security offices, schools, etc.) to harass 
not only the activists, but also their families. 
In the worst cases, this repression took the 
semblance of an authentic police persecution. 
It happened in 2013 to Wu Guijun, a worker 
and NGO volunteer who was detained for 
over a year for joining a strike against the 
relocation of the company he worked in, and 
it happened in the past year to Zeng Feiyang 
and his colleagues (see the briefs on pp. 11, 41, 
and 77 in the present book).
Worth noting is that, while this repression 
eventually led some labour NGOs to shut 
down, many others simply changed name and 
revised their strategies. In the interviews 
that I carried out in 2014 and 2015, most of 
my interviewees stated that the number of 
labour NGOs active in China had grown since 
2012—an annus horribilis in terms of political 
repression—but that the organisations had 
become smaller in size. Even more important 
is the fact that the new organisations that 
emerged in that period were mostly founded 
by activists of NGOs that fell victim to state 
repression. Although they were working 
independently from each other, these activists 
maintained friendly relations with their 
former colleagues, a development that in 
the long run may end up fostering solidarity 
and trust among organisations, laying the 
foundation for a tighter and more effective 
network that may even be able to exert some 
influence at a policy level. From this point of 
view, atomisation is not necessarily is a signal 
of impending annihilation. Still, it remains 
Less Incorporation and 
More Repression
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to be seen whether these new groups will be 
able to survive the latest assault by the party-
state and the new restrictive regulations.
Another significant development concerns 
the way labour NGOs deal with migrant 
workers’ struggles. Until a few years ago, 
labour NGOs steered clear of collective 
disputes and politically sensitive cases—a 
modus operandi which attracted much 
criticism from the international academic 
community. Still, recently some organisations 
have displayed a remarkable willingness 
to engage with labour strikes and protests, 
effectively promoting collective bargaining 
(jiti tanpan) as a tool to solve labour disputes. 
This can be seen not only in many ordinary 
disputes related to unpaid employers’ social 
insurance contributions, severance pay, 
overtime, and housing contribution schemes, 
but also in various high-profile cases that 
involved several hundreds if not thousands 
of workers, such as the Yue Yuen strike in 
Dongguan in 2014 and the struggle of the 
Lide employees in Guangzhou in 2014 and 
2015 (Chen 2015; China Labour Bulletin 
2015). That such events remain politically 
sensitive is proven by the severity of the 
consequences for the activists involved. In 
2014 an NGO worker involved in the Yue 
Yuen strike was detained for a month after 
trying to convince the workers to elect their 
representatives to bargain collectively with 
the management, and Zeng Feiyang and his 
colleagues paid dearly for their involvement 
in the Lide campaign, which was played up 
by the Chinese state media as a case in which 
greedy activists neglected the interests of the 
workers in order to achieve money and fame 
(Zou 2015).
Duan Yi, a prominent labour lawyer based 
in Shenzhen, recently argued that labour 
NGOs are transitioning from ‘service-
oriented’ (fuwuxing) and ‘rights protection-
oriented’ (weiquanxing) to ‘labour movement’ 
(gongyunxing) organisations (Duan 2015). 
Yet, such a conclusion may be premature and 
even dangerous. It is premature because most 
labour NGOs still focus on providing services 
to migrant workers and, at most, deal with 
individual disputes of very limited social 
and political impact, such as cases related to 
occupational health and safety. It is dangerous 
because the term ‘labour movement’ evokes 
spectres of worker upheaval, which have been 
haunting the Chinese leadership since the 
early 1980s. According to my interviews, few 
labour activists identify their organisations 
with the ‘labour movement’ label. As an NGO 
leader in Shenzhen told me:
Some scholars say that we are ‘labour 
movement organisations’. I don’t agree 
completely. I think that it would be more 
appropriate to define us as ‘comprehensive 
organisations’ (zonghexing). Why? Because 
our organisation carries out service work, 
rights-protection work, and even some work 
with strikes simultaneously… Sure, you 
can also talk about labour movement, the 
expression is not bad, but in my opinion it 
is not complete, it doesn’t cover all facets. 
Moreover, this expression easily catches the 
attention of the government. If you talk about 
labour movement, the Party, who started to 
establish itself exactly through the labour 
movement… gets alarmed. Why? Because 
this is the way in which they came to power. 
For this reason, I prefer to use the term 
‘comprehensive’ to define us and the other 
labour NGOs that engage with collective 
bargaining. 
[Interview, September 2015]
Lexical quibbles aside, it is undeniable 
that in recent years some labour NGOs have 
started to experiment with new strategies to 
engage more closely with migrant workers 
and have proved themselves willing to face 
the wrath of the authorities in order to push 
Labour NGOs and Migrant 
Workers’ Struggles
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the boundaries of the political discourse and 
praxis. Although these organisations are still 
far from being ‘independent trade unions’, 
they are becoming more responsive to the real 
needs of migrant workers. In this respect, it is 
significant that the input for this push toward 
collective disputes and collective bargaining 
has come not only from foreign donors (which 
nevertheless played a fundamental role in this 
shift), but also from the workers themselves. 
In this regard, the experience of a southern 
labour NGO established in 2012 with the 
aim of carrying out cultural and recreational 
activities for female migrant workers is 
particularly interesting. As one of the leaders, 
herself an injured migrant worker, told me:
At the end of 2012, many controversies 
between labour and capital arose in the 
factories around us and these female workers 
came to our centre to ask for information… 
During the winter, we organised a meeting 
during which we asked them to vote on what 
kind of activities best fit their interests. They 
chose trainings in law, collective bargaining 
and communication techniques. Their 
choices were completely different from what 
we expected! On this basis, since the end of 
2012, we have rearranged our work, starting 
to deal with the rights of female workers and 
with collective bargaining.  [Interview, April 
2015]
In all likelihood, it was the very fact that 
labour NGOs were increasingly willing to 
deal with collective disputes, engage more 
closely with the workers, and promote a 
confrontational model of collective bargaining 
very different from the official narrative of 
‘collective negotiation’ (jiti xieshang), that 
triggered the latest crackdown against them. 
Organised groups that didn’t work as ‘anti-
solidarity machines’, but actually promoted 
labour organising were highly menacing 
to the party-state and the official union, 
especially in light of the current slowdown 
of the Chinese economy. For this reason, 
Zeng Feiyang and his colleagues, who were 
at the forefront of this new trend, were made 
into a public example for all labour activists 
in China and abroad. Still, although the 
situation in China today is very grim, even 
in this bleak hour there may still be reason 
to look at the future of Chinese labour NGOs 
with some optimism. As described above, 
even in a context of further atomisation of 
these organisations, activists from NGOs 
targeted by state repression are breaking off 
to establish their own groups, a development 
that in the future may foster the emergence 
of a stronger solidarity network. Moreover, 
some activists are also adopting ‘guerrilla’ 
tactics, working on an individual basis and 
bringing aid in areas where no labour NGO 
is present. It remains to be seen how far the 
party-state is willing to go to fight this wave, 
if labour NGO activists will find a way around 
the new restrictions on foreign funding, and 
whether the migrant workers will remain 
silent or will finally start to speak up for those 
who have been risking everything to fight for 
their rights.
Some Grounds for Hope?
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On 21 June, the Walmart Chinese Workers’ 
Association (wo’erma zhongguo yuangong 
lianyihui, WCWA) announced in its blog 
that it had joined hands in cyberspace with 
its American counterpart, OUR Walmart 
(Organisation United for Respect at 
Walmart), to discuss how to move forward 
in their struggle against the company. In a 
show of solidarity, the WCWA also launched 
a campaign in support of American Walmart 
workers’ fight for a fifteen US dollar 
minimum wage. This marked a new stage 
in recent Chinese labour history. This time 
the news was not about a leader of the All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
the official government trade union, shaking 
hands with a leader from a foreign trade 
union. Nor was it Han Dongfang, the well-
known director of the Hong Kong-based 
China Labour Bulletin, shaking hands with 
the world’s trade union leaders. Instead, a 
group of workers had themselves, through 
persistent efforts to break through Chinese 
walls, finally succeeded in reaching out to 
co-workers overseas. This appeared to be the 
culmination of a number of breakthroughs 
Recently, Walmart workers in China joined 
hands with their international counterparts 
to move forward in the struggle against the 
American retail giant. This development has 
momentous implications for the Chinese labour 
movement, which is finally linking up with 
the outside world without going through any 
intermediary. Yet, this achievement urgently 
needs international support to be maintained. 
The Resistance of 
Walmart Workers 
in China: A Missed 
Opportunity
Anita Chan
A group of Walmart worker activists stages a protest at a Walmart store in Shenzhen on 29 June. On their 
shirts is written: ‘Implement the spirit of President Xi’s speeches; Walmart employees stand up; oppose the 
elections of puppet unions.’ PC: WCWA
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union born out of a strike in China (Chan 
2015). The year was 2006. A group of sixty 
women workers in a small Danish electronics 
company named Ole Wolff felt aggrieved 
at the fact that the manager refused to pay 
social security contributions and agitated to 
set up their own union. Zhang, the husband 
of one of these workers, was then a blue-
collar worker in a factory nearby and became 
their legal consultant. They struggled for four 
years against management and the district-
level trade union to keep their union going. 
At one point, Zhang was exchanging texts 
with one of the ACFTU’s deputy chairs, who 
flew to Shandong to personally instruct the 
provincial union to recognise the Ole Wolff 
union. The fight ended in 2010, when Ole 
Wolff deliberately relocated the factory to 
South China. In the meantime, Zhang had lost 
his own job and in March 2011 he became a 
Walmart worker in his neighbourhood.
The chain of events that led to the emergence 
of the WCWA can be traced back to 2006. At 
that time, Andy Stern, the president of the 
over the last decade, but then, after a few 
months of hard struggle, the movement 
encountered a setback. In this article, I will 
outline the background of the struggle of 
Walmart workers, illustrate its significance, 
and analyse the causes of its ultimate failure.
Walmart in China has more than four 
hundred stores in 169 cities, and employs 
around one hundred thousand people. The 
WCWA is an online network linking up a large 
number of Walmart employees across the 
country. It was set up in 2014 by two Walmart 
workers: Zhang Jun, an electrician then 
employed at a Walmart store in Yantai City, 
Shandong Province, and Zhang Liya, who 
was working in a store in Shenzhen. Their 
original intention was to create a platform 
where Walmart workers could exchange 
experiences, air grievances, and provide 
moral support to each other. 
Zhang Jun was involved in union 
organising even before he started working 
at Walmart. In fact, he had helped organise 
the first democratically-elected workplace 
2006: A Year of 
Significance
Zhang Jun: Electrician and 
Labour Activist
A group of Walmart worker activists stages a protest at a Walmart store in Shenzhen on 29 June.  On the back of 
their shirts is written: ‘Walmart employees stand up; boycott the comprehensive working hour system; oppose 
cheating and keep protecting our rights.’ PC: WCWA
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is now waiting for the ruling of the second. In 
September 2014, Zhang Jun and Zhang Liya 
decided to establish the WCWA, which grew 
out of a series of online chat groups in which 
Walmart workers shared their experiences 
and gave each other advice on how to deal 
with problems in their workplaces all over 
China. In 2016, Zhang Jun quit his job at 
Walmart.
In mid-May 2016, Walmart announced that 
it was going to use a ‘comprehensive working 
hour system’, which is very similar to 
American Walmart’s ‘open work hour system’ 
(see the brief on p. 42 of the present book), 
allowing extreme flexibility in the allocation 
of work hours. This meant that there would be 
no more overtime and thus no more overtime 
pay, which workers have been relying on to 
supplement the low income. Suddenly the 
number of people in the WCWA’s online 
groups jumped to around ten thousand.
Drawing from Zhang Jun’s experience at 
Ole Wolff a decade ago, one of the WCWA’s 
strategies was to hold the trade union 
responsible for its failure to stop Walmart’s 
flagrant abuse. The WCWA sent appeals 
for help to different levels of the ACFTU, 
including two open letters signed by a 
thousand workers addressed to the union 
headquarters (WCWA 2016). They also 
lodged a series of complaints about Walmart’s 
violations of the Chinese labour law and the 
company’s heavy-handedness in forcing 
workers to sign a consent form for the new 
working hour system. 
Some managers, who were under intense 
pressure from upper levels of Walmart to 
collect these signatures, reportedly locked 
some workers who refused to sign in storage 
rooms, and threatened them with demotion 
Service Employees International Union, one 
of the biggest unions in the United States, was 
launching an international campaign against 
Walmart. He had come to China a couple 
of times seeking to persuade the ACFTU to 
join the global anti-Walmart campaign and 
it so happened that the ACFTU at the time 
was under strong pressure from the party-
state to contain the rising number of strikes 
in the country. This instigated the ACFTU to 
do something that it had not done since the 
1950s—organise workers.
Up until that point, whenever it had 
wanted to set up a branch in a company, the 
ACFTU had gone directly to the management 
to establish a workplace union that managers 
would be able to control. This time, however, 
the ACFTU experimented with organising 
Walmart workers ‘underground’. In less than 
two months, the ACFTU was able to set up 
about one and half dozen Walmart union 
branches, holding surreptitious night-time 
union committee elections and founding 
ceremonies (Chan 2006). But after two 
months, the ACFTU changed its mind and 
signed a memorandum of understanding 
with Walmart, which effectively allowed the 
company to set up management-controlled 
unions in more than one hundred stores. Since 
then, Walmart union branches have been 
staffed by human resource managers, who 
have signed so-called ‘collective agreements’ 
in the name of the workers (Chan 2011). Yet, 
as of today the ACFTU still boasts of its high 
unionisation rate in China’s Walmart stores.
Still, the initial spate of democratic 
elections in 2006 had unintended 
consequences. Some workers who had 
participated in those elections wanted to get 
their unions back. In the following years, 
when some of the workplace union branches 
were due for new elections, they fought to 
register as candidates. Walmart management, 
with the tacit support of the local unions, put 
a variety of obstacles in their way. In 2015, 
Zhang Liya was fired for trying to run. He 
then sued Walmart, lost the first appeal, and 
The Latest Struggle: the 
‘Comprehensive Working 
Hour System’
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That day in 1927 the Nanchang Uprising led by 
key Chinese Communist Party leaders rose up 
against the Nationalist Party. The Nanchang 
Walmart workers prided themselves for 
having this privilege of starting a rebellion 
against the world’s largest retailer in a store 
that bears this historically iconic name. They 
cried in unison: ‘At this store, we are carrying 
on the glorious tradition of the Chinese 
Communist Party!’
But still why this particular store? Indeed, 
for Walmart workers in China this store 
has a glorious past in its own right that has 
nothing to do with Chinese history. In 2006, 
this was one of the stores that were able to 
hold a genuinely democratic union election 
under the ACFTU’s tutelage. An ordinary 
worker armed with self-taught knowledge 
of the labour law by the name of Gao Haitao 
ran as a candidate and was elected as the 
union chairman (Chan, 2011). He fought 
with Walmart management over a number 
of workplace issues. When Walmart issued 
a blanket collective agreement for all store 
unions to sign, Gao demanded some changes. 
The struggle became heated and the news 
passed upward to the ACFTU headquarters 
in Beijing. As a model of a courageous trade 
union chairman, Gao was invited to Beijing to 
and layoffs. Other workers were inundated by 
management phone calls and texts, and two 
workers even suffered mental breakdowns 
due to the incessant hounding from their 
superiors.
On 14 June, the Guangdong Province 
Federation of Trade Unions made a sudden 
public newspaper statement that a Walmart-
style work hour system can only be used by 
workplaces that operate a special roster 
system (Xu 2016). Retail stores were not 
eligible to apply, and using it is a violation of 
the labour law. Blatantly missing from this 
statement was any mention of Walmart, or of 
the fact that some Walmart workers were in 
rebellion. For a while, it seemed the workers 
had gained a small victory. But because the 
union had not taken any concrete action 
besides these generic declarations (Huang 
2016), the announcement did not deter 
Walmart from continuing to force workers to 
sign off on the new work hour system.
Having exhausted all possible channels 
to stop Walmart’s coercion, workers in a 
Walmart store in Jiangxi province called 
‘Nanchang August First Walmart Store’ ‘fired 
the first shot’. On 1 July, starting at seven in 
the morning, seventy workers, all wearing 
the red Walmart uniforms with protest signs 
stuck on their backs, went marching up and 
down the store yelling slogans like ‘Boycott 
Walmart’s Comprehensive Working Hours 
System!’ and ‘Defend Our Rights to the End!’ 
The news of the strike immediately spread 
through the WCWA network. Supportive 
messages poured in and the Nanchang August 
First Store was hailed as a model store by the 
aggrieved Walmart workers.
That the first strike broke out in this 
particular Walmart store is itself of great 
symbolic significance. 1 August was an 
important day and place for the city of 
Nanchang in Chinese Communist history. 
Strike as the Last Option
A group of Walmart worker activists stages a protest 
at a Walmart store in Shenzhen on 29 June.
PC: WCWA 
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meet with high-level union officials, but when 
he continued to resist signing the collective 
agreement, the ACFTU abandoned him and, 
in the end, he was fired. This case was widely 
reported in the Chinese press (China Labor 
News Translations 2008). 
According to information circulated 
online in the WCWA network, the Nanchang 
store today is staffed by a sizeable number 
of older workers. Some of them must have 
fought alongside Gao years ago. It is thus not 
surprising that when the campaign against 
the new working hour system began, it was 
workers in this Nanchang store who came out 
first to declare that none of them had signed 
nor would sign the consent form.
On the second day of the strike, city 
authorities finally appeared at the store to 
find out what the protest was about. They then 
left and said that they would consider their 
complaints. In early July, one other store in 
Nanchang, one in Harbin, and one in Chengdu 
went on strike. Morale was then high among 
Walmart workers across the country.
While activist members of the WCWA 
were immersed in daily struggle in the stores, 
some labour NGOs based in Guangdong 
Province entered the fray. Zhang Zhiru, the 
leader of a labour NGO based in Shenzhen, 
was particularly vocal in claiming a leading 
role in the struggle of Walmart workers. On 
several occasions, he publicly criticised the 
two WCWA founders for being too timid and 
cautious in dealing with the union and the 
authorities. He encouraged Walmart workers 
to set up a new group, the ‘Walmart Workers 
Coordinating Committee’ (wo’erma yuangong 
xietiao huiyuanhui), which purportedly would 
be a structured organisation strong enough to 
demand Walmart to come to the bargaining 
table. 
Zhang Jun and his colleagues reacted with 
strong statements warning the members of 
Splits in the Movement
WCWA about these attempted ‘interferences 
from external powers’ (Wechat 8 July 2016). 
This split had a devastating effect not only on 
the morale of the Walmart workers, but also on 
the relationship among labour NGO activists 
themselves, who had to take sides with one 
or the other while they still were right in 
the middle of one of the worst crackdowns 
against NGOs in recent history. 
Arguably, behind what at first seemed to 
be a strategic divergence—Zhang Jun’s idea 
of cooperating with the unions against Zhang 
Zhiru’s advocacy of a more confrontational 
type of collective bargaining—is the issue of 
funding. As international funds are rapidly 
drying up—a situation that is bound to get 
worse with the enforcement of the new 
Foreign NGO Management Law in January 
2017 (see the compendium of the Law on pp. 
60–67 of the present book)—some NGOs are 
becoming desperate to find new sources of 
sustainment. In order to attract the attention 
of foreign donors and secure their financial 
support, now more than ever they need to 
claim credit for workers’ struggles, especially 
in high profile cases. 
The open confrontation in the chat-
rooms between two sides, with a continuous 
exchange of venomous accusations of greed, 
official collusion, and corruption, filled the 
workers with consternation. Participation 
A Walmart worker in Chengdu holds a sign in support 
of American Walmart workers‘ fight for a 15 USD 
minimum wage.
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in the WCWA network went into free fall. 
The damage was so serious that an activist 
in a labour NGO privately told me that he 
believed that this clash between workers and 
NGOs—as well as among NGOs themselves—
in the end had done more harm to the labour 
movement than the government crackdown. 
Before, labour NGOs were somehow united 
against a common enemy, now they are rift 
apart by mutual suspicion.
Taking advantage of this confusion, 
Walmart went on the offensive, forcing 
workers to sign the consent form and 
lashing out at the recalcitrant workers who 
refused. The retaliation has been relentless, 
A Missed Opportunity
with some employees being fired. The only 
thing die-hard activists can do now is to try 
to sue Walmart for wage theft and unfair 
treatment and dismissal. Despite the initial 
announcements that Walmart was breeching 
the law, local unions and the higher echelons 
of the ACFTU have not lifted a finger to help 
the workers.
What seemed to be a promising protest 
movement involving large numbers of workers 
coordinating on social media collapsed as 
quickly as it had begun. This exposed the 
shortcomings in totally relying on the social 
media as an organising vehicle. Co-ordination 
is still difficult and unsustainable. But a 
bigger lesson learned by workers and labour 
NGOs alike is that foreign funding—as well as 
the lack thereof—can have a corrosive effect 
on labour solidarity. Unfortunately, there is 
every reason to believe that this is bound to 
get worse in the near future.
A group of Walmart worker activists stages a protest 
at a Walmart store in Shenzhen on 29 June. 




In September 2011, the village of Wukan, Guangdong Province, made international headlines for its 
violent protests against the illegal sale of land by their corrupt village elite. Villagers were successful 
in both toppling the existing village leadership and electing, in their stead, the moral leaders of the 
revolt as their new village committee. A few months ago, the original leader of the protests was 
arrested on unclear corruption charges, an event that led to violent clashes between villagers and 
police. Is Wukan’s sad story an example of a conscious democratic challenge to the existing system?
What Does Wukan Have to Do With 
Democracy?
Luigi Tomba
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In September 2011, the village of Wukan 
in Eastern Guangdong province became the 
centre of a media storm and made international 
headlines for its violent protests against 
the illegal sale of land by their established, 
and corrupt, village elite. Village leaders 
had taken it upon themselves to sell large 
chunks of village land without consulting 
the villagers, formally the collective owners 
of the land-use rights. Villagers in Wukan 
were successful in both toppling the existing 
village leadership and electing, in their stead, 
the moral leaders of the revolt as their new 
village committee. What was more important, 
in the tightly controlled Chinese system of 
village elections, was that villagers were 
allowed to cast a secret ballot. 
Yet, despite international media calling 
Wukan the ultimate example of a democratic 
trend in rural China (Wong 2016), the 
situation of the villagers changed little. The 
government claimed that part of the land-
stealing controversy was resolved ‘according 
to the law’, which took some of the wind 
out of the sails of the collective protests. 
Ultimately, however, the land-use rights 
were not returned to their owners. The new 
leadership rapidly split and members of the 
newly elected village committee were then 
investigated for petty acts of corruption and 
were themselves forced to write ‘confessions’. 
The original leader of the protests, Lin 
Zuluan, was re-elected in 2015 with ninety 
per cent of the votes, only to be arrested 
on unclear corruption charges in mid-2016 
(Birtles 2016). As it so often happens in these 
corruption cases, facts and circumstances 
are hard to ascertain. An Al Jazeera series 
of reports exposed the banality of village in-
fighting between 2012 and 2015, along with 
the progressive re-assertion of state control 
over the conflict-ridden village (Lee and 
Leong 2013). The arrest of Lin, seen by many 
as a moral beacon in this complex story, led 
to new violent clashes with the police, and to 
the almost inevitable analysis of the end of 
Wukan’s ‘democratic experiment’.
Is Wukan’s sad story an example of a 
conscious democratic challenge to the 
existing system, as it has often been argued? 
Is every conflict in China that attracts the 
attention of the media a new step towards 
an inevitable democratic future? The battles 
in the streets, with national flag-bearing 
villagers throwing stones at riot police are 
generated much less by a desire to change 
the political system than they are by the 
exclusion of countless villagers from the 
spoils of economic growth and urbanisation. 
Villagers have seen the value of their land 
grow and the profits of urbanisation being 
appropriated by greedy local elites in the 
name of national development. Villagers’ 
slogans are invariably about the redressing 
of a wrong, not a call for a rather distant 
idea of democracy. In a competition with the 
predatory urban governments, the cards are 
stacked against the village collectives, often 
leaving little alternative to violence. And 
these conflicts are everywhere, potentially 
much more significant for prosperity, 
stability, and justice in China than for its 
democratic future. Arguing that the story 
of Wukan is about China’s transition into a 
liberal democracy would be forgetting the 
structural conditions that have led to this 
local conflict in the first place.
To explain some of these conditions, 
let’s take a step back. One of the pillars of 
China’s authoritarian system, and the main 
remnant of its socialist planned past, is 
the public ownership of land. In the cities, 
this takes the form of ‘state ownership’ 
while in the countryside the collectives 
(the villages) can claim the ownership of 
use rights over agricultural land. Villages 
are not formally considered to be a level of 
‘government’, but are instead a level of ‘self-
administration’—a subtle but important 
Urbanisation and Land 
Ownership
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distinction that contributes to explaining 
why villages committees are the only part of 
the governance structure where leaders can 
be elected, not appointed. 
In this context, urbanisation inevitably 
necessitates the ‘conversion’ of collectively 
owned land into state-owned land. Urban 
administrations reap significant advantages 
from conversion, as the price of expropriation 
or acquisition of rural land is invariably a 
small fraction of the price that they can obtain 
when they lease the land on the market. The 
competition is very intense and a matter 
of survival for both villagers and urban 
governments. Various estimates suggest that, 
on average, villagers end up being significantly 
short-changed. According to a report by 
Jiang Ming at Peking University, the market 
price of expropriated land is, on average, 
more than fourteen times higher than the 
cost of compensation (Tomba 2014). There 
are, of course, substantial variations, and 
some strategically located peri-urban villages 
have successfully negotiated handsome 
compensation packages through unified 
and collective bargaining, especially when, 
because of rapid urbanisation, some of these 
‘urban villages’ have ended up owning land in 
central areas of Guangzhou or Shenzhen. Yet, 
in general, these remain the exception rather 
than the rule, and local governments use 
violence and even local thugs to evict village 
residents (Sargeson 2013). 
City governments can be only partly blamed 
for having such an aggressive stance. This 
is because growth in their territory, their 
capacity to provide services to an increasing 
population, and their implementation of 
higher-level government policies remain 
highly dependent on land. Because of the 
centralised taxation system, land fees are 
among the few components of an urban 
government’s revenue that stay local. This 
has turned cities into aggressive agents of 
expropriation as, according to the law, rural 
land can only be turned into ‘construction 
land’ once it has been converted to state-
owned land and their inhabitants relocated 
or given an urban household registration 
(hukou). Despite central attempts to limit 
expropriation in the name of the preservation 
of the already limited amount of arable land 
in the country, the dependence of local 
governments on land sales has continued to 
grow over the last decade. On average, more 
than one quarter of urban governments’ 
budget depends on land fees, and in some 
cities it is as high as forty or fifty per cent. 
In 2012 alone, income from land fees grew 
nationwide by more the forty-six per cent.
Villagers, for their part, have experienced 
expropriation since the 1980s. In the early 
period, it was easier for them to justify 
the state’s intervention with the needs of 
economic development. Yet, after three 
decades of successive expropriations, the 
cases of neighbouring villages and the 
declining attraction of urban welfare (an 
urban registration was often offered in 
exchange for land-use rights) have made it 
more difficult and expensive to convince 
farmers to give up their land. With a much 
greater flow of information, they now know 
how much governments speculate on the land 
that is taken away from them, and they are no 
longer ready to sacrifice their interests in the 
name of national development. 
Many ‘rural’ villages on the outskirts of 
large cities are also no longer relying on 
agriculture. Despite the legal limitations, 
they have often built significant collective 
industrial economies on their land and are 
now living from rent paid by factories, as well 
as the income generated by a growing army of 
migrant workers who need accommodation, 
food, and services. They no longer see their 
land as a munificent concession of the socialist 
state but as a long-held entitlement, and have 
created complex local institutions to control 
The Plight of Chinese 
Villagers
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their collective economies. Shareholding 
cooperatives have been set up, for example, 
that spread from Guangdong to many other 
parts of the country, turning villagers into 
shareholders of their village corporation. 
Shares (that cannot be sold outside of the 
collective) have now replaced land, and 
traditional village elites have consolidated 
their capacity to decide on important 
aspects of the village economy with limited 
consultation with the villagers.
These are concerns that Wukan’s villagers 
are familiar with and clearly not only theirs. 
About two-thirds of the estimated 187,000 
collective conflicts a year across the country 
have something to do with land. Last year, 
land also replaced corruption as the main area 
of dissatisfaction in the government’s work 
among Chinese citizens (Forsythe 2015), 
probably suggesting that, while the centrally 
engineered anti-corruption campaign is 
generating positive vibes, the aggressive 
stance of local urban governments (and the 
growing prices of real estate) is increasingly 
becoming a focal point in China’s public 
opinion.
When we think of Wukan in these terms, the 
democratic content of the violent resistance 
to the government’s attempt to re-establish 
control over the village is hardly an indication 
of a growing democratic awareness, or a 
strong opposition to the existing institutions. 
Rather, the grievances stemming from the 
long-term infringement of local interests 
and the perception of being cheated by the 
local government contribute decisively to 
strengthening the resolve of these villagers. 
Yet, they hardly see the change of the current 
institutional arrangements as a solution to 
their grief. Much of the contestation has to 
do with the corruption of some officials. The 
election of their own leaders was supposed 
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to return the land that was originally sold 
without their consent. The autonomy and 
special rules in the Wukan elections are part of 
the concessions resulting from the bargaining 
process in which local governments 
invariably engage when conflicts arise. By 
keeping that autonomy local—the result of 
specific negotiations, not a rule change—they 
very efficiently deny the possibility that a 
more democratic arrangement can emerge, 
that the legitimacy of higher-level leadership 
is affected, and that, eventually, the Wukan 
experience is systematically replicated.
This incident, and the massive contestation 
in the village between 2012 and 2016 is a 
very visible sign of China’s rural malaise. 
Urbanising China is a massive attempt to 
nationalise its territory, to absorb collective 
economies that have in the last two decades 
been at the centre of China’s industrialisation. 
It is driven by the structural needs of urban 
governments and observed with continuous 
apprehension by central authorities, always 
ready to tailor their intervention to the 
different realities of urbanisation in the 
country, to quell conflicts when they risk 
spilling beyond their local dimension. To look 
at Wukan as an experiment in local democracy 
would be too generous an evaluation for the 
current authoritarian government. 
Wukan as Symptom of a 
Rural Malaise
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The Foreign NGOs Management Law: 
A Compendium
Ivan Franceschini, Elisa Nesossi
Recently, people from the State Security who had summoned me to ‘have a tea’ said to me: ‘Us 
from the State Security are still quite civilised, but with this coming law that will regulate NGOs 
you will have to deal with the Public Security [i.e. the police]. You have to understand that their 
work methods are rather savage.’ Actually, this was also a pressure of kind, you can read it as 
some sort of well-intentioned warning. 
(Interview with a Chinese labour activist, Shenzhen, June 2015)
On 1 January 2017, the highly controversial 
Law on the Management of Foreign NGOs’ 
Activities within Mainland China entered 
into force. As defined in Article 1, the Law 
was introduced with the aim of ‘standardising 
and guiding all the activities carried out by 
overseas NGOs within China, and protecting 
their rights and interests.’ From January 2017, 
those foreign NGOs that have been operating 
in the People’s Republic of China in a legal 
limbo are required to act according to the 
principles established by this Law. Although 
some scholars have argued that the Law can 
be interpreted as a positive development in 
China’s process of legal development and 
acceptance of international standards (Sapio 
2016), we fail to see how this can be the case 
(see also the Forum on pp. 68–73 in the present 
book). At this stage it appears to us that the 
limits imposed by the Law on the practice 
of foreign NGOs significantly outweigh its 
alleged benefits. A number of provisions 
within the Law are extremely vague and 
urgently require further explanation by the 
relevant authorities. Still, on this matter we 
are unable to share the optimism of long-
time observer of Chinese civil society Shawn 
Shieh who, in a valuable exegesis of the Law 
that appeared earlier on his personal blog, 
noted that some flexibility may be allowed 
in the implementation phase (Shieh 2016). 
Here below we offer our short analysis of the 
legislation in the form of FAQs to explain its 
scope and significance. For the translation 
into English of the contents of the Law, we 
wish to acknowledge our debt to the excellent 
version that appeared on China Law Translate 
(China Law Translate 2016). 
What is an NGO and what kind of activities 
fall within the scope of the Law on the 
Management of Foreign NGOs’ Activities 
within Mainland China?
The Law broadly defines NGO as ‘non-profit, 
non-governmental, social organisations 
lawfully established outside Mainland China, 
such as foundations, social groups, and think 
tank organisations’ (Art. 2) that can operate in 
fields such as ‘economics, education, science 
and technology, culture, health, sports, and 
environmental protection, and in areas such 
as poverty alleviation and disaster relief ’ 
(Art. 3). In carrying out their activities, these 
organisations are required to abide by Chinese 
laws, and not to endanger China’s national 
unity, security or ethnic solidarity, as well as 
not to harm China’s national interests, the 
common good of the society and the lawful 
rights and interests of citizens, legal persons, 
and other organisations (Art. 5). Furthermore, 
they must not engage in or fund for-profit 
activities, political or religious activities (Art. 
5).
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Be aware that:
The range of activities NGOs can engage in, as 
listed in Articles 3 and 5, exclude issues that 
may be deemed politically sensitive, like work 
for the protection of labour rights and human 
rights (in particular civil and political rights). 
Article 5 is particularly vague and potentially 
problematic. Firstly, the meaning of ‘political 
activity’ remains unclear. In fact, the specific 
work in the allowed fields of operation for 
foreign NGOs as well as numerous policies 
encouraging charity and volunteer services 
are political at some level, and as such, might 
be excluded from the protection of the Law. 
Secondly, while it is reasonable to expect 
that a foreign NGO would not violate China’s 
key national interests like national security, 
national unity and ethnic unity, it is important 
to understand the context in which these terms 
are phrased within Chinese law and how they 
may be broadly applied to incriminate a wide 
range of activities within society. Indeed 
in recent years, there have been numerous 
examples of NGO workers and activists having 
been incriminated under the existing criminal 
laws for endangering China’s national security 
and interests, and in the future, in view of this 
Law, these circumstances might well extend to 
foreign NGOs. Thirdly, expressions like ‘ethnic 
solidarity’ and ‘the common good of society’ 
remain extremely vague and easily resonate 
with crimes concerning the disruption of public 
order frequently used to incriminate various 
categories of citizens who are considered a 
potential threat to social stability. 
Do foreign universities fall within the reach 
of this law?
Article 53 of the Law states that ‘where 
foreign schools, hospitals, natural science 
and engineering technology research 
institutions or academic organisations carry 
out exchanges or co-operation with Mainland 
Chinese schools, hospitals, natural science and 
engineering technology research institutions 
or academic organisations, it is handled 
according to the relevant national provisions, 
unless these activities violate the principles 
listed in Article 5.’ This provision—which was 
inserted only in the final version of the Law 
and is one of the very few concessions made 
by the legislators to the critics—indicates 
that certain forms of educational exchange 
could be exempted from the registration 
requirements imposed on foreign NGOs, and 
that other laws should govern these kinds of 
activities instead. 
Be aware that:
Much clarification is still needed in relation to 
what constitutes ‘exchanges’ and ‘co-operation’. 
As some commentators have mentioned 
already, it is unclear whether exchanges 
and co-operation may include programmes 
between foreign schools and Chinese entities 
which do not operate schools ( for example, 
third party providers of abroad programs or 
student internships), and unilateral programs 
of foreign schools (e.g., a faculty-led short-
term summer program that is organised 
without affiliation with any Chinese partner). 
It is also unclear whether a foreign university 
that goes to China to recruit, or to meet with 
its alumni, is required to either register as a 
representative office of a foreign NGO or work 
with a Chinese co-operative body and secure 
an approval and record filing for temporary 
activities from relevant Chinese authorities.
What are the organs in charge of the 
registration and supervision of foreign 
NGOs?
According to the Law, the Ministry of Public 
Security (MPS) and the provincial public 
security bureaus (PSBs) are in charge of 
the registration of foreign NGOs carrying 
out activities within Mainland China (Art. 
6). The PSBs at the county level or above 
are required to supervise and manage the 
activities of foreign NGOs and to provide 
services for their activities (Art. 7) (note that 
the Law refers to public security departments 
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as ‘registration and management organs’). 
In order to register with the public security 
authorities and establish a representative 
office, foreign NGOs should receive the 
consent of Professional Supervisory Units 
established under the State Council (Arts. 6 & 
11). Once registered, they will be supervised 
first by the PSBs, then by a Professional 
Supervisory Unit at the local government 
level and by any other supervisory authorities 
responsible for national security, finance, 
foreign affairs, customs or tax (Art. 43).  
Be aware that:
Foreign NGOs’ supervision by the public 
security authorities is one of the most 
problematic aspects of the legislation. 
Currently, Chinese NGOs are supposed to 
register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but 
most of them—especially those that work in 
politically sensitive areas—are in fact refused 
registration and therefore are informally 
supervised by the State Security. Very few 
foreign NGOs are registered within China and, 
given their unclear legal status, their activities 
are informally monitored through their local 
partners. Giving control to the public security 
(rather than the Ministry of Civil Affairs) 
reflects the Law’s emphasis on security, rather 
than a willingness to facilitate meaningful co-
operation. It signals that, according to Chinese 
authorities, foreign NGOs have the potential to 
threaten social stability and security and, for 
this reason, they should be kept under control by 
one of the most politically powerful ministries 
within China. It remains to be seen whether the 
MPS—which lacks any relevant experience in 
managing civil society organisations—actually 
has the capacity to manage NGOs.
How to register a representative office in 
China?
In order to carry out any activity in Mainland 
China, foreign NGOs should register and 
establish a representative office. The Law 
sets out the following five requirements 
that a foreign NGO should satisfy in order 
to register and establish a representative 
office within China: a) it should be legally 
established outside of Mainland China; 
b) it should be able to independently bear 
civil liability; c) the objectives and scope of 
activities defined in its organisational charter 
should be beneficial to the development of 
social welfare; d) it should have continuously 
carried out substantive activities outside 
of Mainland China for two or more years; 
e) other requirements provided by other 
laws and regulations (Art. 10). A foreign 
NGO that meets the above criteria should 
submit an application for registration within 
thirty days after having received consent by 
a Professional Supervisory Unit listed in a 
directory published by the public security 
organs (Arts. 11, 12). The application should 
include the following materials: a) a written 
application; b) supporting documents and 
materials certifying that the NGO complies 
with the requirement outlined in Art. 10; c) 
proof of identity, resumé and materials or 
attestations showing proof of no criminal 
record for the proposed chief representative; 
d) materials showing the proposed premises 
for the representative office; e) materials 
showing the sources of capital; f ) documents 
of consent from the professional supervisory 
unit; g) other documents and materials 
required by law or by administrative 
regulations. If the registration is granted, the 
foreign NGO representative office will obtain 
a registration certificate that it will use to 
register for taxes, get an official seal and 
establish an account at a bank in Mainland 
China (Art. 13).
Be aware that:
First, some of the criteria included in Article 
10 are extremely vague and may easily exclude 
some foreign NGOs from the possibility of 
registering within Mainland China. Indeed, it 
remains unclear according to which standards 
an activity can be deemed ‘beneficial to the 
development of social welfare’ and what the 
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‘other requirements provided by other laws 
and regulations’ could be. Second, the Law 
does not specify whether a foreign NGO has the 
right to appeal decisions by the public security 
authorities and Professional Supervisory 
Units if registration is not granted. Finally, 
foreign NGOs are supposed to choose a 
local Professional Supervisory Unit from a 
list published by the public security organs 
‘together with the relevant departments’ (Art. 
11). This will clearly limit their choices and 
introduce an additional layer of supervision 
and control that will further restrict their 
ability to operate in China. 
Is it possible to operate without a 
representative office?
Unregistered foreign NGOs that wish to 
conduct temporary activities within China 
should legally file a record (Art. 9). Foreign 
NGOs that have not registered and established 
representative offices or filed a record to 
carry out temporary activities are not entitled 
to carry out activities within Mainland China, 
and must not entrust or fund, or covertly 
entrust or fund, any unit or individual in 
Mainland China to carry out activities within 
the country (Art. 9). Temporary activities 
can be carried out only in co-operation with 
state organs, mass organisations, public 
institutions, or social organisations (Art. 16). 
It will be the Chinese partner unit who will 
have to file with the public security organs 
for the proposed activity at least fifteen days 
before activities are carried out (except for 
emergency situations) (Art. 17). The Law 
provides that ‘temporary activities’ cannot 
last for more than one year and that where 
‘there is truly a need to extend the period’, 
a new filing shall be made (Art. 17). Beside 
this, the law clearly states that ‘units and 
individuals in Mainland China must not 
accept retention, funding, agency, or covert 
agency to carry out foreign NGOs’ activities 
in Mainland China, from foreign NGOs that 
have not registered a representative office or 
filed to carry out temporary activities’ (Art. 
32). 
Be aware that:
This process entails the establishment of 
a closer relationship between the Chinese 
partner organisation—which needs to be 
officially sanctioned, for instance the official 
trade union, a university, or an NGO with a 
regular registration as a social organisation—
and the public security authorities. This will 
inevitably lead to a closer scrutiny of the 
local partner by the police organs. Given the 
fact that most Chinese NGOs, especially in 
politically sensitive fields, cannot register as 
social organisations, the restrictions imposed 
by Article 32 of the Law make it almost 
impossible for international entities to fund 
most local NGOs, severely curtailing the ability 
of local civil society organisations to access 
foreign funding and putting even more pressure 
on Chinese activists (as highlighted by the 
quote which we added at the beginning of this 
compendium). The parameters for renewing a 
one-year permit for temporary activity remain 
unclear and it is not clarified whether multiple 
temporary activities can be carried out either 
simultaneously or in subsequent years. 
Can a foreign NGO establish more than one 
office in Mainland China?
The Law establishes that the representative 
office of a foreign NGO in China can carry 
out activities only within their registered 
operational scope and region, and it cannot 
establish branch organisations within China, 
except as otherwise provided by the State 
Council (Art. 18). 
Be aware that:
Prohibiting the establishment of branches 
and restricting the work of NGOs only within 
their registered region impose very serious 
operational limitations on the type and scope 
of activities that can be carried out. This 
provision has the potential to limit multiple 
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partners’ co-operation and diversification 
of activities. The option for approval by the 
State Council is left extremely vague and it 
remains completely unclear what the scope and 
significance of exception might entail. 
What are the planning and reporting 
requirements? 
There are two types of reports that a 
representative office has to submit annually 
to the Chinese authorities: an activity plan 
and an annual work report. First, the NGO 
representative office is required to submit to 
the Professional Supervisory Unit before the 
end of each calendar year an activity plan for 
the following year, including a description 
of project implementation, use of funds, and 
other similar content (Art. 19). Within ten 
days of approval, the representative office 
has to file the plan with the public security 
authorities (Art. 19). When variations of 
the activity plan are necessary, these must 
be promptly filed with the public security 
authorities (Art. 19). Second, foreign NGO 
representative offices are required to 
file annual work reports to Professional 
Supervisory Units before 31 January each year 
(Art. 31). These reports shall include content 
such as audited financial accounting reports, 
and reports on the situation of activities, as 
well as personnel or institutional changes 
(Art. 31). When dealing with ‘temporary 
activities’, foreign NGOs must send written 
reports to the public security authorities 
within thirty days of concluding temporary 
activities. These reports must include 
information on the state of activities and the 
use of funds (Art. 30).
Be aware that:
While planning and reporting are very 
reasonable requirements for an NGO to operate 
legally, the Law however is fairly vague on the 
level of detail required by the annual plan. It 
is unclear the extent to which such planning 
will allow a degree of flexibility for the 
implementation of ad hoc activities or activities 
in an emergency situation. In case of both 
temporary and planned activities, it remains 
unclear how reports will be used, whether they 
will be simply filed by the relevant authorities 
or whether they will constitute the basis for 
approving future activities by the same NGOs.
What funds can be used to support activities 
within Mainland China?
The Law explains that foreign NGOs are 
allowed to use the following funding: a) funds 
from lawful sources outside of Mainland 
China; b) interests on bank deposits within 
Mainland China; and c) other funds lawfully 
obtained within Mainland China (Art. 21). 
Foreign NGOs and their representative offices 
must not fundraise within Mainland China 
(Art. 21). These funds—which must be used 
only in accordance with the registered scope 
of operations (Art. 23)—must be deposited 
in the bank account that is recorded on the 
official registration documents or, in the case 
of temporary activities, the bank account of 
the Chinese partner unit (Art. 22). Any other 
strategy to receive funding from abroad 
is explicitly forbidden (Art. 22) and wire 
transfers will have to be used in accordance 
with China’s relevant provisions on regulation 
of foreign exchanges and payments (Art. 25).
Be aware that:
While these provisions might have been 
thought of as a way to control illegal money 
movements from outside and within China, 
they however present some contradictions 
and limitations. Article 21 allows for funding 
to be obtained within Mainland China but 
excludes the possibility of fundraising within 
the country. As the activity of fundraising is 
not defined in this Law, it potentially excludes 
a significant portion of funding that could 
come from within the country. It also creates 
opportunities for funding obtained lawfully 
to be considered illegal because it is attained 
through alleged fundraising. The Law also 
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excludes the possibility, or makes it extremely 
difficult, for Chinese citizens to donate to 
foreign NGOs operating in China, closing 
avenues for China’s wealthy to contribute to 
international philanthropy. 
What about accounting and taxes?
According to the Law, foreign NGO 
representative offices are required to 
implement China’s unified accounting system, 
hiring accountants with Chinese professional 
certifications to carry out their accounting 
(Art. 24). Mainland Chinese accounting 
firms are required to audit foreign NGOs’ 
financial accounting reports (Art. 24). Tax 
registration, tax declarations, and payment of 
taxes must be dealt with in accordance with 
the law (Art. 26), but it is explicitly stated 
that foreign NGO representative offices enjoy 
tax and other policy benefits according to the 
law (Art. 36).
Be aware that:
There are at least two main problematic 
issues concerning the required system of 
accounting and taxes. In terms of accounting, 
foreign NGOs are financially accountable to 
their donors, which generally impose strict 
accounting reporting standards. The imposition 
of carrying out accounting within China 
according to China’s unified accounting system 
may either benefit the process of accounting for 
international donors, or hinder the process if the 
two systems are completely different, imposing 
significant operational burdens on the foreign 
NGOs.  The requirements concerning taxes 
are utterly vague. It remains unclear what 
taxation regime will apply to foreign NGOs and 
what benefits, if any, they could potentially 
enjoy. It is also left unspecified whether these 
accounting requirements and taxes provisions 
apply to foreign NGOs conducting temporary 
activities. 
Who should staff a representative office?
The Law states that foreign NGO 
representative offices can hire employees 
in Mainland China as long as they follow 
local laws and administrative regulations, 
and that all the information regarding 
employed personnel must be reported to 
the professional supervisory units and 
to the public security organs (Art. 27). 
Representative offices can designate a chief 
representative and up to three representatives 
as required for operations, but they must not 
be: a) persons lacking or having limited civil 
capacity; b) persons with a criminal record; 
c) chief representatives or representatives 
of representative offices that have been de-
registered or had registration certificates 
cancelled within the past five years; d) other 
situations provided by the law or regulations 
(Art. 29). As for the expatriate staff, the 
Law provides that ‘the chief representative 
and other representatives that are foreign 
employees of foreign NGO representative 
offices may use the organisation’s registration 
certificate, documents proving the 
representative’s status, and other materials 
to process employment and work permits in 
accordance with the law’ (Art. 38).
Be aware that:
The clause ‘other situations provided by 
the law or regulations’ included in Article 
29 is extremely vague and may be broadly 
interpreted by the public security authorities 
to exclude anybody who is deemed inadequate 
according to undefined standards. The Law 
is also silent in relation to the conditions for 
hiring volunteers. 
What does supervision and management by 
the Chinese relevant authorities entail?
The Law provides that public security 
authorities are not only responsible for the 
registration of the NGOs’ representative 
offices, annual inspections and the filing of 
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temporary activities, but they have also a duty 
to investigate and punish illegal activities 
carried out by foreign NGOs. When public 
security organs suspect that a foreign NGO 
is violating this Law, they may adopt the 
following measures: a) question the chief 
representative and other responsible persons 
from the foreign NGO representative offices; 
b) enter the foreign NGOs’ domicile and 
venues of activities within Mainland China to 
conduct on-site inspections; c) question units 
and individuals related to the investigation, 
and request an explanation; d) examine and 
reproduce documents or materials related 
to the matters being investigated, and 
seal documents or materials that might be 
removed, destroyed, concealed or tampered 
with; e) seal or seize venues, facilities, or 
assets suspected of being involved in illegal 
activities (Art. 41). Public security organs 
can also make inquiries into bank accounts 
of units or individuals related to the matter 
being investigated and request the courts 
to freeze bank account funds in accordance 
with the Criminal Procedure Law (Art. 42). 
Other departments, such as those for national 
security, foreign affairs, finance, financial 
oversight, customs, tax, and foreign experts 
are to conduct oversight and management of 
foreign NGOs and their representative offices 
in accordance with the scope of their duties 
and relevant laws (Art. 43). The anti-money 
laundering departments shall supervise and 
manage the opening and use of bank accounts 
by foreign NGOs, Chinese partner units, and 
also of units or individuals in Mainland China 
who receive funds from foreign NGOs (Art. 
44).
Be aware that:
It appears that while the Law is fairly specific 
on what the public security authorities and 
other departments can do in case of suspicious 
activities, it imposes very few limitations 
on their actions. For example, on the basis 
of a simple suspicion, the public security can 
indiscriminately get access to individuals, 
their properties and domiciles without any 
significance restriction been imposed by the Law. 
What are the penalties for non-compliance?
If a foreign NGO representative office or 
a foreign NGO carrying out temporary 
activities in China do not comply with the 
clauses that govern registration, filing, scope 
of activities, funds, reporting, supervision 
and inspection, they and the Chinese partner 
units will be given warnings or ordered to 
suspend activities for a given period by the 
public security organs, have illegal assets 
or unlawful gains confiscated; where the 
circumstances are considered serious, their 
registration certificate or temporary activity 
permit documents will also be withdrawn by 
the registration management organs and the 
temporary activities shut down (Art. 45). The 
same penalty applies where the representative 
offices of a foreign NGO, a foreign NGO carrying 
out temporary activities, or a Chinese partner 
unit provide false information to obtain 
registration certificates for representative 
offices or to obtain an authorisation to carry 
out temporary activities; or where there 
are acts of counterfeiting, altering, buying 
and selling, renting, or loaning registration 
certificates or seals (Art. 45). NGOs that have 
been de-registered cannot re-apply to set up 
representative offices in Mainland China or 
carry out temporary activities for five years 
from the date of de-registration, cancellation, 
or closure (Art. 48).
Article 46 explains that in circumstances 
where NGOs carry out activities without 
registration or filing, the public security 
organs can stop their activities, confiscate 
their illegally obtained property and unlawful 
gains, give directly responsible personnel 
warnings, and, in serious circumstances, 
detain them for up to ten days (Art. 46). The 
same applies to circumstances where units 
and individuals in Mainland China know that 
a foreign NGO has not registered or filed for 
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temporary activities, and co-operate with 
them or accept their retention or funding, or 
act as their agent or covert agent to carry out 
activities for them or accept and spend funds 
for a project (Art. 46). 
More serious penalties are provide for those 
foreign NGOs and foreign NGO representative 
offices that: a) incite resistance to the 
implementation of laws and regulations; 
b) illegally obtain state secrets; c) create 
rumours, engage in defamation, or the 
publication or dissemination of other harmful 
information that endangers state security or 
damages the national interest; d) engage in or 
funding political activities or illegal religious 
activities; e) other situations that endanger 
state security or damage the national or public 
interest (Art. 47). In such circumstances, 
the public security organs should cancel 
their registration certificates or shut down 
temporary activities; where a crime is not 
constituted, they will detain the persons 
who are directly in charge and other directly 
responsible personnel for up to fifteen days; 
and where a crime is constituted, criminal 
responsibility is pursued in accordance with 
the law (Art. 47). The same applies where 
foreign NGOs or foreign NGO representative 
offices exhibit criminal conduct such as 
separatism, undermining national unity, 
or subverting national sovereignty (Art. 
47). These organisations may be added to 
an unwelcome list by the public security 
department under the State Council and must 
not again establish representative offices 
or carry out temporary activities within 
Mainland China (Art. 48).
When foreign persons violate this law, 
relevant organs may lawfully order them to 
leave the country within a given period of 
time, deport them, or expel them (Art. 50).
Be aware that:
Besides including a number of very vague clauses 
that can be easily used to justify arbitrary 
actions by the public security authorities 
in the name of protecting social order and 
stability—for instance, the publication of any 
critical report can be easily considered as 
‘dissemination of harmful information’—one 
problem that emerges from these provisions 
relates to the use of administrative detention 
for the personnel of foreign NGOs for up to 
fifteen days. It is well known that the public 
security authorities generally implement 
administrative detention without any judicial 
supervision and is in strict contrast with 
international fair trial standards. 
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As outlined in the previous chapter, the 
Foreign NGOs Management Law will deal a 
hard blow not only to foreign NGOs in China, 
but also to those Chinese organisations that 
work in sensitive fields and that are almost 
entirely reliant on foreign funding. Labour 
NGOs are, therefore, likely to suffer the most 
from the new rules. This Forum attempts to 
make sense of the current situation by posing 
questions to three international activists with 
extensive experience in the field: Ellen David 
Friedman, Kevin Slaten, and May Wong.
In your opinion, will the Foreign NGOs 
Management Law have a significant impact 
on Chinese labour NGOs?
Ellen David Friedman: Of course, it already 
had while it was not even a law yet. In China, 
the law is often ‘advisory’. A law may not be 
enforced, or be enforced in wildly varying 
ways, and is coercive as an unpredictable 
and threatening presence. NGO activists 
will tell you that the state can—and already 
does—manage the presence of foreign 
NGOs in innumerable ways. For example, 
a couple of years ago, NGOs and other non-
commercial ‘units’ were ordered to report on 
all foreign-sourced funds. Of course, this was 
understood not merely as a neutral inquiry, 
but a signal. One way to understand this law 
is as a sign of intent; a downward notch by the 
state in tolerating foreign ‘interference’. But 
actually, in my view, it is not really directed 
at foreigners but at Chinese citizens. It is 
relatively easy for the government to shut 
the door on foreigners, but the problem 
A Civil Society Under Assault 
A Debate among International Activists
remains—workers live miserable lives, lack 
security or dignity or a future, have no way 
to make things better, and so will continue 
to organise, strike, and force employers and 
the government to negotiate with them. 
This is not provoked by foreign influence, 
not funded by foreign foundations, but by a 
dynamic inherent in the political-economic 
system. So, yes, with this law we can expect 
further pressure on Chinese labour NGOs and 
their relationships with foreign funders, but 
we don’t have to wait for the law to see the 
government is already increasing repression.
Kevin Slaten: Some of the labour activists 
and labour NGOs who have been most 
willing to walk the line of what is considered 
acceptable conduct under the Communist 
regime have been harassed, forcibly relocated, 
Eighty-six-year-old Jia Huizhen from Tianjin, 
China, holds a sign that says: “Release Feminist 
Sisters Now!”  PC: ‘Free Chinese Feminists’ 
Facebook page
Edited by Ivan Franceschini and Kevin Lin
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and now arrested. The repression has ramped 
up particularly over the past two years. It’s 
important to note that this has all happened 
before the Foreign NGO Management Law 
was officially promulgated. It is difficult to 
imagine what actual new restrictions these 
regulations will create for labour NGOs. 
Most NGOs have been operating registered 
as businesses or unregistered altogether 
for years. So the authorities have long had 
the grounds to go after NGOs under the 
pretence of them operating outside of their 
organisational purview. Authorities have also 
carried out repression in the name of ‘national 
security’ and ‘disturbing public order’, which 
can be used by the government practically 
at will and without restraint. In this sense, 
the most significant part of the Foreign NGO 
Management Law for labour NGOs may not be 
the rules themselves but rather that the Law 
signals an intention by the government to 
more greatly restrict NGOs that are not under 
the thumb, or at least the close scrutiny, of 
the Party.  
May Wong: As a Hong Kong labour activist 
and being treated as a foreign NGO, yes, I 
think that the law will have a significant 
impact on Chinese labour organisations 
because it puts lots of restrictions on the 
cooperation between foreign and local 
NGOs. This obviously aims at stopping local 
Chinese labour groups from getting overseas 
funds and making close contacts with foreign 
NGOs. For example, foreign NGOs, which 
fund mainland individuals or labour NGOs 
activities, or recruit local Chinese staff and 
volunteers, now need to apply for and get an 
approval from the authorities. This means 
that Chinese labour NGOs, which get foreign 
funds to support workers’ rights in China, 
take greater risks. Labour activists could 
face long-term detention or imprisonment; in 
the worst case, they may be accused of being 
involved in activities that ‘endanger China’s 
national security’ or ‘harm China’s national 
interests’. The law says that foreign NGOs 
must work with Chinese registered NGOs. 
However, most Chinese labour NGOs could 
not get official recognition as NGOs, and thus 
by law they cannot get foreign funds and work 
with foreign NGOs. Since it is impossible to 
get domestic funds to support labour rights 
in China, in the end the law will help to end 
Chinese labour NGOs.
What is your take on the latest wave 
of repression of labour NGOs? Why do 
you think it has taken place now? Is it 
an ‘unprecedented’ move by the Chinese 
authorities or part of a long-term trend?
Ellen David Friedman: I began working 
with labour NGOs in China around 2003, 
and believe I have observed three waves of 
repression since that time. Each has had some 
similar features. For example, whenever there 
is a crackdown, the offices of the NGOs will 
be visited by various local officials—from the 
water department, tax department, fire safety 
officers—and harassed about petty code 
violations. Often the landlord will abruptly 
cancel the lease, sometimes illegally, and 
evict the NGO. It is also very common over 
these years for government officials to ‘drink 
tea’ (he cha) with NGO staff or activists—to 
try and learn about their activities and deliver 
relatively polite warnings. But there have also 
been much more aggressive interventions by 
the government, often targeted at foreign 
funders, which impact on labour NGOs or 
university programs. In 2010, for example, 
Oxfam was bluntly forced to close programs 
at universities designed to expose students to 
public service experience. And sometimes the 
repression is violent—such as the knife attack 
that nearly killed labour NGO activist Huang 
Qingnan in 2007—which may have been 
initiated by bosses, but was done with little 
fear of state reprisal. So, no, I do not see this 
wave as unprecedented; far from it. At the 
same time, the repression is becoming deeper, 
broader, and more structured—the arrests of 
human rights lawyers, of the Feminist Five, 
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and now of the Guangzhou labour activists, 
plus the targeting of foreign funders and 
other kinds of foreign influence—this appears 
to be a new stage.
Kevin Slaten: The tightening of space for 
labour NGOs seems to be at the intersection 
of at least two larger trajectories. One 
is the broad closing of space for civil 
society, especially those organisations 
and individuals who partake in activities 
that could be construed as challenging the 
authority of the Communist Party—which 
includes the All-China Federation of Trade 
Unions (ACFTU)—either through framing 
or organisational capacity. 2015 and 2016 
witnessed broad harassment and arrests of 
feminists, lawyers, Christians, and other 
activists; the creation of new laws that 
further strengthen the government’s basis for 
repressing voices in civil society, including 
laws around security, the Internet, and NGO 
management; and a clear intention of the 
Communist Party to reinstate its authority 
at every level of society. The other trajectory 
is the slowing of the economy. This is driven 
by overcapacity in real estate, infrastructure, 
and manufacturing, a long-term impending 
industrial shift as lower tech sectors head 
out of China, and a gruelling anti-graft 
campaign putting a drag on local economies 
which depended in part on a certain level of 
collusion between business and government. 
Widespread factory closures, lay-offs, and 
labour disputes have ensued, threatening a 
foundational thread of the Party’s modern 
authority: a roaring economy and jobs. 
Some labour activists and NGOs exist at the 
intersection of these two trajectories. They 
are generally beholden to ideals that include 
fairness and justice, not beholden to the 
Party, which offends the first concern of the 
Party. The target population of labour NGOs 
also happens to be the group—workers—
which is losing the most during the economic 
slowdown, which offends the Party’s second 
concern. Given the framework above, in the 
long-term, either greater self-confidence on 
the part of the Communist Party or a return 
of rapid economic development could lead to 
the re-opening of space for labour NGOs. It is 
an open question when either of these factors 
will change anytime soon.
May Wong: The recent wave of repression 
against labour NGOs is an example meant to 
show the determination of the authorities to 
stop labour groups getting foreign funding. 
The Chinese economy has been slowing 
down and the export-oriented economy has 
been deteriorating. There have been lots of 
factory shutdowns, mergers, relocations to 
inner China or to other countries and thus 
many labour disputes and strikes to demand 
compensation. Labour NGOs in Guangdong 
have been using the recent provincial 
Regulations on Enterprise Collective 
Contracts to fight for the right of the 
workers to bargain collectively with factory 
bosses. The Regulations are not meant to be 
taken seriously, but labour activists really 
use them to empower the workers. The 
Shenzhen NGO activist Huang Qingnan (on 
the left) recovering in the hospital after a knife 
attack that nearly killed him in 2007. 
PC: Inmediahk.net
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authorities fear that if they allow labour 
NGO to organise workers, the situation may 
get out of control. From this point of view, 
the crackdown is a way to stop the growing 
labour activism before the labour movement 
becomes stronger. Of course, this is not the 
first crackdown in China and, before this, 
the arrest of five women activists in March 
2015 and the massive detention of lawyers 
also show that the authorities have changed 
their policy towards the development of civil 
society in China. Still, the crackdown is an 
‘unprecedented’ move since China opened up 
its economy in the late 1970s, as it puts a halt 
on the growing labour activism and the overall 
growing civil society in mainland China. 
In what way do you think the latest 
crackdown may change the landscape of civil 
society and what will it entail for the labour 
movement more generally?
Ellen David Friedman: In the last century 
or so, many countries adapted to the sharp 
inequalities of modern capitalism by 
establishing legal, enforceable channels 
for resolution of labour-capital disputes, 
including regulations for union elections, 
collective bargaining, arbitration, right to 
strike, and so on. Most of the progressive 
voices in China—labour activists, scholars, 
lawyers, and even a few trade union officials—
yearned for that development, and were 
briefly optimistic around 2007 and 2008 that 
this might happen. But it did not. Now there 
is a dawning recognition that it will not, at 
least under the current government. So the 
inevitable result is that there will be continued 
extra-legal resistance by workers—strikes, 
sabotage, riots, mass petitions—that will 
encounter increased state repression. Civil 
society looks unlikely to develop. This means 
that it will be nearly impossible for workers to 
consolidate their knowledge, their experience 
of struggle, their trust of one another, in 
any kind of formal organisation; it won’t be 
tolerated within the increasingly totalitarian 
framework. But, the direct resistance will of 
course continue, and I expect underground 
networks will inevitably continue to form—a 
harsh, but perhaps necessary, training ground 
for workers excluded from all other forms of 
self-determination.
Kevin Slaten: The crackdown may ultimately 
be aimed at trying to reassert the authority 
of the ACFTU among workers. By ‘clearing 
out’ the major potential organisational 
and principled challengers, the Party has 
ostensibly given the ACFTU an opportunity 
to become the hero for the massive proletariat 
created over the past two decades of neoliberal 
economic growth. To truly gain legitimacy 
among workers, the ACFTU would need 
to attain a much greater level of autonomy 
from the Party and representativeness for 
workers. But an autonomous union (or 
unions) would open up the door to a massive 
potential challenger to the Party, given the 
organisational potential of the union and the 
economic and political marginalisation of 
China’s working class. Professor Eli Friedman 
discusses this predicament for the Party in his 
recent book, The Insurgency Trap. It’s worth 
mentioning that if the Communist Party ever 
arrived at a point where it was comfortable 
enough to allow the ACFTU to become 
more autonomous as a true organisation of 
Chinese workers, then the resulting political 
environment would also probably leave space 
for independent labour activists and NGOs.
May Wong: In the future, Chinese labour 
NGOs will face a tougher environment, but I 
am optimistic that these groups will be able 
to adapt. Even in the recent crackdown, it is 
possible to discern some positive signs. For 
example, despite all the dirty tricks played by 
the authorities, we see that the key detained 
activists fought the false accusations 
levied against them. This is a good sign for 
the sustainability of the Chinese labour 
movement, as it shows that these people have 
a remarkable commitment to their mission, 
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which is fundamentally necessary to change 
the landscape of civil society in China. 
The authorities are well aware that labour 
activism in China is growing. For example, 
Meng Han, one of the activists detained in 
December 2015, was a worker representative 
in a labour dispute between security guards 
and a Guangzhou hospital, and had already 
been imprisoned for nine months in 2013. 
Roughly at the same time, Wu Guijun, a 
worker representative in a factory dispute 
in Shenzhen, was imprisoned for more 
than one year just because he took part in a 
strike. Instead of keeping silent after their 
release, both workers joined labour NGOs 
and continued to defend worker rights in 
South China. These two examples show that 
workers are more conscious about their class 
identity and more committed to organising 
their fellow workers. Imprisonment does not 
prevent them from upholding their mission.
How do you think the labour NGOs can best 
adapt to the new environment?
Ellen David Friedman: I am not at all 
optimistic. Of course it is up to those in the 
NGOs to decide their strategies, but their 
choices will become starker. If foreign funding 
is eventually choked off, will they look for 
ways to get these funds surreptitiously? That is 
very dangerous, but what are the alternatives? 
There really are not any domestic sources to 
fund labour NGOs. And who will carry on 
this work when NGO activists are surveyed, 
threatened, arrested, and immobilised? Some 
NGOs will try to change, and take up projects 
that are less sensitive—social enterprises, 
classes, cultural activities—but then the goal 
of promoting labour rights is lost. I expect that 
the state will largely succeed in disrupting 
and terminating the growth of labour NGOs 
in this period. But, the underlying problems 
will persist, and workers will still resist. So, 
out of this ferocious imbalance of power, 
something new will emerge. We just cannot 
see its outlines yet.
Kevin Slaten: It is not an easy environment 
in which to operate for people and 
organisations hoping to truly fight for the 
long-term interests of China’s working class. 
Labour NGOs have a number of options. They 
can bide their time by occupying themselves 
with less risky activities, which are limited 
in scope and impact. Labour groups can 
cooperate with local authorities to participate 
in activities that are in line with official 
interests, including social stability and social 
services. Both of these paths lead to the 
continuation of labour’s place in Chinese civil 
society, which is not all negative, even if it falls 
short of the hopes of political liberals inside 
and outside of China. Of course, despite the 
environment, labour NGOs can also choose 
to cross political lines, actively assist striking 
workers, and push for reforms through public 
advocacy. But they choose this road knowing 
that it carries a likely grave personal cost.
May Wong: The authorities should build 
up healthy labour relations by allowing space 
for workers and their elected representatives 
to resort to the various local collective 
consultation regulations to negotiate with 
bosses in order to improve wages and 
working conditions. They should also allow 
labour NGOs to support workers’ rights 
where the official union remains inactive. 
I am optimistic that labour NGOs will find 
new ways to adapt to the new environment. 
After all, Pandora’s box has been opened for 
a younger generation of Chinese migrant 
workers to develop their own ways to fight 
against capitalism for a better life, no matter 




Walmart Workers on strike.
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Walmart Workers on Strike Second Anniversary of Zhou 
Jianrong’s Suicide 
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(Left) Walmart workers stage a protest in a Shenzhen store 
at the end of June. (Right) Vigil to commemorate the second 
anniversary of Zhou Jianrong’s suicide. 
In July, the struggle of Walmart workers in China 
entered a new phase. Early that month, Walmart 
workers at retail stores in Nanchang, Chengdu, and 
Harbin staged wildcat strikes against the company’s 
new working hour system (see Anita Chan’s chapter 
on pp. 50–55 in the present book). Dozens of workers 
from each of these stores participated in the strikes, 
holding signs, and chanting slogans inside the Walmart 
premises. The strikes were coordinated via workers’ 
online networks facilitated by the Walmart Chinese 
Workers Association (WCWA), an informal group led 
by former employees of the company. The Financial 
Times reports that there were forty such WeChat 
groups with about twenty thousand members, roughly 
a fifth of Walmart’s workforce in China. The All-
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) neither 
organised nor intervened in the strikes. Workers 
ended their protest only after management promised 
a response, but the company never stopped pushing 
for the new working hour system to be adopted in its 
retails stores. These strikes represent a rare instance 
of cross-regional labour organisation leading to work 
stoppages. Since July, individual Walmart workers 
have taken the company to arbitration on issues 
related to the new working hour system. 
(Sources: China Labor Bulletin, The Financial 
Times, Xinjing Bao)
PC: WCWA
On 17 July, Chinese labour activists commemorated 
the second anniversary of the death of Zhou Jianrong, 
a forty-nine-year-old worker at a Hong Kong-owned 
footwear factory in Shenzhen. Two years ago, Zhou 
committed suicide by jumping out of her dormitory 
after being fired for her role in organising a strike. 
Since May 2014, Zhou and her co-workers had been 
struggling with the management over the issue of 
compensation following the company’s ownership 
restructuring. They were concerned they would 
lose out. In the protracted struggle, more than one 
hundred workers were fired by management. On 16 
July, the day before the suicide, the company had fired 
another sixteen activist workers, including Zhou. In 
Shenzhen, it would have been extremely difficult 
for female workers over the age of forty to find any 
factory work, and the loss of her job deeply distressed 
Zhou. Two years later, her death is not forgotten. A 
candlelight vigil was held in the office of a labour 
NGO in Guangzhou with more than a dozen former 
worker representatives and activists from Zhou’s 
factory. They proposed to mark 17 July as the ‘Day of 
Suffering of Chinese Workers’.
(Sources: Caixin, Radio Free Asia)
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Mounting Concerns about 
the Impact of the Economic 
Slowdown on Wage Growth
Wukan Sieged and Conquered 
PC: YOUTUBE
(Left)  A garment worker. (Right) Wukan villagers hold a 
demonstration in 2011.
In mid-July, China’s National Bureau of Statistics 
issued a report warning that sustaining economic 
and wage growth will be a challenge in the second 
half of 2016. In particular, the report cited industrial 
overcapacity in the state-owned coal and steel sectors, 
and  declining agricultural prices as contributing 
factors. In the first half of this year, inflation-adjusted 
disposable household income rose 6.5 percent, barely 
keeping pace with economic growth at 6.7 percent. 
However, in anticipation of slowing economic growth, 
the Chinese government has taken measures to 
moderate wage growth. The deputy director of China’s 
Bureau of Social Security and Human Resources, Xin 
Changxing, maintains that if Chinese companies are 
to remain competitive, the frequency and scale of 
wage adjustment should be slowed. In the first half 
of 2016, only six regions in China increased their 
local minimum wage, compared to thirteen regions 
in 2015. The average minimum wage increase is also 
slower: only eleven percent compared to 13.5 percent 
in the previous year. Mirroring the minimum wage 
adjustment, local governments’ annual guidelines 
for workplace salaries similarly propose slower wage 
growth. In addition, in August, the powerful National 
Development and Reform Commission released 
a document that described the relatively large 
amounts provided by the social insurance scheme 
as undermining the competitiveness of China’s 
manufacturing industry. This comes after sixteen 
provinces slightly reduced the percentage of social 
insurance contributions in the first half of 2016 in an 
effort to drive down labour costs. 
(Sources: Caixin, Jinghua Shibao, The South China 
Morning Post, Zhongguo Jingji Zhoukan, 21 Shiji 
Jingji Baodao)
On 19 June, hundreds of residents in the southern 
fishing village of Wukan, Guangdong province, 
returned to the street five years after protests had 
flared up against official corruption and land grabbing. 
The protesting villagers demanded the release of 
Village Chief Lin Zuluan, who had been detained on 
18 June for his persistent advocacy for land rights. 
Lin had been elected as chief of the village committee 
and Party secretary after he and others led a massive 
village protest in 2011 that secured a concession to 
hold democratic village elections (see also Luigi 
Tomba’s chapter on pp. 56–59 in the present book). 
The land issue at the heart of the protest, however, had 
become increasingly difficult to resolve. Frustrated, 
Lin attempted to mobilise villagers to collectively 
petition the government, but he was detained shortly 
afterwards. Following the detention of his grandson 
and having been denied access to his lawyers, Lin 
confessed to bribery charges. After his confession 
was taped and broadcasted on state television, he 
was sentenced to thirty-seven months in prison. 
For almost three months, villagers held daily public 
demonstrations. On 13 September, riot police broke 
into the village to detain thirteen villagers accused 
of inciting a mob and disrupting public order. The 
police were met with resistance by villagers, and with 
many injured; however, since this time the protest has 
subsided.
(Sources: The Initium, The New York Times, BBC)
PC: SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
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Flurry of Legislative Activity on 
Civil Society Organisations
Panyu Labour Activists 
Sentenced, Lu Yuyu Beaten in Jail
PC: ON.CC
After the passing of the Charity Law and the highly 
controversial Foreign NGOs Law earlier this year, over 
the summer, the Chinese authorities have continued to 
move forward with the revision of legislation related 
to the management of civil society organisations. Since 
June, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued draft 
registration and management regulations for public 
comment for all three types of social organisations 
legally recognised in China: foundations (jijinhui), 
social service organisations (shehui fuwu jigou), 
and social association (shehui tuanti). As long-time 
observer of Chinese civil society Shawn Shieh has 
pointed out in his blog NGOs in China, ‘these three 
sets of regulations form the heart of the regulatory 
system governing the registration and management 
of social organisations—China’s equivalent of not-for-
profit organisations.’ Complementary administrative 
regulations in either draft, provisional, or final form 
have also been concurrently released. The rationale 
behind the new legislation is spelled out in an 
‘Opinion’ jointly released by the General Office of 
the Communist Party’s Central Committee and the 
General Office of the State Council on 21 August. 
According to this document, the overall goal of the 
reform is to see that by 2020 China will have achieved 
‘the complete and sound building of a Chinese-style 
social organisation management system that features 
unified registration, with each undertaking their own 
duties, coordination and cooperation, responsibilities 
according to level, and oversight on the basis of the 
law.’ In the new legal and political environment, 
‘government and social organisations [will be] 
separate, powers and obligations [will be] clear, and 
self-regulation [will be] practiced in line with the 
law,’ but at the same time ‘Party organisations [will 
be] playing a more obvious role.’
(Sources: China Law Translate 1, China Law 
Translate 2, NGOs in China, Central Government 
Website)
On 26 September, the Panyu district court in 
Guangzhou held separate hearings for labour activists 
Zeng Feiyang, Zhu Xiaomei, and Tang Huanxing. 
Zeng was sentenced to three years imprisonment, 
suspended for four years, for ‘gathering a crowd to 
disturb social order’, while Zhu and Tang received 
prison sentences of eighteen months, suspended for 
two years, for the same charge. The case of Meng 
Han, another activist who refused to cooperate with 
the judicial authorities, was sent back to the police 
for further investigation (he already had a previous 
conviction back in 2014 for organising hospital 
security guards). All activists worked for the Panyu 
Migrant Workers Centre, an outspoken labour NGO 
based in Guangzhou that has, over the past few years, 
distinguished itself for taking on several high-profile 
collective cases. After being arrested in a coordinated 
crackdown against labour activists in early December 
2015, Zeng and his colleagues were formally accused 
of ‘gathering a crowd to disturb social order’. While 
Zhu and Tang were released on bail after a few weeks, 
Zeng and Meng remained under detention for almost 
ten months. Worrying news has also emerged about 
blogger Lu Yuyu, chronicler of protests in China, and 
his girlfriend and collaborator Li Tingyu who have 
been detained since 15 June. On 31 August, Lu met 
his lawyer at the Dali Bai Autonomous Prefecture 
Detention Centre, and told him that he had been 
beaten by officers and was suffering from sleep 
deprivation after having been exposed to strong light 
at night. Amnesty International has called for urgent 
action in support of Lu and Li.
(Sources: Amnesty International, China Labor 
Bulletin, The New York Times)
(Right) Labour activist Zeng Feiyang 
signs a document in court.




Since China’s opening up in 1978, the 
Chinese party-state has put great effort into 
reforming the labour law system. During the 
1990s, the 1992 Trade Union Law, 1994 Labour 
Law, and the 1995 Arbitration Law were 
enacted. In 2001 and 2004, the revised Trade 
Union Law and Provisions on Minimum Wage 
were promulgated respectively. In 2007, the 
Labour Contract Law was passed. All these 
events may be easily taken at face value as a 
sign of the commitment of the party-state to 
advance labour rights. 
This article, however, argues that the labour 
law system is a vital vehicle through which the 
Chinese party-state has constructed capitalist 
hegemony with regard to state-capital-labour 
relations in the country. While Marx and 
Engels, as well as Lenin, mostly focussed on 
the oppressive nature of the state, in Prison 
Notebooks Gramsci advanced the idea that 
the power of the ruling class is organised by 
the state in both political society and civil 
society through ‘coercion’ plus ‘hegemony’ 
(Gramsci 1971). He contended that the 
coercive machinery of the state helps sustain 
the domination of the capitalist class, but 
at the same time it has to acquire the active 
consent of the working class by establishing 
what Joseph Femia termed ‘its own moral, 
political and cultural values as conventional 
norms of practical behaviour’ in order to 
sustain its class rule (Femia 1987, 3). The 
ideological ascendency of the capitalist class 
over the subaltern classes is what Gramsci 
called ‘hegemony’. 
For years, Chinese migrant workers have 
carried out contentious actions to strive for 
defaulted wages, compensation for workplace 
injury, overtime payment, and so forth. 
Recently, democratic enterprise trade union 
elections, decent wages above the minimum 
wage rate, compensation related to factories’ 
closure or relocation, and payments of social 
insurance have also been key demands of 
migrant workers. Some studies point out that 
migrant workers have manifested a growing 
level of class consciousness over time (Chan 
Since China’s opening up, the Chinese party-
state has put great effort into reforming its 
labour laws. Taken at face value, the new laws 
and regulations adopted in these decades may 
easily be seen as a sign of the commitment 
of the party-state to advance labour rights. 
This article contradicts this view through an 
examination of how the labour law system in 
China has been utilised to build up hegemony 
and dampen workers’ class consciousness.
The Neglected Side 
of the Coin:
Legal Hegemony, Class 
Consciousness, and 
Labour Politics in China
Elaine Sio-ieng Hui
This article is based on two of the author’s 
publications: ‘The Labour Law System, Capitalist 
Hegemony and Class Politics in China’, The 
China Quarterly (226): 431-455; and Hegemonic 
Transformation: The State, Laws and Labour 
Relations in Post-Socialist China, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York (forthcoming).
Portrait of Antonio Gramsci
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interviewed noted that ‘labour laws must 
have been passed for good reason. They were 
made by professionals; they, thus, must have 
taken into consideration national and social 
needs.’ Many workers have taken labour 
laws as a yardstick for measuring employer 
behaviour—if employers do not violate the 
Labour Law, then paying workers low wages 
is not unjust. This ‘normalising mechanism’ 
embedded in the labour law system does not 
simply legitimise low wages, but also covertly 
endorses market principles such as waged 
labour, private property rights, surplus value 
extraction, commodification of labour, and so 
forth. 
Another mechanism—which I define as a 
‘countervailing mechanism’—is incorporated 
into the labour law system to strengthen 
capitalist dominance. Despite its pro-capital 
essence, the labour law system provides 
aggrieved workers with a platform for 
resolving labour disputes, such as mediation, 
arbitration, and litigation. Being unaware of 
the many limitations of this system, because 
of the countervailing mechanism, many 
workers believe that the market economy is 
not structurally exploitative, and that their 
hardships are a result of erratic misdeeds 
from idiosyncratic employers. In one of my 
interviews, a migrant worker commented: 
‘Some factories are really bad… But when 
my employer is problematic, I can simply 
complain to the labour bureau or sue the boss. 
There was no law when we first worked in the 
cities; now things have improved.’ For some 
workers, the juridical sphere is autonomous 
from the capitalist economy, and labour laws 
are a useful tool for remedying misbehaviour 
occurring in the economic realm. 
Concerning state-labour relations, the 
abundance of labour laws in China, which on 
paper are very comprehensive and seemingly 
try to constrain and regulate employers, has 
convinced some workers that the party-state 
protects workers. They, thus, do not attribute 
worker misfortunes to the state’s pro-capital 
bias. As a worker I interviewed noted: ‘In the 
and Pun 2009). Workers’ class consciousness 
and capitalist hegemony are two sides of the 
same coin. Hegemony is the endeavour of the 
ruling class to constitute workers’ worldviews 
and values in such ways that the latter may 
criticise, but not challenge fundamentally, 
the legitimacy of the capitalist economy and 
the party-state, and that they may resist, but 
not take rebellious actions to transform the 
socio-political and economic systems. In 
other words, through establishing capitalist 
hegemony, the ruling class aims to forestall the 
emergence of workers’ class consciousness, 
which is a cardinal factor in inducing system-
changing initiatives. Focussing on the 
often-neglected side of the coin, this article 
examines how the labour law system in China 
has been utilised to build up hegemony and 
dampen workers’ class consciousness.
The labour law system has been given a 
greater role in the mediation of industrial 
relations in post-reform China. The concept 
of ‘yifa zhiguo’ (rule of law) was added to the 
Chinese constitution in 1999 and the notion 
of ‘yifa weiquan’ (defending rights according 
to the law) has been widely promoted by the 
party-state (see also the Forum on the rule of 
law on pp. 98–105 in the present book). The 
labour law system has produced a double 
hegemony, which seeks to deflect radical 
worker opposition against both the market 
economy and the party-state. Concerning 
capital-labour relations, despite complaining 
about poor income, many workers still 
approve of the meagre wages offered by 
their employers. As one female worker 
whom I interviewed back in 2013 remarked: 
‘I go to work according to the schedule; it 
is fair and just, so long as my employer does 
not underpay me.’ Another male worker I 
The Double Hegemony 
Buttressing Market and 
Party-State
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Those workers who have rendered active 
consent to the capitalist leadership approve 
of the official legal discourses and labour 
law practices (see also the chapter by Ivan 
Franceschini on pp. 84–87 in the present 
book). Most of them perceive of economic 
reforms and economic growth in a positive 
light. They endorse the state’s development 
strategy of ‘letting some people get rich first’, 
which is akin to the liberal ‘trickle down 
economics’ theory, believing that economic 
progress fuelled by the state’s pro-business 
policies will eventually benefit other members 
of the society. Many of them believe that 
employers would have been above reproach 
had they paid workers wages according to 
the labour laws. The market economy and the 
wealthy class are thought to have created jobs 
for workers and prosperity for the country, 
rather than exploiting labour. 
Workers who have rendered passive 
consent to capitalist leadership have neither 
completely assented to it, nor fundamentally 
challenged it. Some workers do not place 
full trust in the labour law system because 
of the gap between their work experiences 
and the unfulfilled promises of the official 
legal rhetoric. However, the labour law 
system is still able to elicit passive consent 
from them because, as Joseph Femia put it, 
their ‘spontaneous discontent is contained by 
the pre-existing categories of the dominant 
ideology’ (Femia 1987, 137). This means that, 
even though they disapprove of the juridico-
political and economic system, their criticism 
is constrained by the ideational framework 
produced by the ruling bloc. Although these 
workers discredit the labour law system, their 
criticism usually targets implementational 
issues rather than asymmetrical power 
relations embedded within the system. Many 
of them maintain that the central government 
has good intentions to protect workers with 
labour laws; they attribute the failing labour 
law system to the fault of local governments 
or officials. 
past, there were no regulations on wages, and 
we just earned a little. But now, enterprises 
must follow the laws and pay us the minimum 
wage. Our situation is much better now…’ 
This ‘concealing mechanism’ embedded in 
the labour law system induces some workers 
to believe that the Chinese political regime is 
‘autonomous’ from the market economy and 
is willing to curb economic misdeeds. Hence, 
they do not fundamentally challenge the 
party-state’s legitimacy. 
The concealing mechanism usually goes 
hand in hand with another mechanism—the 
‘transmuting mechanism’—to protect the 
Chinese Party-state from workers’ radical 
challenges. Due to the decentralised politics 
of China, the central government delegates 
the task of capital accumulation to local 
governments, while it focuses its attention 
on maintaining political legitimacy and 
social harmony (Lee 2007). Some workers, 
therefore, perceive government corruption 
and its pro-business bias as being caused by 
local governments or officials. In the words 
of a worker I interviewed: ‘I think the central 
government doesn’t have any problems; it 
has legislated many labour laws to protect 
workers. The problem lies with the local 
governments who protect businesses too 
much.’ In brief, the transmuting mechanism 
shifts the target of workers’ contempt from 
systemic state-capital collusion to local 
governments. 
Through the aforementioned four 
mechanisms, the labour law system has been 
able to impose double hegemony on some 
workers. However, the double hegemony has 
influenced Chinese migrant workers in an 
uneven manner. Some workers have granted 
active consent to the ruling class through the 
mediation of the labour law system, while 
some others have rendered passive consent. 
Some, however, have given no consent at all. 
An Uneven Influence
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than two hundred rights-lawyers and legal 
assistants were detained by the government 
without following proper legal procedures. 
In December of the same year, seven labour 
NGO activists were arrested—five of them 
were formally charged at a later date for 
‘gathering a crowd to disrupt public order’ 
and ‘embezzlement’—and they were denied 
many legal rights, such as the rights to 
communication with lawyers and families. 
Some of the detained activists were made to 
confess their alleged crimes on television. 
These incidents have aroused tremendous 
concern at both the international and national 
level. Still, it is important to highlight the 
fact that the greater the discrepancies 
between the government’s rhetoric and the 
legal reality is, the easier it is for workers to 
become distrustful of the juridico-political 
system and to overcome the deception of the 
legally-mediated double hegemony.  
Some workers have given no consent 
to the ruling class at all. These workers 
have formulated radical challenges to both 
the market economy and the party-state; 
and they refuse to follow the ruling bloc’s 
leadership. They are relatively immune to the 
normalising mechanism of legal hegemony. 
They do not see legal minimum wages as fair 
or just; instead they measure their wages 
against how much their employers earn. In 
addition, they are not influenced much by 
the countervailing mechanism. Some of them 
understand that the legal and the economic 
are not independent from each other; that 
the law-making process and legal content are 
biased towards employers; and that workers 
and capitalists are on unequal footing within 
the legal realm. Moreover, the concealing 
mechanism and the transmuting mechanism 
have little effect on them. They see through 
the intricate relations between government 
and businesses, and do not construe the 
party-state as wholly autonomous from the 
capitalist class. They do not simply blame the 
local governments or officials, but censure 
the central government or the party-state en 
bloc. 
The differing degrees in which the impact 
of this legal hegemony on workers expose its 
fragility and precariousness, which are the 
results of a number of factors. At the economic 
level, unbalanced economic development 
and growing social inequality have laid the 
material foundation for worker contestation 
to capitalist leadership. At the associational 
level, the Party-led trade unions are unable 
to secure short-term material concessions for 
workers and, hence, worker allegiance to the 
ruling bloc. At the legal level, the party-state 
has failed to consistently uphold the legal 
ideals it has reproduced; the discrepancies 
between legal ideals and legal reality have 
produced disenchantment. In July 2015, more 
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One fascinating question concerning labour 
activism in contemporary China regards the 
attitude of Chinese migrant workers towards 
the law. In recent years, much has been 
written about the ‘rights awakening’ (quanli 
de juexing) of Chinese workers. But what 
kind of rights are we talking about? Do they 
respond to an entirely subjective concept of 
justice or do they somehow coincide with 
the entitlements provided by the labour 
legislation? And what is the relationship 
that binds legal awareness (falü yishi), rights 
consciousness (quanli yishi), and solidarity 
(tuanjie yishi)? That these elements do not 
necessarily go hand in hand is highlighted by 
the following testimony by a labour activist 
whom I interviewed in Shenzhen in 2014: 
If ten [young migrants] come to me saying 
that their rights have been violated, they 
usually want to sue the company, but don’t 
know how. Although I suggest that they sue 
the company together, they generally choose 
to do it separately. I don’t think of this as a 
contradiction. If legal consciousness and 
solidarity consciousness are so low, how can 
they have such a high awareness of rights 
protection (weiquan yishi)? For example, if 
one of their fathers had his rights violated, he 
would choose to stay silent. If the son has his 
rights violated, he will explode and fight. If 
he didn’t sign a labour contract and gets fired, 
he will ask for double wage as compensation. 
But they don’t know anything about these 
compensations, they only know that their 
bosses have deceived them.
[Interview, Shenzhen, October 2014]
It is with these and other questions in mind 
that a few years ago I undertook a survey among 
the employees of nine Italian metal mechanic 
factories (either joint ventures or wholly 
foreign owned enterprises) in three Chinese 
cities: Shenzhen, Yangzhou, and Chongqing. 
In three rounds of interviews—respectively in 
2012, 2014, and 2015— I was able to conduct 
1,379 questionnaires at the gates of the 
In recent years, much has been written about 
the ‘rights awakening’ of Chinese workers. But 
what kind of rights are we talking about? Do 
they respond to an entirely subjective concept 
of justice or do they somehow coincide with the 
entitlements provided by the labour legislation? 
On the basis of a survey carried out among 1,379 
employees of Italian metal mechanic companies 
in China, this article will attempt to answer 
three key questions: how do Chinese workers 
perceive the labour contract? How much do they 
know about labour legislation and how does this 
knowledge affect their trust of the law? What do 
they think about going on strike as a strategy to 
protect their rights?
Chinese Workers 
and the Law: 
Misplaced Trust?
Ivan Franceschini
A fuller set of data can be found in the author’s 
book: Lavoro e diritti in Cina: Politiche sul lavoro e 
attivismo operaio nella fabbrica del mondo (Labour 
and rights in China: Labour policies and worker 
activism in the world factory), Il Mulino, Bologna, 
2016.
Wu Tingshan, a worker in Shenzhen interviewd for 
the documentary Dreamwork China in 2011
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various factories, without any knowledge or 
interference by the management. The workers 
in my sample were mostly men (74.2 per cent); 
24.5 per cent of them were born before 1980, 
45.4 per cent in the Eighties, and 30.1 per 
cent in the Nineties; and their educational 
level was medium-high, with 32.7 per cent of 
the workers having graduated from middle 
school, 22.1 per cent from high school, 20.2 
per cent from middle technical school, and 
18.9 per cent from higher technical school.
Were all these workers migrants? Actually, 
only 63.7 per cent of the respondents had a 
rural household registration (nongye hukou), 
the traditional parameter to determine a 
worker’s status as an internal migrant. Still, 
taking the hukou as a parameter that defines 
the identity of Chinese workers today may be 
quite treacherous, as many ‘urban’ employees 
of the factories in Chongqing and peri-urban 
Yangzhou were local farmers whose status 
had been ‘upgraded’ following the new 
policies of forced urbanisation adopted by the 
local authorities. Similarly, only thirty-three 
per cent of the workers came from a different 
province—with the significant exception of 
Shenzhen, where only 11.3 per cent of the 
workers were from Guangdong—a finding 
that mirrors the growing importance of intra-
provincial migrations in China.
In my survey, I attempted to measure 
the awareness of these workers regarding 
some key aspects of labour law, as well as 
their expectations towards wages and work 
hours. Yet in this article I will focus on three 
questions: how do Chinese workers perceive 
the labour contract? How much do they 
know about labour legislation and how does 
this knowledge affect their trust of the law? 
What do they think about going on strike as a 
strategy to protect their rights? 
At the cornerstone of the discourse of the 
party-state on ‘harmonious labour relations’ 
(hexie laodong guanxi), labour contracts can 
provide some interesting insights on the way 
Chinese workers relate to the labour law 
and the relevant propaganda. 97.2 per cent 
of the workers in my survey had signed an 
individual labour contract, a clear proof of the 
commitment of the authorities to enforce the 
labour contract system, at least in the industry 
I considered (in other sectors, for instance 
the construction sector, the rate is remarkably 
lower, and according to official data from the 
National Bureau of Statistics in 2015 only 36.2 
per cent of all migrant workers had signed a 
labour contract with their employer). But how 
many workers believed in the importance of 
the contract as an instrument to protect their 
rights? A question I asked is whether the 
workers had read the clauses of the contract 
before signing it. Only 26.7 per cent of them 
had read them carefully (zixi yuedu), while 
46.5 per cent just had had a quick look (suibian 
kan), and 26.8 per cent had signed without 
reading (qianming eryi). This seems to display 
a certain disinterest in the labour contract, 
as if it were an irrelevant piece of paper. Yet, 
when directly asked whether they considered 
contracts as an effective tool to protect their 
rights, 22.3 per cent of the workers responded 
affirmatively (keyi) and 49.2 per cent was 
relatively optimistic (hai keyi), compared 
with only 7.3 per cent who expressed disbelief 
(bu keyi), and 21.2 per cent who did not know 
how to answer. In essence, almost two thirds 
of the workers trusted the capacity of labour 
contracts to protect them.
I then asked whom they thought was the 
main beneficiary of a labour contract. Although 
the Labour Contract Law that came into force 
in 2008 is rather favourable to workers when 
it comes to the resolution and severance of 
labour relations, somehow unsurprisingly 
82.5 per cent of the respondents believed that 
a labour contract benefitted both employer 
and employee, while only 3.5 per cent declared 
that the worker was the one to benefit the 
most. Still, there was a significant minority of 
workers (12.8 per cent) who believed that the 
Labour Contracts
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labour contract benefitted only the company. 
This was because in the eyes of some workers 
a labour contract is a significant restraint to 
mobility, and mobility—i.e. ‘voting with your 
feet’ (yi jiao toupiao)—often is the only way 
to resist corporate exploitation. As a migrant 
worker whom I interviewed in 2011 for the 
documentary Dreamwork China said:
A contract? It is like this: if you sign it, you 
cannot leave for the next three months. If 
you don’t sign it, you can leave whenever you 
want, even before a month. If it is an annual 
contract, you have to work for at least three 
months or you cannot quit. This is the labour 
contract. [Interview, Shenzhen, January 2011]
  
 This relative confidence in labour contracts 
opens some further questions about how 
Chinese workers perceive the labour law. 
Without going into too much detail, I found 
that the workers in my sample to have a 
selective knowledge of the provisions of the 
labour legislation, exemplified by the 1995 
Labour Law and the 2008 Labour Contract 
Law. In particular, they were very aware of 
clauses that affected their direct economic 
interests—such as those that regulate the way 
overtime wages are calculated (90.6 per cent 
of the workers were aware)—while knowing 
very little about other aspects of the labour 
legislation, which they probably perceived as 
less relevant to their income. For instance, just 
17.5 per cent of the workers knew that they 
were supposed to work no more than thirty-
six hours of overtime a month. Similarly, 
only 25.1 per cent of the workers could write 
down the correct local minimum wage (on 
the whole, though, I found that the higher a 
worker’s basic wage, the less likely he/she is to 
know the correct minimum wage). Even more 
important, I found a clear divide between the 
knowledge of individual rights—generally low 
but still existing—and that of collective rights. 
Many workers had no clear idea about what a 
trade union is (11.4 per cent had never heard 
the word ‘trade union’ before), and 98.2 per 
cent of the respondents had no idea of what 
‘collective negotiation’ (jiti xieshang)—the 
Chinese watered-down version of collective 
bargaining—was.  
 In spite of (or maybe due to) this highly 
selective knowledge, when I asked the workers 
whether they believed that the existing labour 
legislation was able to protect them, most of 
them were quite optimist. 5.7 per cent were 
absolutely sure that it could (wanquan neng) 
and 49.6 per cent were slightly less sure, but 
still quite positive about it (yinggai keyi). 
On the contrary, 34.1 per cent were dubious 
(yexu neng) and 10.5 per cent were definitely 
sceptical (bu neng). If these results display 
a considerable confidence in the law, it is 
interesting that this perception does not 
derive from a personal experience with the 
Chinese legal system. In fact, only 3.3 per cent 
of the workers in the sample had dealt with 
a labour dispute by legal means before. This 
apparently confirms what Mary Gallagher and 
Yuhua Wang found out in a previous study, 
that ‘non-users [of the legal system] tend to 
have vague but benevolent notions of the legal 
system and its effectiveness’ (Gallagher and 
Wang 2011, 204). 
   
 
How do strikes figure within such a 
‘benevolent notion’ of the legal system? 
My survey shows that trusting the law and 
resorting to strikes are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. While China has ratified 
the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, which at article 
8.1 (d) binds the government to ensure ‘the 
right to strike, provided that it is exercised 
in conformity with the laws of the particular 
country’, the Chinese legislation does not 
mention the right to strike at all, consigning 
Legal Knowledge and 
Trust towards the Law
Perception of Strikes
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it to a grey area (Chang and Cooke 2015). 
Since even Chinese scholars have not reached 
a conclusion on the legality of industrial 
actions in China, I therefore did not expect 
the workers to have a clear idea on this issue. 
Yet, when I asked them whether they believed 
that going on strike was legal or illegal, I was 
surprised to find out that 38.5 per cent of the 
respondents said that it was legal, compared 
with only 13.9 per cent who believed the 
opposite (the rest did not know). That such 
a high percentage of workers expressed the 
belief that strikes are legal is quite impressive. 
It means that many workers in China believe 
that the law—and therefore the apparatus 
of the party-state—will support them in the 
event of a strike. This may be taken as a hint 
of the extent to which the work of propaganda 
and legal dissemination undertaken by the 
Chinese authorities in the past two decades 
has succeeded.
 Still, the idea that going on strike is ‘legal’ 
does not mean that Chinese workers are 
willing to protest at the slightest perceived 
violation of their rights. The right to strike is 
often framed by the workers in moral rather 
than legal terms, as a last resort after all other 
avenues of redress have failed. As a young 
respondent said: ‘In a situation in which 
there is no choice other than going on strike, 
you cannot say that it is illegal. Still, the 
workers do not want to go on strike without 
reason’ [Interview, Shenzhen, April 2012]. 
Nevertheless, when I asked what they thought 
about going on strike as a strategy to protect 
their rights, 43.3 per cent of the respondents 
were either favourable or extremely 
favourable, compared with only 26.8 per cent 
who were against or absolutely against it (29.8 
per cent did not know).
 
  
The data presented in this article show 
that when discussing the ‘rights awakening’ 
of Chinese workers it is important to 
consider what we mean by the term ‘rights’. 
In particular, more attention should be paid 
to the way these workers respond to the 
official discourse on labour rights promoted 
by the party-state through the labour law and 
other relevant policy documents. As I have 
attempted to show, the official discourse 
is deeply rooted in the mind of the workers 
in my sample. This can been seen in two 
respects: the workers’ conviction that labour 
contracts and the labour law can protect them; 
and their selective knowledge of the labour 
law provisions, strongly unbalanced towards 
individual rights with direct economic 
implications. This ‘benevolent notion’ of the 
legal system even affects the perception of 
strikes, which are considered ‘legal’ by a very 
significant portion of the workforce. This 
means that many Chinese workers believe that 
the apparatus of the party-state will support 
them in their decision to go on strike—at least 
as long as they have a ‘reasonable’ motivation 
to do so. If these findings do not provide 
a definite answer to the wider theoretical 
questions outlined at the beginning of the 
article, they nonetheless warrant some further 
attention when discussing the ‘awakening’ of 
the Chinese working class.
Conclusions
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A decade ago, the Chinese authorities adopted 
a set of new laws to grant increased legal 
protections to workers and easier access to the 
legal system to enforce their rights through 
litigation. Since then, Chinese workers have 
increasingly turned to labour arbitration and 
courts in the hope of resolving their grievances. 
But how do they fare in this process? And are 
they able to find legal representation?
Chinese Workers 
and the Legal 
System: 
Bridging the Gap in 
Representation
Aaron Halegua
In 2007, the Chinese authorities issued 
the Labour Contract Law to grant new legal 
protections to workers and the Labour 
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law 
to make it easier for them to enforce their 
rights through litigation. In the decade that 
followed, Chinese workers have increasingly 
turned to labour arbitration and courts in the 
hope of resolving their grievances. But how 
do they fare in this process? Are they able 
to find legal representation? In China, as 
elsewhere, a significant ‘representation gap’ 
exists between workers’ legal needs and the 
available legal services.
A new report that I authored, Who Will 
Represent China’s Workers? Lawyers, Legal 
Aid, and the Enforcement of Labour Rights, 
takes an in-depth look at the landscape of 
enforcing worker rights in China, with a 
particular focus on trends in labour rights 
litigation and the availability of legal 
representation (Halegua 2016). The report 
draws on over one hundred interviews, 
observations from litigation proceedings, 
and an extensive review of published and 
unpublished written materials. The executive 
summary lists seven ‘key findings’, including 
that the number and diversity of labour 
disputes is rising; mediation has become 
the predominant means of resolving labour 
disputes; workers are often unsuccessful in 
litigation; and represented workers achieve 
better outcomes in litigation.
Finding competent legal representation 
to assist in the litigation process remains 
a challenge for workers, however. Due to 
economic and political considerations, 
private lawyers and law firms are reluctant 
to represent workers. ‘Barefoot lawyers’ have 
been essentially banned and labour NGOs 
are significantly constrained in the current 
political environment. More workers are 
represented each year by the government-
sponsored legal aid system, which pays 
private lawyers a set stipend to handle cases 
regardless of the outcome. But many workers 
are still turned away and those who receive a 
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when violations are detected, a fine against 
the employer is only imposed in 3.4 percent 
of cases. Accordingly, measures are needed 
to both encourage workers to come forward 
with violations and raise the penalties for 
employers who are not in compliance—
which the first two strategies do. The third 
strategy—growing a robust plaintiffs’ bar—
most directly addresses the ‘supply’ side of 
the representation gap, but a heightened 
threat of litigation against employers could 
also lead to increased compliance. 
 
Employer retaliation against workers who 
complain about unfair or illegal working 
conditions is commonplace—not only in 
China, but also other countries. In the United 
States, for instance, over forty-four percent 
of the nearly ninety thousand charges filed 
with the federal anti-discrimination agency 
in 2015 contained an allegation of retaliation, 
making it the most frequent complaint. This 
agency even made combating retaliation a 
‘national priority’. As for China, a survey 
of Foxconn employees revealed that over 
forty-seven percent of workers experienced 
retaliation after raising a complaint. Eighty 
percent of Guangzhou workers feared that 
suing their employer would result in their 
termination. If workers are too afraid to 
complain about violations, employers will not 
be held accountable. With nothing to fear, 
employers will continue violating the law. 
The Chinese government may consider 
adopting anti-retaliation protections for 
workers who protest employer violations 
of discrimination, workplace safety, and 
other labour laws. The concept of an anti-
retaliation measure is not foreign to China. 
Indeed, similar protections already exist for 
trade union officers, workers who complain 
to the labour inspectorate, and certain 
witnesses. The best model may be the fairly 
Anti-Retaliation Measures
lawyer are often dissatisfied with the quality 
of the representation. 
In addition to describing the above trends, 
the report takes an initial step towards 
quantifying the representation gap and other 
aspects of labour litigation. In collaboration 
with the Chinese data analytics company 
Legal Miner, over thirty thousand publicly 
available court decisions were collected 
and then analysed to determine how many 
workers have a legal representative, the 
identity of these representatives (licensed 
lawyers versus other providers), and the 
average length of the court proceedings. A 
significant number of workers, roughly forty 
percent, had no legal representation in court. 
However, plaintiffs who make it all the way to 
court are only the tip of the iceberg in terms 
of workers who need legal assistance but are 
unable to obtain it.
In light of this representation gap, the 
penultimate section of the report sets 
forth eight practical strategies to narrow 
the chasm and improve the enforcement 
of labour rights. Some proposals seek to 
decrease the ‘demand’ for legal services by 
reducing labour violations in the first place. 
Others are designed to increase the ‘supply’ 
of quality legal representation for workers. In 
the remainder of this article, I discuss three 
of these strategies that have received less 
attention: (1) strengthening anti-retaliation 
measures; (2) imposing criminal sanctions 
and establishing personal liability for 
employers; and (3) encouraging the growth of 
a plaintiffs’ bar.
The first two strategies address the ‘demand’ 
side of the representation gap. One crucial 
reason for the prevalence of noncompliance 
with labour standards, and thus the large 
number of aggrieved workers, is the lack 
of adequate deterrents for employers. The 
labour inspectorate in China, which enforces 
labour laws, employs just one inspector for 
every thirty thousand workers. For the most 
part, investigations only occur in response to a 
worker filing a complaint. Furthermore, even 
89MADE IN CHINA - EYE IN THE SKY
governments to increase both the number 
of criminal prosecutions and their impact. 
Chinese officials complain that the most 
significant obstacle to achieving more 
prosecutions is the poor evidence that workers 
bring to the government. Accordingly, one 
potential area for cooperation is for the 
government to educate lawyers and labour 
NGOs about the types of cases and evidence 
they seek, and for these advocates to then 
identify cases that are ripe for prosecution—
thus resulting in more prosecutions. Another 
aspect of this type of cooperation would be 
for labour advocates to assist in publicising 
the prosecutions that occur. If employers are 
aware that these prosecutions are happening, 
and with increasing frequency, they are more 
likely to be deterred from committing similar 
violations.
An additional prong of this deterrence 
strategy is to create civil liability for individual 
employers. At present, an individual does not 
have the capacity to be an ‘employer’ under 
Chinese labour law. Therefore, a judgment 
for unpaid wages can only be issued against 
the corporate entity that employed a worker 
and may only be enforced against the assets 
of the corporation. The individual employer 
has little to fear. Labour law scholar Xie 
Zengyi writes that this lack of individual 
accountability has a lot to do with the poor 
implementation of labour law in China (Xie 
2015). Therefore, labour advocates should 
propose establishing such individual liability 
so that judgments can be enforced against the 
personal assets of the individual employer.
Given their current reluctance, the 
emergence of a bar of Chinese lawyers 
committed to representing workers would 
significantly help to narrow the representation 
gap and improve the enforcement of labour 
rights. If the compensation structure were 
properly aligned, attorneys could become 
robust anti-retaliation provisions to protect 
whistle-blowers that China promulgated in 
2016, which includes a broad list of actions 
that constitute retaliation. 
Labour advocates might propose that any 
amendments to the Labour Contract Law, 
which is rumoured to be revised in the near 
future, include an anti-retaliation provision. 
This would provide an opportunity not only 
to explicitly prohibit retaliation, but also 
establish procedures for handling complaints 
and set meaningful penalties against 
violators. In light of speculation that the other 
amendments will be designed to increase 
the flexibility of employers, and may even 
broaden the grounds upon which employees 
can be terminated, it is particularly important 
to make explicit that workers cannot be fired 
for challenging illegal conditions in the 
workplace. 
Another strategy to deter employer 
noncompliance is to hold them personally 
accountable for any violations, including 
through criminal prosecutions. In 2011, 
China amended its Criminal Law to establish 
criminal penalties—including fines and 
imprisonment—for the malicious non-
payment of wages. Where an employer has 
been ordered to pay a ‘comparatively large 
sum’ of wages, but instead chooses to transfer 
assets or otherwise evades payment, he 
may be held criminally liable. The Chinese 
government has already demonstrated some 
willingness to undertake these prosecutions: 
753 cases were prosecuted in 2014 and nearly 
one thousand and two hundred in 2015, an 
increase of fifty-eight percent. But while 
Shenzhen alone brought ninety-three cases in 
2014, Beijing did not prosecute its first case 
until 2013 and is reported to only undertake 
about forty per year.
Labour advocates should engage local 
Criminal Prosecutions and 
Personal Liability
Plaintiffs’ Bar
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entrepreneurial and zealous advocates for 
workers. The report recommends reforms in 
three areas—contingency fee arrangements, 
aggregate litigation, and fee-shifting 
provisions—that would help create such 
incentives.
Contingency fee arrangements—by which 
the lawyer only collects fees if the client 
recovers money—are generally banned 
in labour cases. Workers are therefore 
required to pay legal fees upfront, which 
many cannot afford. Permitting contingency 
fee arrangements would allow lawyers 
to represent workers with strong cases, 
regardless of whether they could afford to 
pay. Moreover, as contingency fees are often 
calculated based on a percentage of the 
compensation awarded to the worker, they 
may allow attorneys to earn more money in 
cases where there are sizeable recoveries.
Bringing collective or class litigation is 
difficult in China. But aggregating small, 
individual claims can be an effective way 
to make litigating those cases economically 
viable for a lawyer. For instance, a China 
Labour Watch report discovered that seventy 
thousand workers at Pegatron attended a 
fifteen-minute meeting each day for which 
they were not compensated (China Labour 
Watch 2016). Litigating the claim of one 
worker may not be worth a lawyer’s time; but 
if one lawsuit could be brought on behalf of 
all workers, who are collectively owed over 
eleven million US dollars, the case would be 
quite attractive. Therefore, labour advocates 
should promote the adoption of measures to 
facilitate collective and class labour cases.
A final reform to help encourage the growth 
of a plaintiffs’ bar is a properly structured fee-
shifting scheme. Shenzhen already permits 
workers to be awarded legal fees when they 
prevail in labour cases, but several aspects of 
that system limit its utility and impact. Due 
to restrictions on contingency fees, plaintiffs 
must still front the legal fees before a court can 
require the employer to reimburse those fees. 
In other countries, fee-shifting schemes can 
deter employers from dragging out litigation 
because the amount of the fees is calculated 
based on the number of hours worked by the 
plaintiff ’s counsel. In Shenzhen, the legal fee 
is tied to how much the worker actually paid 
his lawyer and is capped at five thousand yuan 
per procedure—hardly enough to deter most 
employers. But if this system were modified, 
it has great potential to help narrow the 
representation gap.
As the Chinese government considers 
rolling back some of the labour protections 
previously granted to workers in the 
Labour Contract Law, it becomes even more 
important to ensure that whatever rights still 
exist are adequately enforced. For a more 
comprehensive discussion of the landscape 
of labour rights enforcement in China and 
other proposed strategies for narrowing the 
representation gap, readers are encouraged to 
access the full report (Halegua 2016).
Conclusion
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The academic study of Chinese religion 
overlaps with, and sometimes confronts, 
the work of rights advocates. These 
encounters can be uncomfortable for both 
parties. Scholars, diplomats, and jurists 
often have very different ideas of what 
rights are worth protecting, and what 
counts as religion. As recent revisions to 
China’s religions law show, ideas about 
religion in China are changing quickly.
China’s Religion 
Law and the 
Perils of Counting 
Consciousness
Thomas David DuBois
Nearly two decades since China launched 
its campaign against Falungong, issues of 
religious freedom remain among the most 
sensitive and stubborn points of contention 
between the Chinese government and the 
international human rights community. Even 
as the legal protection and regulation of 
religion has taken on an increasingly global 
character, China has withstood criticism to 
stand by certain core principles of how it 
defines legitimate religious expression.
As a historian of Chinese religion, I 
occasionally find myself in the unexpected 
position of explaining and even defending the 
logic behind China’s religion policy. The basic 
reason is that historians such as myself aim 
to investigate trends and processes, rather 
than to engineer them. Our job demands the 
separation of advocacy from the dispassionate 
task of understanding what happened and 
why. 
Part of this is the realisation that ideas of 
human rights and freedoms are themselves 
Entrance to the tomb of Cangjie, legendary inventor of writing. As an expression of gratitude and civic virtue, 
Guomindang general Zhu Qinglan restored this tomb in 1939. The Guomindang and Republican flags are clearly 
visible above the entrance. Baishui County, Shaanxi, 19 September 2016. PC: Thomas DuBois.
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than from the place of religion in history. 
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan (2005), Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd (2008, 2015) and many others 
have written extensively and persuasively 
about the ways that the American legal 
understanding of religious freedom, including 
the specific criteria by which IRFA makes 
its judgments, derive from very specific 
moments in US history. In contrast, the 
French view that public space must remain 
secular has played out most recently in the 
ban some French cities have levied on Islamic 
swimwear (aka the ‘burkini’), and derives 
from the deeply egalitarian tendencies of the 
French Revolution (Decherf 2001).
China, of course, has its own very long, and at 
times very violent history of organised religion 
(a term that already presents something of 
a problem when used historically), and this 
view will undoubtedly shape how the current 
Chinese state understands not only the limits, 
but also the definition of religious freedom, 
specifically the question of freedom from 
whom and to what end. While the American 
view heavily favours the rights of churches to 
be free from an oppressive state, the Chinese 
state advocates freedom of the individual 
conscience from an oppressive clergy, or from 
foreign interference.
If we want to see what Hurd calls the 
‘historical contingency’ of how states 
understand religious freedom, we need 
look no further than the difference between 
these two views. Throughout the history 
of the United States, flight from religious 
oppression has been a consistent source of 
new migrants. Not surprisingly, the American 
legal protection of confessional freedom—
that is, the right of organised religions to 
exist—is very near absolute. In contrast, the 
history of China has included some very 
painful experiences with organised religion 
products of history. Even within the Western 
world, the genesis and application of religious 
freedom legislation is by no means static or 
universal. Looking to China, there is a world 
of difference between seeking to understand, 
and seeking to transform, between asking 
‘what does China value?’ and ‘why doesn’t 
China value what we want them to?’
There is, of course, a great deal of common 
ground between these two premises, and the 
best way to find it is by understanding the 
faults in the ground we stand on. The most 
effective rights advocacy is that which is 
able to draw a line between universal ideals 
and culturally specific practices. Religious 
freedom is a very good example. Religious 
freedom is a very laudable ideal, and in some 
jurisdictions also a legally actionable one. The 
1998 passage of the International Religious 
Freedom Act (IRFA) required the U.S. State 
Department to annually assess the state of 
religious freedom in every country, and left 
open coercive options up to and including 
sanctions for the worst offenders offenders 
(U.S. Department of State 1998). Recently, a 
number of other countries, including Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Italy, France, and the 
European Union have followed suit (Hurd 
2015), introducing legislation that advocates 
the promotion of religious freedom at home 
and abroad.
However, the difference between an ideal 
and an actionable program is very significant. 
Putting an assessment of religious freedom 
into practice forces a general principle 
through a very specific set of gateways and 
criteria that will suit some situations better 
than others. While most states, including 
China, avow support for the ideal of religious 
freedom, they differ quite significantly when 
it comes to defining it. The difference between 
these views derives less from religion itself 
Religion in the Eyes of 
Advocacy
Heresy and the Freedom 
of Religion
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itself. Because the imperial state saw itself 
as a moral entity that mediated between the 
sacred realm and the human world, rebellion 
or other anti-state activity oftentimes started 
with a competing view of the supernatural, 
otherwise known as heresy. I use this term 
very deliberately. As early as the fourteenth 
century, the legal code of the Ming dynasty 
demarcated three realms of religion: ‘proper’ 
(zheng), ‘illicit’ (yin) and ‘perverse’ (xie). The 
final category was strictly banned precisely 
because it was real, and thus a source of 
danger on many levels—as a moral danger to 
be sure, but also as a gateway for dark magic 
and demonic forces to infiltrate the realm. 
For the next five centuries, the imperial state 
excluded this realm of illegitimate religion 
from religious choice, in the same way that 
freedom of speech would not extend to libel 
or an incitement to violence (DuBois 2012).
Similarly, because official memory often 
equates Christian mission with imperialism, 
the Chinese state remains especially vigilant 
to what it would call foreign domination 
in the name of religion. Of course, China’s 
experience of Christianity was in reality 
extremely broad, and included the foundation 
of many of the country’s first modern schools, 
hospitals, and orphanages. Yet, while the 
tendency to equate mission with foreign 
oppression is unquestionably biased, it is by 
no means new. The country’s first modern 
charity regulations, enacted in late 1920s 
Shanghai, aimed to curb the influence of 
foreign benefactors by making it difficult for 
missions to channel donations to Chinese 
counterparts (DuBois 2015). Chinese 
Christians themselves developed a resentment 
towards the tendency of some foreign 
missions to view native clergy as churches 
in perpetual training (Young 2013). Fears in 
the early years of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) that Chinese Christians might 
already have been brainwashed into acting as 
a foreign dominated fifth column drove the 
new government’s violent confrontation with 
the Catholic clergy during the 1950s.
We need not be unduly dismissive of the 
fact that many of these fears were politically 
created or exaggerated, because the narrative 
of history shapes national character regardless 
of its origin. Part of the Chinese political view 
of religion in fact comes not from China, but 
from the experience of the early Soviet Union, 
which faced in the Russian Orthodox Church 
a much larger, more politically powerful and 
more deeply rooted religious enemy than 
anything that any Chinese state had seen for a 
thousand years. It was in part from the Soviet 
experience that China adopted the idea, or at 
least the rhetoric, that religious freedom was 
less freedom of a clergy than freedom from it 
(Gong 2014). The fact that indices of religious 
freedom used by diplomats and advocates 
alike often disproportionately emphasise the 
rights of clergy and clerical organisations 
should alert us to the potential for conflict 
down the line.
At the same time, the ‘China first’ view—
that everything the Chinese government 
does or says grows out of China’s cultural 
particularism—has its limits. Not everything 
can be explained by culture, and certainly 
not everything should be excused by it. Part 
of the problem is that there is no culture 
without power. Whatever its legitimacy, 
the argument that Asians culturally value 
stability over democracy (aka the case made 
for ‘Asian values’) would likely have gained 
wider acceptance had it not originated 
from Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad and 
Singapore’s Lee Kwan Yew, two of the region’s 
most deeply entrenched political dynasts (Sen 
1997). And there is no doubt that just as China 
has made an art of mobilising the idea of 
historical victimhood to further its interests, 
it promotes the idea of cultural difference to 
deflect human rights criticism, conveniently 
selecting the elements of culture that are 
useful at the time (Browne 2016).
Religion and Law in China
MADE IN CHINA - EYE IN THE SKY94
The point here is not to dissuade the 
promotion of human rights, religious or 
otherwise, but to understand where the 
Chinese state is likely to be the most sensitive 
of criticism, especially in those areas where 
they would believe themselves to be in the 
right. A good first step would be to take 
seriously China’s own pronouncements on 
the issue, especially as they have evolved over 
the past few years. Beginning with Article 88 
of the 1954 Constitution, China’s successive 
legal reforms have all voiced various 
iterations of support for religious freedom, 
consistently defined as the freedom of belief 
(zongjiao xinyang de ziyou) (Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China 1954). This 
wording is worth noticing—it was copied 
directly from previous Chinese constitutions, 
and before that appeared in Japanese 
constitutions as early as 1889. As written, the 
freedom being promised is closely in concert 
with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, which demands ‘freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion’ (United 
Nations General Assembly 1948).
So far so good, as long as religion is defined 
strictly as individual belief and conscience.
The difficulty begins with the life of 
religion as a social entity. The same article 
of the Universal Declaration that speaks of 
the freedom of thought, also demands that 
religion find free expression ‘in community 
with others and in public or private, 
[manifested] in worship, observance, practice 
and teaching.’ In contrast, the PRC’s stance 
has always been that religion be banned 
from public life. This assessment featured 
prominently in the 1982 document titled ‘The 
Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious 
Question During Our Country’s Socialist 
Period’ (zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian 
he jiben zhengce, more commonly known as 
‘Document 19’), which is widely seen as the 
key moment of rehabilitation for religion in 
the post-Mao era (Central Committee of the 
CCP 1982). Since the 1994 passage of the 
‘Rules for the Regulation of Sites for Religious 
Activities’ (zongjiao huodong changguo guanli 
tiaoli), China has set aside sites specifically 
demarcated for religious activity, while at 
the same time insisting that the rights of 
religious expression end at the door of the 
church, mosque or temple. Even with these 
restrictions in place, only a set number of 
religions are legally accepted, and each of 
these is corralled into a Patriotic Religious 
Organisation (aiguo zongjiao xiehui), overseen 
by the State Administration of Religious 
Affairs (guojia zongjiao shiwuju). Very little is 
left to chance.
China has produced a steady stream of laws, 
regulations and legal pronouncements on 
religion (Zhuo 2008). The first full religions 
law, the ‘Regulations on Religious Affairs’, 
was promulgated in 2005, with draft revisions 
released in September of 2016. Placing the 
2005 law and the recent revisions side by side 
shows continuity in the desire to physically 
separate organised religious activity from 
public spaces (DuBois 2016). It also reveals 
some more recent changes: a growing concern 
over the spread of information (especially 
over the Internet), and desire to exert greater 
control and oversight over the internal 
finances of religious groups and activities. 
But even as restrictions on religious activity 
tighten, the space given to what the law calls 
‘legitimate’ religion is, if anything, growing. 
Some have even suggested that the Xi Jinping 
regime may be signalling the emergence of a 
new and less virulent stage in the campaign 
against Falungong (Ong and Xie 2016). We 
should take these trends seriously especially 
as recent legal reforms suggest that the 
Chinese state seems genuinely interested in 
developing and expanding the role of ‘social 
organisations’, i.e., civic groups, charities and 
NGOs.
What is most striking is what the laws 
neglect. Even if they reveal a certain 
recalibration of policies towards organised 
confessional religion, none of the laws as 
written deal in any way with the real religion 
of China: the holy trinity of country, party 
MADE IN CHINA - EYE IN THE SKY 95
and civic virtue. As early as 1974, Joseph 
Kitagawa first suggested that the worship of 
Mao Zedong satisfied all of the hallmarks of 
religion—an organised regimen of worship, a 
sacred text and a deified founder—an idea that 
has continued to reverberate with scholars of 
Chinese religion (Kitagawa 1974). However, 
I am speaking instead of one variety of what 
Jose Casanova (1994) has famously called 
‘public religions’, the sort of religion that 
exists within and undergirds the life of the 
public sphere. Although the church of politics 
is no longer mobilised to replace personal 
loyalties (as in the past, or in Emilio Gentile’s 
2006 portrayal of secular religion), China’s 
civic religion indeed remains ubiquitous, 
written into slogans, pictures, commercials 
and dramas in every conceivable space. If the 
techniques of dissemination have changed, 
much of the content—respect for historical 
paragons, admonitions to pursue knowledge, 
respect elders and love country—remains 
true to the moral education first advanced in 
the early Ming dynasty.  Now as then, civic 
virtues are not optional.
Returning to the larger problem, I find it 
striking how often not just the specialised 
perspective of rights advocacy, but the 
process of counting and categorising more 
generally, misrepresents the real state of 
religion in China. Again, this does not in any 
way deny the legitimacy of rights advocacy, or 
of the history of repressing certain religious 
groups in China—not only Falungong, but also 
Christianity, Islam, and Tibetan Buddhism. 
Rather, it simply takes note of how poorly 
the normative criteria used by diplomatic 
organs such as IRFA fit the actual practice of 
religion in the country, both the ubiquitous 
expressions of public ethics, and very 
often even the lives of those who consider 
themselves religious.
Many of the nation’s Christians do indeed 
visit churches, but millions of others, like 
this elderly woman I recently spoke to in 
rural Shaanxi , lead a very private Christian 
life. Asked about the meaning of Christianity, 
she replied that her religion taught to be 
kind to others, not to cheat or steal, and to 
seek spiritual value in suffering (this last 
point is one that I deal with at some length 
in most recent book) (DuBois 2017). This 
woman’s religious life, one that she has held 
dear for decades, is completely internal and 
individual. It resembles neither the public 
religion of Chinese nationalism, nor the 
organised, church-based religion that is the 
primary concern of the rights community.
Just across the street from this woman’s 
house, other villagers were gathering for the 
funeral of a woman who had died of cancer. 
The scene was a hive of activity. Even with 
teams of specialists hired to do the cooking, 
perform the rituals, and play the music, there 
was a job for every member of the community, 
and importantly for this discussion, 
absolutely no reason or excuse for opting 
out. Every member of the community was 
assigned a task, with names and jobs posted 
on a large sheet of paper at the doorway of 
the courtyard.  Although the activities would 
include scriptures and incense, few would 
have thought of the funeral as a religious 
function, or of their required presence as 
Counting Consciousness
Temple of Guandi, with the character for ‘loyalty’ in 
prominent gold paint. This temple shares a courtyard 
with the Communist Party Headquarters of Beixian 
Township, Shaanxi, 19 September 2016. 
PC: Thomas DuBois.
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an imposition of religious freedom (the lone 
Christian had happily taken her place peeling 
sweet potatoes with the other old women). 
If anything, they would have described 
the gathering of the community as good-
neighbourliness, or simply common sense.
The difference in vision is not simply one 
between scholars and advocates. The problem 
of a field of vision clouded by categories 
is likely to apply to any overly normative 
approach to beliefs and ethics. This would 
include the problem of surveying values, or 
as the title suggests, counting consciousness. 
Surveys, such as the often-cited Pew Values 
Surveys or the big data approach taken by 
scholars such as Fenggang Yang at the Center 
on Religion and Chinese Society can produce 
very useful points of reference, but can also 
be dangerously misleading (e.g. Gutting 
2016) if taken too literally, or read without 
appreciation of the background issues. Like 
religion, ideals such as democracy and human 
rights in reality contain within them a very 
wide spectrum of ideas and understandings. 
Simply comparing how respondents in 
countries as diverse as Korea, Singapore and 
Vietnam answer the same questions about 
these exceedingly complicated concepts 
cannot tell us much if we do not know what 
these ideas mean on the ground and in history 
(Doh 2011). In these cases, survey data alone 
may obscure more than they reveal, a case 
of bad information being worse than no 
information at all. In the end, no amount of 
surveying can replace a deep and substantive 
appreciation of history and values in practice.
Thomas David DuBois
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(Left) Christian woman in Gounan Village, Shaanxi, 18 September 2016. Photo by Micah Muscolino. (Right) Roster of 
duties at village funeral, Gounan Village, Shaanxi, 18 September 2016. PC: Thomas DuBois.
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With its ample resonance both within China 
and internationally, ‘rule of law’ (yifa zhiguo) 
is an expression that can justify the most 
disparate justice reforms. It is both a political 
value worth defending and a reason for 
consternation; it is an ideal that is inherently 
troubling for its interlocutors, advocates, and 
critics. For this reason, even the term ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ has been translated differently, with 
‘rule of law’, ‘rule by law’, and ‘ruling the 
country according to the law’ being the most 
frequent renderings in the English language. 
While the rule of law has become a key 
component of the Chinese legal-political 
vocabulary since the onset of the reform period, 
under Xi Jinping’s leadership it appears to 
have increased in importance. Since Xi Jinping 
took the helm in 2012, he has chosen to adopt 
exactly this expression to shape his policy and 
justice agendas. But the authoritarian way 
in which the concept has been used thus far 
has, in many quarters, produced a palpable 
sense of surprise and dismay over the future 
of the Chinese legal system. The current 
leadership is shaping what at first glance 
seems to be quite incongruous goals—fighting 
corruption and the erosion of institutional 
Interpreting the Rule of Law in Xi 
Jinping’s China 
Edited by Elisa Nesossi, 
with the participation of Joshua Rosenzweig, Ewan Smith, Susan Trevaskes
credibility; fighting criminals and dissenters 
who threaten stability; and guarding against 
national and international security threats—
all under the same rhetorical and ideological 
rubric. During the last year, the rule of law has 
served the practical function of maintaining 
social stability and controlling dissent. It has 
equally justified anti-corruption campaigns 
targeting party officials, and the repression 
of civil society and human rights activism. 
Although their activities remained well within 
the legal or constitutional rights of Chinese 
citizens, lawyers, labour activists, and people 
working for NGOs became key targets of 
repression.
Through a discussion between three 
experts on the historical and ideological 
development of socio-legal issues in China—
Joshua Rosenzweig, Ewan Smith, and Susan 
Trevaskes—this Forum aims at reframing our 
understanding of Xi’s ‘rule of law’ agenda and 
enriching our sense of the meaning of this 
contested expression in the contemporary 
political context.
Yifa zhiguo, the Chinese expression often translated as ‘rule of law’.
以法治國
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The expression ‘yifa zhiguo’ may be 
translated in different ways. The most 
common renderings in English are ‘rule of 
law’, ‘rule by law’, and ‘ruling the country 
according to the law’; however, each of these 
translations carries different connotations. 
How would you best translate ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
and, in your view, what is the meaning of 
this expression in contemporary China? 
Joshua Rosenzweig: I think that part of 
the reason why this expression has so many 
different translations is that the meaning 
can be very context-dependent. As with 
other ideologically significant phrases, 
there are hegemonic uses that serve to 
reinforce existing power structures and 
there are counter-hegemonic uses that work 
against those structures—often deliberately, 
sometimes less so. Most people probably 
have a particular understanding of what they 
mean when they use the phrase at any given 
point, but once those usages become part of 
the public discourse, they can be understood 
in ways that were not necessarily intended. 
Put simply, I think that the differences boil 
down to whether or not one believes that 
law has any autonomous moral authority of 
its own, separate from political power. When 
Chinese officials speak of ‘yifa zhiguo’, they 
are thinking of law purely in terms of a tool of 
governance. Law establishes rules that reflect 
the morality that is assumed to inhere in 
political order, and a society that understands 
and follows those rules is, therefore, a good 
and just society. I do not think it matters too 
much whether you call this notion ‘rule by 
law’ or ‘rule according to law’. When others 
talk about ‘yifa zhiguo’—or its cousin ‘fazhi’—
it is clear that they are, in fact, thinking in 
terms of law as a source of authority that is 
distinguishable from power. As such, for them 
law reflects external standards that should set 
bounds for the behaviour of the regime, not 
just society. I think this is closer to what many 
people mean when they think of rule of law. 
Because the difference comes from different 
understandings of ‘fa’, so the same phrase can 
connote different things to different people.
Ewan Smith: Neither rule of law nor ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ has a fixed meaning: both expressions 
refer to a range of contested ideas. There 
is a partial overlap between the English 
and the Chinese phrases. Sometimes, ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ means something similar to rule 
of law. For example, if the words are used 
casually, to describe an alternative to arbitrary 
government, the ‘rule of law’ is the best 
translation because it is familiar. In contrast, 
‘rule by law’ and ‘ruling the country according 
to the law’ are unfamiliar expressions that jar 
the reader. They draw attention to the fact 
that ‘yifa zhiguo’ means something different, 
unfamiliar and even dissonant to rule of law. 
In some contexts, it is important to underline 
these differences by translating ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
in this way. It would be unwise to offer an 
all-purpose definition of ‘yifa zhiguo’, just 
as it would be unwise to give an all purpose 
definition of the rule of law. It might mean the 
same thing A.V. Dicey, or Lon Fuller, or Tom 
Bingham meant when they said ‘rule of law’. 
But in official discourse, this is unlikely.
Susan Trevaskes: ‘Yifa zhiguo’ is probably 
best translated as ‘governing the nation [or 
country] in accordance with the law.’ This is 
a concept that developed in the mid-1990s 
drawing on basic ideas about socialist rule 
of law from the 1980s. It began in the 1990s 
as a slogan that stood for greater emphasis 
on the use of law and regulations in state 
administration. It does not mean a separation 
of the Party from the state. To the contrary, 
governance in China since the 1990s has seen 
the embedding of the Party within the state 
through party groups (xiaozu) planted in all 
areas of government which comprise members 
holding key positions (such as a governor of 
a province). The Party delegates authority to 
state institutions for routine governance while 
continuing to lead exclusively over political, 
ideological and institutional matters. 
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Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have guided the Chinese Communist Party for almost 
three decades. PC: South China Morning Post
In your opinion, to what extent has the 
use of the concept ‘yifa zhiguo’ changed in Xi 
Jinping’s China in comparison to the Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao eras? Can you please 
highlight both continuities and changes?
Joshua Rosenzweig: I do not think that 
Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao had substantially 
different understandings of the concept of 
‘yifa zhiguo’ compared to Xi Jinping. But Xi 
Jinping seems to have given the idea a bit of 
a renaissance and made it a more prominent 
part of his agenda. One reason is that Xi 
Jinping sees rule-based governance as a way 
to impose discipline and centralise control 
over the party-state bureaucracy. The stress of 
the previous decades had been on promoting 
economic growth and maintaining social 
stability, and there was a tacit understanding 
that as long as these results were achieved 
there would not be too many questions from 
above about who was getting rich on the side 
or what methods were employed to maintain 
stability. But corruption, inequality, and ‘rigid 
stability’ tactics contributed to a growing 
sense of popular injustice that needed to be 
addressed in some way. Moreover, given the 
daunting task of reorienting China’s economy, 
the country’s leaders need to be able to count 
on the bureaucracy to respond to its directions 
instead of playing by its own rules. Another 
reason for the prominence of ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
under Xi Jinping is that China’s current 
leadership is trying to restore the party-state’s 
ideological dominance by flooding the public 
discourse with its own messages and squeezing 
out any alternative usages. The promotion 
of ‘yifa zhiguo’ in the 1990s coincided with 
the re-emergence of a relatively autonomous 
arena for discussion and debate of public 
affairs in which matters of law and justice 
formed an important part. For a while, ideas 
about human rights, procedural justice, and 
constitutionalism flourished and shaped 
critical notions of how law might function in 
China. Recognising the challenge posed by 
these alternative ideas, Xi Jinping has taken 
steps to isolate and excise these views from the 
public discourse and ‘unify thinking’ around 
orthodox views of law and justice.
Ewan Smith: Hu Jintao came to power 
less than a year after China acceded to the 
101
MADE IN CHINA - EYE IN THE SKY
World Trade Organization. During Hu’s 
administration, the ‘yifa zhiguo’ policy was 
often presented as necessary step towards 
compliance with rule of law obligations, and 
as an instrument to achieve bigger economic 
objectives, such as the ‘xiaokang shehui’ or 
‘moderately prosperous society’. Over time, 
we see more and more language presenting the 
rule of law as something that is instrumentally 
good. In the official discourse, rule of law 
became an ‘essential guarantee’ of policy goals 
as diverse as ‘socialist material, spiritual, and 
political culture’, the ‘three represents’, and 
‘scientific development’. In his explanation of 
the Decision of the Fourth Plenum from 2014, 
Xi mirrors this language. He describes the 
rule of law as a ‘fundamental requirement’ for 
‘safeguarding social harmony and stability’, 
‘guaranteeing the long-term peace and order 
of the Party and the country’, and ‘[promoting] 
the sustained and healthy development of 
our country’s economy and society’. But 
one important change under Xi has been a 
decidedly voluntarist turn in the use of the 
rule of law, especially with the advent of the 
current anti-corruption campaign. Under Xi, 
the rule of law has been partially subordinated 
to an agenda that seeks to contain power 
‘within the cage of regulation’ (ba quanli 
guanjin zhidu de longzi li). It is not a tool that 
can rectify institutions. Instead, it is one of a 
series of tools that can rectify individuals.
Susan Trevaskes: The use of ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
in the Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao, and Jiang Zemin 
eras is essentially the same, but Xi has given 
it a new twist, emphasising the idea of Party 
leadership through the rule of law. The 
Resolution of the historic Fourth Plenum of 
the Eighteenth Party Congress in 2014 states 
that the Party’s leadership [over and through 
government] and socialist rule of law are 
identical. Crucially, the document insists that 
the Party will now ‘implement its leadership 
role through the rule of law’. The meaning 
of ‘yifa zhiguo’, or at least the purpose to 
which it has been put to use by Xi Jinping and 
close colleagues, is to accentuate a particular 
relationship between the party-state and 
the people. After a decade of Hu Jintao’s 
‘Harmonious Society’ (hexie shehui) and 
‘Stability Maintenance’ (weiwen) in the 2000s, 
it had become apparent to the incoming Party 
leadership that rigid Stability Maintenance 
operations were severely undermining judicial 
and political credibility, and could not be 
sustained as a long-term political solution. 
To win back the hearts and minds of people 
whose trust in the law had been seriously 
eroded by party corruption, Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang began talking about accountability, 
transparency, clean government, and so on. 
But this new platform required a substantial 
reinvigoration of centralised Party power in 
order to regain the capacity to limit corruption 
at the local level on the one hand, and to deal 
with perceived threats to national security on 
the other. Hence, we find Xi Jinping bringing 
Party supremacy back into political fashion. 
The ideological role of ‘yifa zhiguo’ in Xi’s 
China gives the Party rhetorical permission 
to govern China in such a way that it can deal 
with disunity, dissent, and crime using the 
weapon of the law.
How does history matter to the way in 
which ‘yifa zhiguo’ is officially intended 
today?
Joshua Rosenzweig: There are so many 
ways to approach this question, in part because 
there are different ways to think about ‘history’. 
Let me focus on two. First, I would say that in 
contemporary China ‘yifa zhiguo’ has always 
been contrasted positively against the idea of 
the ‘lawless’ and arbitrary years under Mao, 
especially during the Cultural Revolution. The 
Maoist period is a useful benchmark for legal 
and institutional progress because, especially 
for the majority of people whose lives have 
improved since the ‘reform and opening’, 
there are so many reasons to be satisfied with 
the relative stability and security that China’s 
current legal system has to offer—even with its 
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many flaws. But the utility of this referent is 
fading as time marches on, and there’s reason 
to wonder whether Chinese citizens now in 
their twenties, thirties, and even forties will 
continue to evaluate the state of their legal 
system against the high point of legal nihilism 
under Mao. Second, I would say that history 
matters in the sense that, in the nearly forty 
years since the beginning of the reform period, 
China has experienced historical changes that 
I would argue are transforming the way that 
Chinese people think about the state-centred 
justice model that underlies the official agenda 
of ‘yifa zhiguo’. Several decades of socio-
economic change have produced a society 
that is far more individualistic, diverse, and 
contentious than the authoritarian stability-
harmony model acknowledges. It is within 
such a society that alternative ideas about 
rights, checks on government, and procedural 
rights have started to make sense. China’s 
current leaders seem to want to ignore the 
passage of time and the demands that socio-
economic change has brought. They want 
to force society to conform to their vision 
of society, rather than adapt to the changed 
realities of that society. I do not think this is a 
sustainable strategy.
Ewan Smith: History provides a reference 
point by which we can assess what it means 
to run the country according to law. While 
international comparison dominates the debate 
about the rule of law outside China, historical 
comparison is a much more important context 
for Chinese official discussion of ‘yifa zhiguo’. 
Every politburo member grew up during 
the Cultural Revolution, and this serves as 
a framing device for ‘yifa zhiguo’. Younger 
Chinese people grew up while a legal system 
was rebuilt from scratch around them. In the 
official discourse (especially the early official 
discourse) this sense of constant progress is 
offset against the type of arbitrary government 
that came before. In this way, history amplifies 
the importance of ‘yifa zhiguo’, it relativises 
it, and it emphasises the extent to which it 
has already been achieved. More broadly, 
for reasons that I touch on above, historical 
argument sets the tone and tempo for political 
reform in Chinese official discourse. During 
the Seventeenth Politburo, one reason why 
China needed to implement the rule of law 
policy was because ‘prevailing historical 
conditions’ meant the time was right. Likewise, 
at least in the official discourse, ‘prevailing 
historical conditions’ will dictate when China 
is ready for more democratic and accountable 
governance.
Susan Trevaskes: The history of various 
discussions on socialist rule of law and a 
number of key political events in China have 
helped to shape ‘yifa zhiguo’ as we know it 
today. We can break up the term ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
into various parts—‘fa’ then ‘yifa’ then ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ to understand the influence of history. 
First, in terms of law (fa), from the early 1950s 
onwards, law in the People’s Republic of China 
was seen as a manifestation of party policy. 
That is not to say that all laws were party 
policies, but that the intent of the law was 
basically in harmony with Party policy. After 
Deng Xiaoping came to power, the Party’s ideas 
about the nature of law did not fundamentally 
change; law remained socialist in purpose and 
intent. As the scholar Harro von Senger noted 
in 1985, ‘law does not serve the function of an 
autonomous force for shaping the social order, 
independent of the [Chinese Communist] Party 
norms. It serves rather as a vehicle for making 
casuistic elaborations to Party norms’ (Von 
Senger 1989, 207). Second, the phrase ‘yifa’ (in 
accordance with the law) has its origins in the 
1950s, particularly during a brief period after 
1954 when the Constitution was promulgated. 
It was taken up again with gusto in the early 
1980s as a phrase attached to various party-
state actions such as ‘severely punishing in 
accordance with the law (yifa yancheng) or 
‘[Party] Rule in accordance with the law’ 
(yifa zhizheng). Stressing ‘yifa’ in the 1980s 
was an attempt to changed public and Party 
mindsets from ‘rule of man’ to ‘rule of law’. 
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This was a new consciousness of law based 
on the idea that law would institutionalised 
through courts and government agencies to 
create a basis for economic modernisation and 
a sound spiritual civilisation. Third, in terms 
of ‘yifa zhiguo’ in the 1990s. It has been widely 
documented that the Party abandoned its 
aspiration of state-Party separation following 
the 1989 Tiananmen incident and the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Therefore, progressively 
throughout the mid to late 1990s, the relatively 
simple message about the benefits of rule-of-
law over rule-of-man was replaced with a more 
specific governance-based message about how 
the country should be ruled. This new political 
line required a new slogan, ‘Governing the 
Nation in Accordance with the Law’ (yifa 
zhiguo). ‘Yifa zhiguo’ became the platform 
under which the institutionalisation of the 
Party-state was to take place in China. It was 
a catchcry about how good governance should 
be achieved: through introduction of new laws 
and regulations aimed at better supervising 
and limiting administrative powers. In the late 
1990s, ‘yifa zhiguo’ morphed into a political 
institutionalisation strategy, bolstering 
Party power to make concrete decisions 
about governance through Party groups 
and committees at all levels of government. 
President Jiang Zemin promulgated ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ at the Fifteenth Party Congress as the 
Party’s ruling paradigm and it was inserted 
into the Constitution in 1999. 
In your view, what is the relationship 
between ‘yifa zhiguo’ and ‘yide zhiguo’ 
(ruling the country according to virtue) in 
today’s China?
Joshua Rosenzweig: I think the ideas are 
meant to be complementary and acknowledge 
the two main strands of Chinese political 
tradition, Confucianism and Legalism. Even 
though these are often taken to be opposed, 
the reality is that for millennia Chinese 
leaders governed by mixing the two schools 
of thought. To me, the relationship between 
the two goes back to the assumption of a 
political regime that is inherently moral. The 
virtue of the regime’s rulers is a manifestation 
of that morality but is also something that 
must be properly cultivated and reinforced. 
Law is necessary to guide virtuous behaviour 
among officials and society at large, but it too 
is intended as a manifestation of the moral 
regime. Both work together in a kind of balance 
that produces order and stability from the top 
down. I do not necessarily think this harkening 
back to traditions of Chinese political-legal 
culture is part of any great ideological shift 
under Xi, per se. These ways of thinking about 
power and the relationship between state and 
society are structural elements of Chinese 
culture that are being laid bare because the 
modern ideological garb that they have been 
wearing for over a century has begun to wear 
thin.
Susan Trevaskes: To understand the 
significance of ‘yide zhiguo’ for ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
we need to understand the Confucian mindset 
of the Party. Party leaders assume a paternal 
fosterage role in enlightening a politically 
and legally illiterate citizenry. Xi has been 
continuously enlightening China’s citizens of 
the necessity of a strong Party to rule in their 
interests
The concept of ‘rule of law’ very often 
seems to imply a teleological march from 
Marxism to a more liberal system of 
governance. In your view, to what extent 
will the ‘yifa zhiguo’ agenda be able to 
promote the development of a different, 
more democratic, and accountable system of 
governance in China in the future?
Joshua Rosenzweig: In and of itself, the 
official legal development agenda associated 
with ‘yifa zhiguo’ is not intended to lead to 
liberal democracy for China, and I think the 
sooner we all recognise that the better. For too 
long we have chosen to hear ‘rule of law’ every 
time a Chinese official speaks of ‘yifa zhiguo’ 
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or ‘fazhi’, and we think that they are aspiring 
to achieve our version of legal and political 
culture, but they just lack the capacity or 
techniques to get there. So we have focused 
on helping them build that capacity and 
meanwhile our paths are still not converging—
or to the extent that they are converging, it 
might be because we are actually moving closer 
to them, rather than the other way around. 
The best thing ‘yifa zhiguo’ really has going 
for it is the promise of stability and order. I 
do not see any hint of democratic innovation 
out of such a paternalistic system that puts 
limits on basic freedoms of expression and 
association precisely to stunt the development 
of a democratic (as opposed to populist) 
culture. As for accountability, I think that, so 
long as the system relies on self-regulation 
and sees the regime itself as the ultimate 
source of moral authority, there will not be 
much innovation there either. I would not 
say that either democracy or accountability is 
faring much better in Western countries right 
now, but I do not see any reason to hold out 
hope that China’s current path is leading to 
something superior.
Ewan Smith: I do not agree that the rule of 
law should be thought of as a march. Political 
reform in China is controversial and no single 
idea leads inexorably towards liberalisation. 
If anyone is likely to think of the rule of law 
as a march towards a distant goal, it is the 
Chinese Communist Party. The Party’s official 
doctrine embraces the Marxist theory of a 
historical materialism. Put simply, historical 
materialists believe social and political 
progress is achieved through historical and 
economic development. From this point of 
view, political ideas like the rule of law can be 
seen as waypoints on a longer march towards 
an inevitable, historical objective. It may also 
be politically convenient to think of the rule 
of law as something to be achieved gradually, 
in increments, alongside other economic 
objectives. Progress towards the rule of law is 
not the same as rule of law, and the more we 
think about where China is going, the less we 
think about where China actually is. This is 
not to say that the rule of law does not play an 
important role in Chinese politics. Eighty-five 
million party members spent the latter part of 
2014 talking about a version of the rule of law 
because it was the topic of the Fourth Plenum 
and, in areas where there is limited political 
opposition, China has made rapid progress. 
The current reforms to the justice sector will 
make life more predictable for millions of 
people. Both of these examples suggest ways in 
which the ‘rule of law’ agenda might promote 
a more accountable system of government in 
China. At the same time, we ought to resist 
the temptation to overstate its importance. It 
is official state policy to promote ‘yifa zhiguo’, 
but there is nothing fundamental about this. 
The policy yields to cardinal principles like 
Party leadership.
Susan Trevaskes: A number of basic 
elements of Xi Jinping’s ‘yifa zhiguo’ push may, 
in the future, become very helpful in improving 
greater transparency and accountability. But 
the concept of ‘yifa zhiguo’ will not promote 
an overall improvement in the relationship 
between the party-state and society (or more 
precisely between the Party and ‘the people’). 
This is because the very purpose of ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ is to promote the idea that the law 
is a manifestation of the people’s will and 
interests, and that the Party exists in order to 
protect the people’s interests. Under the ‘yifa 
zhiguo’ ideology, the people cannot enjoy any 
rights and interests outside the leadership 
of the Party whose role it is to develop and 
protect (Party-initiated) rights and interests.
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Rescuers after a mine blast that killed thirty-two miners 
in Inner Mongolia on 3 December. PC: XINHUA
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Xi Stresses Party Leadership 
over State-Owned Enterprises
Tougher Rules for Ride-Hailing 
Businesses in China
PC: SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
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On 11 October at a high-level national meeting Xi 
Jinping reaffirmed the centrality of Party leadership 
over China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
According to the official Xinhua News Agency, Xi 
emphasised that under a stronger leadership from 
the Party—‘the root and soul’ of SOEs in his words—
SOEs should serve to implement the decisions of the 
Party, to promote national projects such as One Belt 
One Road, and to strengthen China’s economic and 
social development and national power. Xi urged 
further reform of the management and supervision 
of SOEs in order to improve corporate profitability 
and competitiveness, and to increase the value of 
state assets. Xinhua reported that in 2016 central 
SOEs underwent merging and consolidation, and 
announced that next year the reforms will focus on 
cutting inefficiency and overcapacity of local SOEs. 
SOEs retain a dominant role in the Chinese economy: 
in the first half of 2016, the gross revenues of central 
and local SOEs (excluding financial companies) 
reached 21.39 trillion yuan, or more than sixty percent 
of the national gross domestic product. In the same 
speech, Xi pointed to state workers’ rights to ‘know, 
participate, express and supervise within the SOEs’, 
and referred to the role of workers’ congresses in 
the democratic management of the companies and 
in the resolution of labour disputes. This is likely in 
response to the state workers’ protests early this year 
against the government’s cutting of overcapacity in 
the steel and coal industries (see the chapter by Kevin 
Lin on pp. 20–23 in the present book). 
(Sources: South China Morning Post, Xinhua 1, 
Xinhua 2)
In October, some of China’s largest cities—including 
Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chongqing, 
Tianjin, and Hangzhou—rolled out new regulations 
on internet-based ride-hailing businesses. China has 
thus become the first country in the world to create a 
formal legal framework for the sector. The regulations 
limit the pool of drivers and vehicles, citing concerns 
about traffic and safety. However, the criteria are 
discriminatory toward migrants in that they require 
drivers to have a local household registration or at 
least to be long-term, tax-paying residents of the city 
with a temporary residence permit of no less than six 
months. In recent years, Internet-based ride-hailing 
businesses have flourished, attracting migrants to 
work as drivers: in Beijing, more than eighty percent 
of the ride-hailing drivers are migrants from outside 
the city. The ride-hailing businesses have also led 
to protests by taxi drivers who see their businesses 
squeezed by unlicensed taxi and ride-hailing cars. But 
ride-hailing car drivers in China have held their own 
protests: for instance, in March, hundreds of Uber 
drivers in Hangzhou blocked roads and protested 
against entrapment by police. Uber China reportedly 
told its drivers not to clash with police.
(Sources: Bloomberg, Caixin 1, Caixin 2, Caixin 3, 
The Financial Times)
(Left) President Xi Jinping giving a speech. (Right) Cars 
impounded for ‘illegal transportation’.
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Meng Han Sentenced Mine Blasts Kill Dozens
On 3 November, Meng Han, the last of the labour 
activists detained in the crackdown of December 2015, 
was found guilty and sentenced to twenty-one months 
in jail by the Panyu district court in Guangzhou. 
While detained, Meng Han was denied access to his 
lawyer, and his parents were repeatedly harassed 
in their apartment by unidentified men. After the 
announcement of the sentence, friends and fellow 
activists held a fundraising initiative to collect money 
to support Meng Han’s living expenses while in jail, 
and about thirty unionists and labour rights groups 
in Hong Kong organised a protest outside the Hong 
Kong China Liason Office demanding his immediate 
release. Days before the trial, the International 
Labour Organisation’s Committee on Freedom of 
Association released its interim report in response 
to a complaint launched by the International Trade 
Union Confederation. In it, the Chinese government 
was criticised for its treatment of labour activists, 
who ‘appear to have been arrested, detained and 
charged for being involved in a labour dispute and 
considers that the detentions of persons connected 
with their activities in defense of the interest of 
workers constitutes a serious interference with civil 
liberties in general and with trade union rights in 
particular.’ Labour NGOs all over the country are under 
increasing pressure. In Beijing, the Migrant Workers’ 
Home, a historic labour NGO that focuses on cultural 
activities for migrants, is facing eviction after more 
than ten years. The enforcement of China’s Foreign 
NGO Management Law in January 2017 will make 
it increasingly hard for NGOs to gain access to vital 
financial support from abroad (see the Compendium 
of the Law on pp. 60–67 in the present book). 
(Sources: China Labour Bulletin, Jiliuwang, South 
China Morning Post, The Initium)
On 27 September, a gas explosion in a coal mine in 
Ningxia took the lives of twenty miners. Similar 
explosions killed thirty-three miners in the 
municipality of Chongqing on 31 October, twenty-one 
miners in Heilongjiang province on 29 November, and 
thirty-two miners in Inner Mongolia on 3 December. 
More recently, on 5 December a gas explosion resulted 
in the deaths of eleven miners in Hubei province. 
Being the world’s top producer and consumer of 
coal, China has a tragic history of mine explosions. 
In recent years, authorities have been swift to crack 
down on unsafe mining operations. Commenting 
on the blast in Chongqing municipality, the State 
Administration of Coal Mine Safety said that despite 
the fact that the mine operation was fully licensed, 
it was still unsafe and illegal. In particular, the mine 
was too deep and the underground facilities did not 
have adequate ventilation. The State Administration 
has ordered all Chongqing mines to halt operations 
and conduct immediate safety inspections. China’s 
national safety regulator has also warned coal mines 
not to operate beyond their daily capacities, as rising 
prices tempt mine owners to increase production. In 
several cases, safety officials have been fired and mine 
operators arrested. 
(Sources: Sixth Tone, South China Morning Post, 
Xinhua)
PC: SOUTH CHINA MORNING POSTPC: SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(Left) Labour activist Meng Han. (Right) Xinjia Coal Mine in 
Badong county, which was the scene of the third fatal mining 
explosion in China within a week.
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Parents of Left-Behind Children 
Face Prosecution
Strikes at Multinational 
Companies in China
PC: BAIDU
According to an official survey on the migrant 
population in China in 2016 released in mid-October by 
the National Health and Family Planning Commission, 
around sixty-one million children—more than a third 
of whom are younger than seventeen—currently live 
in the Chinese countryside without the daily care of 
their parents, who have migrated to other areas for 
work. These ‘left behind children’ are a serious social 
problem in China (see also the brief at p. 12 of this 
book). Earlier this year, Zhang Dandan a professor at 
Peking University, released the result of a survey of 
one thousand two hundred criminals in prison: about 
seventeen per cent of them had been ‘left behind 
children’. Tragedies are common. Earlier this year, 
three children, who had been left in the care of their 
grandmother by their migrant parents, drowned in a 
pond near their home village outside of Nanchang, 
Jiangxi province. There have also been some 
instances of suicide. In January 2014, a nine-year-old 
child hanged himself in the house of his grandparents 
in Huayang, Anhui province, after learning from his 
grandmother that his mother, a migrant worker, was 
not going to come home for the holidays. In June 2015, 
in a village in Bijie, Guizhou province, a thirteen-
year-old boy and his three younger sisters killed 
themselves after having been left alone for months 
by their migrant parents. To prevent such tragedies, 
in February 2016, the State Council ordered local 
governments to establish a database of these children 
and issued guidelines to improve the physical and 
psychological health of such children. In November 
2016, the Ministry of Civil Affairs, along with the 
police, the judicial departments, and the Ministry 
of Education announced a clampdown on parents 
who leave their children behind. Parents who fail to 
provide their children with proper parental care for 
six months or longer can now lose their custodial 
rights at the request of their relatives, village officials, 
or civil-affairs authorities.
(Sources: Caixin, CCTV, State Council,  Zhongguo 
Qingnianbao, National Health and Family Planning 
Commission, South China Morning Post, The Paper)
The last quarter of 2016 witnessed a series of strikes 
among the employees of several multinational 
companies in China over ownership changes. First, on 
8 November, dozens of employees went on strike at 
a bottling plant owned by Danone in Guangzhou that 
had just been sold to a local company after learning 
that the French multinational was refusing to offer 
severance payment according to the workers’ years 
of employment on the pretext of the unchanged 
corporate name. After two weeks of strike, the 
company agreed to meet with the workers, but on 
that occasion the riot police entered the factory 
grounds and attacked the workers, with the result 
that several were injured. On 10 November, workers 
at a smartphone camera parts factory in Guangzhou 
owned by Sony went on strike for two weeks after the 
company announced the sale of the plant to a local 
company. They feared that working conditions and 
pay would suffer and jobs would be lost under the 
new ownership. To end the protest, the Japanese 
company paid off the workers with one thousand yuan 
each and fired dozens of strike leaders. Finally, on 23 
November, protests erupted among workers in three 
plants owned by Coca-Cola in Chongqing, Chengdu, 
and Jilin province, when it was announced that the 
American company was going to sell all its bottling 
plants in China to a Chinese state-owned food giant. 
The workers feared that after the sale they would lose 
their jobs or get lower wages, so they launched these 
coordinated strikes to demand the disclosure of the 
details of the agreement and economic compensation.
(Sources: Caixin, China Labour Bulletin, Nikkei, 
Red Balloon Solidarity, The Guardian)
Danone’s Chinese logo.




Following the widespread privatisation of the 
Zambian copper mining sector in the 1990s, 
several state-owned companies from China 
began to invest in the country. While these 
companies have created jobs, built valuable 
infrastructure, and paid taxes to the government, 
China’s increasing presence in Zambia has 
also given rise to a number of concerns. Some 
Chinese mining companies have been accused 
of maintaining lax safety standards, paying 
low wages to local employees, and of physically 
abusing their workers. Critics allege that this 
has triggered a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour 
standards. Still, such a perspective runs the risk 
of being over simplistic, as it largely overlooks 
the agency of local actors.
Copper mining remains the dominant 
economic activity in Zambia, a situation 
that has not changed since 1928 when large-
scale mining was introduced in the country. 
According to a World Bank report released in 
June 2015, the sector today accounts for more 
than sixty-five per cent of Zambia’s export 
earnings and eleven per cent of its gross 
domestic product (The World Bank 2015). 
However, while the World Bank detailed the 
benefits of the sector to the economy, another 
more critical report released at the same 
time by the Office of the Auditor General of 
Zambia found that the mining sector has seen 
the largest number of industrial accidents and 
fatalities in post-colonial Zambia (Auditor 
General 2015). For this reason, finding a 
way to mitigate risks to worker safety while 
increasing copper production has become a 
paramount public concern in the country. 
The widespread privatisation of the 
Zambian copper mining sector in the 1990s 
led to the re-emergence of foreign mining 
companies in the country, including several 
state-owned companies from China. While 
these Chinese companies have created 
Nkana mine in Zambia is one of the largest in Africa and has been in operation since 1932. PC: Wikipedia
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jobs, built valuable infrastructure, and paid 
taxes to the government, China’s increasing 
presence in Zambia has also given rise to a 
number of concerns. Some Chinese mining 
companies have been accused of maintaining 
lax safety standards, paying low wages to local 
employees—especially if compared to other 
foreign mining companies—and of physically 
abusing their workers (Blair 2006). For these 
reasons, critics have accused the Zambian 
government of weakening its safety standards 
to attract foreign investors, of failing to 
monitor compliance with safety and labour 
laws, and of underfunding local regulators 
(Haglund 2008).
These critics allege that this has triggered 
a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour standards. 
By ‘race to the bottom’, they refer to a 
tendency where the government reduces 
the monitoring and enforcement capacity 
of public regulatory institutions, or enacts 
lax safety laws, in order to attract foreign 
investors. They not only argue that the 
Zambian government weakens safety 
standards through funding cuts, but they also 
claim that current regulatory standards are 
obsolete and that the government intervenes 
in the decision-making process of regulators 
to protect Chinese companies from paying 
penalties when they fail to comply with local 
regulations. Still, such a perspective runs 
the risk of being over simplistic, as it largely 
overlooks the agency of local actors.
In April 2005, fifty-two Zambians were 
killed in an accident in an explosives factory 
jointly owned by the Beijing General Institute 
for Research and Metallurgy (BGRIMM) and 
the Non-Ferrous China-Africa (NFCA) Mining 
Company—both state-owned companies—in 
Chambishi in Zambia’s Copperbelt Province 
(BBC 2005). One year after the accident at the 
BGRIMM plant, five Zambians were shot and 
injured by gunshots fired by their Chinese 
manager while they were protesting against 
low wages and lax safety standards at the 
NFCA Chambishi mine. In light of this, it is 
not surprising that Chinese safety and labour 
relations in Zambian copper mines were at 
the centre of Zambia’s 2006 presidential 
election. Indeed, in a keynote speech former 
Zambian president Michael Sata stated that 
‘[Chinese] labour relations are very bad. They 
are not adding any value to what they claim 
is investment; instead of creating jobs for 
the local workforce, they bring in Chinese 
workers to cut wood and carry water’ (Blair 
2006).
Such high-level political attention fuelled 
the discontent. In August 2008, more than 
five hundred Zambian workers attacked 
a newly built Chinese-owned Chambishi 
Copper Smelter and burnt down the kitchen 
of a Chinese-resident. One Chinese and 
three Zambians working in the kitchen were 
seriously injured. The protesters claimed that 
they had been told that the management was 
going on vacation and abandoning collective 
negotiations in which workers had demanded 
changes in safety standards and a reduction 
in work hours. In another accident that 
attracted a lot of media attention in 2010, a 
Chinese supervisor at the Collum Coal mine 
in Southern Province shot thirteen Zambians. 
The workers at the mine were complaining 
against the state of safety standards in the 
mines and their low wages. These accidents 
A woman in despair at the funeral of fifty-one workers 
who were killed at a Chinese-owned copper mine in 
Zambia in 2005. PC: Salim Henry 
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and protests have raised serious debate about 
labour and safety standards in Chinese mines 
in Zambia and about the local government’s 
ability to enforce their own regulations in 
these contexts.
The claim that Chinese companies are 
creating a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour 
standards, while having certain merits, 
ultimately simplifies the processes at play 
in the formulation of safety and labour 
regulations in Zambia. It is based on a state/
business-centred approach that ignores the 
role of non-state actors, such as trade unions, 
mine workers, local NGOs, and international 
organisations. The 2006 protest at the NFCA 
mine mentioned above is a good case in point. 
In June 2006, NFCA mine workers went on 
strike in protest against the company’s refusal 
to implement a labour agreement it had 
agreed to with National Union of Mine and 
Allied Workers of Zambia to improve safety 
at its Chambishi mine. When five miners 
were shot in the protest, the popular reaction 
to the onslaught led to significant safety and 
labour relations reform at the mine (Sautman 
and Yan 2014). 
In response, the NFCA launched the ‘Safe 
Production Management System’ in which 
Safety and Environmental Protection were 
restructured into a separate department. 
Moreover, in 2007, the NFCA introduced a 
company ‘Safety Month’ in commemoration of 
the incident, an event that is still being held 
every June. Nine years after the incident, in a 
company memo sent to all workers at the start 
of the 2015 Safety Month, the management 
suggested that commemorating the month 
of June on a yearly basis demonstrates the 
company’s commitment to ensuring that its 
operations are conducted in a safe and risk-
free environment. In an interview that I 
conducted in Chambishi Township in October 
2015, a union leader at the NFCA mine told 
me that the 2006 protest positively changed 
safety and labour relations at the mine.
Furthermore, the ‘race to the bottom’ 
thesis suggests that the Zambian government 
is passive with regard to safety abuses in 
the country, or negligent of labour conflicts 
within Chinese mines because the authorities 
prioritise economic growth and investment 
over safety. This is far from the truth. For 
instance, during a parliamentary debate 
on 11 July 2007, in response to the 2005 
BGRIMM accident, former deputy minister of 
Mines and Minerals Development, Maxwell 
Mwale, told the Zambian parliament that 
the government had increased the number of 
inspection vehicles, logistics, and staff at the 
Mines Safety Department (National Assembly 
of Zambia 2007). According to official data, 
inspections increased from two hundred and 
sixty in 2004 to 1,269 in 2014. Furthermore, a 
report published in 2009 by the International 
Labour Organisation also highlighted labour 
and safety reforms undertaken in Zambia 
since the incident (International Labour 
Organisation 2009). For instance, in 2006, the 
government introduced an integrated labour 
inspection form to streamline inspections 
and verification of compliance; forty-five new 
inspectors were hired; and the administrative 
powers of inspectors were increased.
In addition, in 2008, 2012, and 2015, 
the government revised the national 
Employment Act. A Minimum Wage Bill was 
introduced in 2012, fines for non-compliance 
with safety standards were increased, and 
labour inspectors were provided with more 
powers to enforce labour and safety laws. In 
November 2007, the government established 
a Labour Task Force through the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Security to enforce and 
ensure adherence to national labour laws. 
The number of members on the task force 
jumped from forty-five in 2007 to ninety-
one in 2009. Moreover, a new Mines and 
Mineral Development Act was passed in 
2015, providing officials at the Mines Safety 
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Department with stronger powers to enforce 
and ensure that mining companies maintain 
a safe and healthy working environment. 
According to official data, industrial accidents 
and fatalities in mining companies have 
declined since 2006: the number of accidents 
recorded by the Mines Safety Department fell 
from three hundred and fifty in 2005 to 123 in 
2014, while the number of fatal accidents fell 
from eighty in 2005 to twelve in 2014.
Ching Kwan Lee has claimed that ‘Chinese 
investors [operating in Zambia] have had 
to climb a steep learning curve in dealing 
with types of politics not found in their own 
country’ (Lee 2014, 29). The trend of injuries 
and fatalities in Chinese mines in Zambia 
recorded by the Mines Safety Department 
supports this claim. However, as a 2011 
study by Human Rights Watch (HRW) has 
highlighted, Chinese mining companies 
in Zambia still have further reforms to 
make in order to strengthen their efforts 
to mitigate accidents (HRW 2011). These 
include improving the safety conditions of 
workers hired by subcontractors, reducing 
the number of casual employees, and cutting 
the number of working hours. A letter sent 
to HRW by officials from the China Non-
Ferrous Metal Mining Company in 2011, 
and quoted in the same report, suggest that 
these reforms are gradually being introduced. 
Conversations between the author and mine 
workers at the NFCA mine indicates that as 
of October 2015, although safety and labour 
disputes between the NFCA and local unions 
have been normalised, some workers in 
Chinese companies contracted by the NFCA 
still work under unsafe conditions—most 
often without appropriate safety equipment. 
However, as one worker said, compared to 
2006, before the BGRIMM accident and the 
NFCA Chambishi protest, there have been 
significant improvements in the enforcement 
of safety and labour regulations at the NFCA 
mine and the Chambishi Copper Smelter.
To conclude, the activities of Chinese 
mining companies have indeed threatened 
a ‘race to the bottom’ in labour and safety 
standards in Zambia. But local actors such 
as trade unions have organised protests, and 
pushed the issue into the public agenda. In 
response to these protests, some Chinese 
mining companies have altered their safety 
policies and normalised their relations 
with unions. Furthermore, under mounting 
public pressure, the Zambian government 
has introduced labour laws and established 
structures to strengthen its safety regulatory 
standards in the last decade. Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding the demonstrable success 
of these measures in reducing industrial 
accidents, the industrial relations system in 
Zambia still suffers from inadequate funding, 
limited human resources and capacity, and in 
some instances a lack of coordination among 
the relevant regulatory agencies.  
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In mid-2013, the Ghanaian government ini-
tiated a crackdown on the estimated 50,000 
Chinese nationals engaging in small-scale gold 
mining in the country. In both the media and 
popular discourse the Chinese miners were de-
picted as feeding into corruption, destroying the 
environment and stealing resources from mar-
ginal sectors of Ghanaian society. However, we 
still do not know much about who these miners 
were, the factors that compelled them to travel 
to such a distant land in the hopes of ‘striking 
it rich’, or how the spoils of this gold rush were 
distributed back in China.
On 15 May 2013, Ghanaian President 
John Dramani Mahama announced the 
establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Task 
Force aimed at bringing ‘sanity’ to the 
country’s rapidly (and chaotically) expanding 
small-scale mining sector (Kaiman and Hirsch 
2013). Over the course of the next month, the 
army and police proceeded to ‘flush out’ and 
deport nearly five thousand foreign nationals 
who were illegally engaging in small-scale 
mining—the vast majority of whom were 
Chinese, primarily originating from Shanglin 
County in the country’s Guangxi Zhuang 
Autonomous Region (Crawford and Botchwey 
2016). While there are still some reports of 
illegal miners setting up new operations 
‘deep in the bush’ (Quartey 2013), most of 
the estimated fifty thousand Chinese  that 
flooded into Ghana, mainly between 2008 and 
2013, have either been deported or have left 
of their own accord (He 2013).
This brief but intense episode has much to 
tell us about the perceptions and outcomes of 
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in which scarce and valuable resources are 
allocated in the Global South. At the same 
time, it provides a way of understanding what 
the increasingly large presence of China on 
the African continent means for labour and 
livelihoods in both places. The sudden influx 
of these small-scale miners to Ghana also 
draws parallels with Chinese involvement in 
other gold rushes throughout history. Most 
notably, the mass exoduses to the United 
States and Australia in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries—both of which resulted 
in violent confrontations, strict immigration 
policies, and the demonisation of the Chinese 
as ‘invaders’ by local labour movements. 
Indeed, in contemporary Ghana, as in 
previous gold rushes, the Chinese migrant 
miners have been implicitly depicted as a 
homogeneous mass that is working in unison, 
collectively benefiting from the extraction 
of Ghanaian gold at the expense of poorer 
segments of the local population, and having 
a uniform (primarily negative) impact on 
the environment, economy, and lives of local 
people. This essay will begin by examining the 
sudden arrival and equally sudden departure 
of small-scale Chinese miners in Ghana. It 
will then go on to raise important questions 
for future research related to China-Africa 
migration dynamics, the labour relations and 
inequality existing amongst the Chinese, and 
the allocation of the extracted resources back 
in China.
Ghana is the second largest gold producer 
in Africa, and artisanal gold mining has been a 
traditional indigenous activity in the country 
for centuries. Particularly over the past few 
decades, small-scale mining has become 
an increasingly important way for poor and 
marginal segments of Ghanaian society to 
improve their livelihoods by supplementing 
low returns from farming. In recognition of 
the importance of this activity for poor rural 
people, in 2006, the government specifically 
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restricted the sector to Ghanaian citizens, 
making it illegal  for foreign nationals to 
engage in any small-scale mining activities 
(Yang 2013).
However, this attempt to reserve small-
scale mining for Ghanaians was unsuccessful. 
From 2005, large numbers of Chinese miners 
began to arrive to Ghana, mostly from 
Shanglin County. Shanglin, whose population 
is primarily ethnically Zhuang (a minority 
group), has a long historical tradition of gold 
mining. Throughout the 1990s, Shanglin 
residents migrated domestically within 
China to engage in small-scale mining around 
the country. When the Chinese government 
tightened regulations on this type of activity, 
the Shanglin miners looked outward. In the 
late 2000s, stories of people ‘striking it rich’ 
in Ghana, combined with the increase in 
gold prices in 2008, resulted in a mass influx 
of Chinese miners establishing over two 
thousand mining operations (He 2013). 
Most of the ‘Shanglin gang’ took up mining 
in the rural areas surrounding Kumasi, Obuasi, 
and Takoradi, compensating the owners of 
the land with usage fees, and often paying 
percentages to local government officials 
or tribal chiefs (Song 2013). In general, 
mining activities were financed by individual 
Chinese investors or small groups of partners, 
who borrowed and pooled larger sums from 
financial institutions in China in order to 
purchase excavators and large pumps for 
dredging (He 2013). The miners then employed 
workers from China who were promised set 
monthly wages, and local Ghanaians who 
were paid daily at a substantially lower 
rate than the Chinese workers (Song 2013). 
The Chinese involvement in the sector has 
resulted in a huge jump in the production of 
gold from small-scale mines in Ghana (Pichler 
et al. 2016). And at the height of the gold rush 
it was estimated that billions of yuan were 
being sent from Ghana to China—far more 
than the Ghanaian governmental revenue (He 
2013).
The sudden influx of Chinese miners, 
and the expansion of their small-scale 
mining operations, was facilitated through 
cooperation (or collusion) with Ghanaians, 
many of whom benefitted individually from 
their relationships with the Chinese. This 
situation led to the widespread perception—
particularly in the media—that the mining 
phenomenon was feeding into corruption, and 
that these corrupt activities were the reason 
the government had largely ignored (or even 
protected) the illegal miners. In many cases 
this perception was entirely justified, with 
Chinese miners bribing officials to ‘turn a 
blind eye’ or paying-off local chiefs in order 
to illegally gain access to land for mining. For 
instance, Ghana Immigration Service officials 
allegedly enabled entry into the country and 
then provided (false) work permits to Chinese 
miners for a fee. Ghanaian small-scale miners 
also reported that, if challenged, Chinese 
miners would ‘threaten to call the minister 
or police commander,’ suggesting close links 
to high levels of government facilitated by 
bribes (Crawford et al. 2016).  
The Chinese mechanisation of the 
small-scale mining industry also had huge 
environmental impacts  through the pollution 
of bodies of water and the clearing of large 
areas of agricultural land (Kaiman and Hirsch 
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2013). The introduction of new technologies 
and mining teams—replacing traditional 
techniques—meant that the Chinese miners 
were able to extract much larger quantities of 
gold than their Ghanaian counterparts. The 
increasingly visible wealth of the Chinese 
miners, particularly of the main investors, 
unsurprisingly resulted in a narrative of 
resource theft. The Chinese were depicted 
as stealing a vital livelihood resource from 
marginal Ghanaians, while also extracting 
the country’s wealth and sending it back to 
China through illegal channels. In a 2014 
interview conducted in Upper Denkyira East 
Municipality, a licensed Ghanaian concession 
holder who had worked with Chinese miners 
expressed the view that ‘gold was sent direct 
to China’ with ‘so many ways’ of doing so. 
He recounted  one method where containers 
that brought machinery into the country 
were then used to smuggle gold back to China 
by cutting out part of the container, filling 
the inside with gold, and then re-welding it 
(Crawford et al. 2016).
While most interactions between the 
Chinese and Ghanaians were collaborative 
in nature, the negative perception of the 
Chinese miners was also exacerbated by 
the widespread reporting of some violent 
conflicts that coincided with their arrival. As 
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the operations successfully began extracting 
gold, they also became targets for local 
bandits and armed robbery. This prompted 
the Chinese miners to arm themselves—
often with guns purchased illegally from 
the local police (Hirsch 2013)—and engage 
in firefights with would-be thieves; 
resulting in the deaths of both Chinese and 
Ghanaians (Modern Ghana 2013). Finally, in 
mid-2013, the combination of these issues 
presented too large of a political challenge 
to the Ghanaian government, and President 
Mahama established the Task Force, stating: 
‘The government will not allow their [the 
illegal miners] activities to cause conflict, 
dislocation, environmental degradation 
and unemployment when in fact the sector 
should rather benefit our communities and 
our country’ (Kaiman and Hirsch 2013). With 
that, the Chinese gold rush in Ghana was 
largely brought to an inglorious end.
So what does this tell us about the 
perception of Chinese migrant miners in 
Ghana, and the role of Chinese migration to 
the African continent more generally? While 
the story has been reported on extensively—
primarily from Ghana—the picture that 
has been presented fails to shed light on a 
number of important aspects of this episode 
of mass migration, resource extraction, and 
wealth production (for some). In general, 
depictions of the Chinese miners in Ghana 
have been essentialised representations. The 
miners themselves are largely described as a 
homogenous group composed of individuals 
with the same ambitions and having the 
same potential to ‘strike it rich’. This 
perception of the Chinese as a uniform mass, 
rather than differentiated individuals and 
subgroups, follows classic tropes and popular 
representations of mass migrations in general 
and Chinese mining migration in particular, 
both historically and in contemporary 
discourse. Most notably—and notoriously—
both the ‘Chinese Exclusion Act’ in the 
United States and the ‘White Australia Policy’ 
were the direct result of antagonism towards 
the sudden arrival of large numbers of 
Chinese miners, and their perceived ability to 
extract more gold than ‘local’ miners through 
collective effort. Moreover, it is well known 
that after the end of the gold rushes in the 
United States and Australia, the remaining 
Chinese were demonised by local labour 
movements and accused of undercutting 
wages. Similarly, the short-lived Chinese 
gold rush in Ghana has seen ‘the Chinese’ as 
a whole being blamed for causing widespread 
environmental degradation, feeding into 
corruption, increasing violence, stealing the 
livelihoods of poor Ghanaians, and capturing 
the country’s resources.
While these problematic issues arising 
from the sudden influx of Chinese miners 
and the rapid expansion of mining activities 
should certainly not be underestimated, 
the current depiction of the Chinese in 
Ghana as a singular group tends to obscure 
as much as enlighten. In particular, these 
representations fail to explore the migratory 
and class dynamics that gave rise to the 
exodus in the first place. They also turn a 
blind eye to the ways in which different types 
of Chinese miners benefitted or lost out, 
and ignore the developmental impacts back 
in China. Little is known about the Chinese 
miners themselves, other than the fact that 
they mainly come from a single poor county 
in the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. 
Even less is known about the labour relations 
that operated within the small mining groups, 
or the social processes within China that gave 
rise to the wider migration phenomenon. 
While the mining groups are often described 
as collaborative efforts of ‘partners’ investing 
together (He 2013); hierarchical structures 
have also been observed, with individuals 
or small groups hiring wage labourers 




MADE IN CHINA - HEART OF DARKNESS?
likelihood that the individual Chinese miners 
in Ghana have benefited in significantly 
different ways—with some potentially even 
being exploited. After all, research on small-
scale mining within China has shown that 
the contribution to the livelihoods of miners 
is highly differentiated, with wealthier 
investors profiting at a much higher rate 
than more marginalised individuals (Lu and 
Lora-Wainwright 2014). Research has also 
documented the ways in which poor Chinese 
migrant workers are often exploited through 
the withholding (and sometimes non-
payment) of wages by ‘labour subcontractors’ 
(baogongtou) operating in townships and 
villages (Pun and Xu 2011).
Ultimately, this points to the need for 
research following up on the Shanglin miners 
who were chased out of Ghana three years 
ago. Future research should look to examine 
who these people are, how they went to 
Ghana in the first place, how the spoils of this 
gold rush have been distributed amongst the 
Chinese participants in this story, and what 
the remittances meant for socioeconomic 
development in marginal Shanglin County and 
its ethnically Zhuang population. By lumping 
the Chinese together, ignoring the different 
experiences of the miners, and disregarding 
the fact that these Chinese are themselves a 
minority group in their own country, we get a 
distorted view of this historical episode that 
does not properly reflect the developmental 
processes and relations at play. Rather than 
seeing the complex webs of relationships 
connecting peripheral rural China with 
the margins of Ghana—and thus producing 
patterns of resource extraction, accumulation, 
and inequality between, within and across the 
people involved in both places—the Chinese as 
a whole are depicted as uniformly (negatively) 
impacting on the environment, Ghanaian 
politics, and the livelihoods of the poorest. 
In this way, the Chinese miners are ascribed 
with causal abilities—they are seen as the 
origin of the negative outcomes rather than a 
symptom of wider systemic issues. This shifts 
attention away from the labour relations and 
unequal power that exist within the Chinese 
‘mass’, resulting in the production of winners 
and losers among the miners themselves. It 
also obscures the processes implicit within 
global capitalism that prompt large numbers 
of precarious and marginal people to move 
from one place to another—and sometimes 
back again—in search of secure livelihoods 
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While China’s expanding presence in Africa 
is often framed as a new project in empire 
building, the Chinese authorities explain their 
engagement on the continent as simple ‘South-
South cooperation’. Taking the agricultural 
sector in Ghana as a case study, this article 
challenges both narratives and argues that 
Chinese farmers in Africa are not a ‘silent army’ 
(either malevolent or benevolent), but instead 
are largely precarious individuals attempting to 
meet their livelihood needs.
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Western media and research often frame 
China’s expanding presence in African 
countries as a new project in empire building 
on the continent. The Chinese government, 
on the contrary, espouses a very different 
narrative—one which depicts Chinese 
companies and migrants as promoting 
development through beneficial South-South 
cooperation resulting in mechanisation and 
advanced techniques. In this way, in both 
academic research and popular discourse, 
discussions about China’s developmental role 
in contemporary Africa often end up implicitly 
categorising all the activities of Chinese 
businesses and individual migrants in African 
countries as being either malevolent or 
benevolent extensions of China’s expanding 
global influence. 
This is particularly apparent in the 
agricultural sector. At present, most 
‘Mary tills her field’
PC: Felix Clay
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A Chinese Empire in the Making? 
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media attention and research on Chinese 
agricultural engagements in Africa focus on 
aid or commercial investments by large state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), neglecting the 
fact that on the African continent there is 
also a growing number of small-scale farms 
run by individual Chinese migrants and their 
families. Indeed, while doing fieldwork in 
Ghana (Cook et al. 2016), I only encountered 
one case of large-scale Chinese agricultural 
investment that involved modern mechanised 
technologies aiming to produce rice for 
the local Ghanaian market. I did, however, 
encounter a collection of small-scale Chinese 
farms that are filling a very different niche. 
They are characterised by strong personal 
networks and family relations, and target an 
expatriate population trying to make ends 
meet. Such endeavours do not fit neatly 
into the narratives espoused neither by the 
Chinese government nor Western media and 
research. 
In this article, I will take Ghana as a case 
study to explore how Chinese migrants 
operate in the agri-food sector in Africa. In 
particular, I will argue that Chinese farmers 
in Africa are not a ‘silent army’ (either 
malevolent or benevolent), but are instead 
largely precarious individuals attempting to 
meet their livelihood needs. Moreover, these 
migrants are a symptom of, and a response 
to, wider global migration dynamics. In 
particular, many of these small-scale farmers 
have gone into Ghanaian agriculture in order 
to provide for the huge influx of Chinese 
migrant miners (see Loubere and Crawford 
in this issue). In this way, Chinese farmers in 
Ghana can be considered reflective of wider 
processes of contemporary globalisation.
Although since the Mao era there have 
been groups of Chinese people dwelling in 
Ghana—many of whom had originally come 
over as aid experts—the last few years have 
seen a dramatic increase in the number of 
Chinese immigrants in the country. This 
is primarily due to the small-scale mining 
phenomenon and the fact that Chinese 
companies have entered a growing number of 
sectors, including mining, construction, and 
manufacturing, just to name a few. In addition, 
Chinese migrants maintain a significance 
presence in retail trade, fishing, small-scale 
mining, and timber sectors, much of it outside 
the law and without proper registration. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that data on 
the number of Chinese migrants in Ghana 
are limited and unreliable, with estimates 
varying between seven and twenty thousand 
(Mohan et al. 2014). Still, even these figures 
may be conservative if we consider that in 
August 2013 the South China Morning Post 
quoted the secretary general of the Chinese 
Mining Association in Ghana as saying that 
more than fifty thousand Chinese gold miners 
had poured into the country since 2005 (He 
2013). Another article from The Guardian 
published roughly at the same time reported 
that 4,592 illegal Chinese gold miners had 
been deported from June to July 2013 alone 
(Hirsch 2013). 
While Chinese miners in Ghana have 
often featured in the international media, 
China and Ghana have a longer history of 
engagement in agriculture than in mining. 
Cooperation in agriculture between China 
and Ghana goes back to the 1960s, and 
has continued to grow and develop over 
subsequent decades (Amanor and Chichav 
2016). Today, China and Ghana officially 
cooperate in a number of sectors, including 
agro-processing, irrigation, infrastructure 
development, and agricultural technology 
(Amanor 2013). Chinese agronomists even 
teach at the University of Ghana. Yet, just 
as the information on Chinese migration 
is patchy and unreliable, data on Chinese 
investment in the agricultural sector are 
incomplete and often inaccurate. According 
to some estimates, Chinese investments in 
agriculture constitute about four per cent of 
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total Chinese investments in the country, with 
the largest being in rice irrigation projects 
(Amanor 2015). In other words, compared 
with other industries, farming seems to be a 
relatively neglected sector for the Chinese in 
Ghana.
It is clear from our fieldwork that in Ghana 
there are only a few formally registered 
farms. According to a list provided by the 
Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, only 
twelve Chinese farms officially registered 
with the government between 1994 and 2013. 
Moreover, after attempting to get in touch 
with these farms, we found that only two of 
them were actually contactable. Both were 
registered as producing vegetables and one 
was said to rear pigs. However, while we were 
visiting the official farms we had contacted, 
we by chance met some other unlisted farms 
owned by Chinese individuals, as well as 
some unregistered farms owned by large 
Chinese SOEs with their own small vegetable 
and pig farms geared towards meeting their 
own consumption purposes, i.e. for their 
employees. To shed some light on why Chinese 
people migrate to Ghana to undertake small-
scale agriculture I will discuss three of these 
small-scale individually-owned farms, two of 
them registered and one not. The three farms 
were between two and twenty hectares and, 
on average, they employed three Chinese 
nationals as managers and technicians and 
five to ten local people as manual workers. 
According to our findings, many Chinese 
small-scale farmers in Ghana come from 
non-agricultural backgrounds. In the cases 
examined in this article, all three farm owners 
were from different provinces in southern 
China (Hunan, Guangdong, and Zhejiang), 
but only one of them migrated specifically for 
agriculture. Before setting up his farm, the 
owner of one of the farms had been trading 
Profiling Chinese Farmers 
in Ghana
agricultural products between China and 
Ghana. Another of the farm owners had been 
working in Ghana as an engineer in a Chinese 
company. Only the owner of the third farm 
came to Ghana specifically to set up a farm. 
However, his migration history was far more 
complex than those of the other people we 
met. For the past two decades he had been 
living and farming on the Northern Mariana 
Islands, a US Commonwealth territory in the 
middle of the Pacific Ocean where he had 
moved during the Cultural Revolution. 
Despite their very varied backgrounds, 
though, all of them have learned about 
farming, livestock, agricultural management, 
and marketing in a remarkably challenging 
social, linguistic, and physical environment. 
Furthermore, they also have shown a 
willingness to convert to a new line of business 
if it proves to be more economically viable. 
Moreover, their motivations to start their 
farms were somewhat similar: all of them 
said they aimed to meet their own needs for 
vegetable consumption in the first instance. 
As a Chinese employee on one of the farms 
put it: ‘The boss of our farm is about sixty 
years old. He was running a trade business 
in agricultural products between China and 
Ghana four years ago. Later on, when he 
found it difficult to find Chinese vegetables in 
the local market, though, he started his first 
farm.’ In this way, the farm was established 
as a response to a particular market need, 
which itself arose due to the wider processes 
of global migration. 
The Chinese farmers we interviewed stated 
that in order to successfully run a small farm 
in Ghana, they had to consider the following 
elements: land, water resources, access to 
markets, and labour. Among these aspects, 
land was the most significant and challenging 
element to consider. Generally speaking, 
the Chinese farmers had great difficulties 
securing the land of the size and quality they 
wanted within the existing legal framework. 
Part of the problem is that throughout Ghana 
there is a lack of clarity about land ownership, 
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particularly between local chiefs and local 
governments. This is a major hindrance 
for those foreigners who want to invest in 
agricultural activities in Africa, because it is 
not always clear who owns the land rights. 
This meant that the Chinese farmers were 
often unable to operate in a technically 
‘legal’ way, not necessarily because they are 
maliciously land-grabbing or exploiting local 
people, but rather because legality in this 
context is tenuous for everyone involved. For 
this reason, many Chinese migrants give up 
farming after one or two years. 
That being said, although in the beginning 
the farms we examined encountered a lot of 
difficulties, those who stayed and persisted 
in earlier years were able to survive due to 
a sizeable Chinese community that provided 
a ready market, particularly the rapid influx 
of illegal miners after the increase in gold 
prices in 2008 (see the chapter by Loubere 
and Crawford on pp. 116–121 in the present 
book). However, due to the expulsion of a 
large number of Chinese gold miners in June 
2013, the farms lost a significant portion of 
their market. The remaining Chinese farmers 
confirmed that they have been selling less than 
before and are, therefore, struggling. Besides 
the difficulties mentioned above, since their 
products are sold locally, they still need to 
compete in the local market, both among 
themselves and with Ghanaian farmers. This 
greatly tests the farmers’ business acumen, 
patience, and resilience. 
The examples provided above suggest 
that Chinese ‘land grabs’ and agricultural 
‘cooperation’ in Ghana in fact mostly consists 
of informal small plots of a few hectares 
producing vegetables to sell locally. While 
there are a handful of larger SOE farms, they 
are primarily operating for the consumption 
needs of the personnel employed by the 
company. More widespread are small 
individually-owned farms; however, the 
majority of these farmers are working hard 
to meet their own livelihood needs in an 
increasingly unpredictable and volatile 
market. This does not fit neatly into the 
western media discourses focussed on land 
grabbing and neo-imperialism, nor into the 
narrative of the Chinese government centred 
on the idea of mutually beneficial South-
South cooperation. 
From this perspective, Chinese agricultural 
workers in Africa are not an organised ‘silent 
army’ of labourers, but are actually diverse 
and fragmented. They are relatively marginal 
people moving from one place to another 
in an attempt to improve their livelihoods. 
Living independently with no support or 
even contact with the Chinese government, 
they struggle to ensure their survival in the 
local markets, facing the competition of 
local producers and sellers, and surviving in 
unstable and unclear legal situations. Quite 
clearly, there is no real prospect for these farms 
to become large-scale, highly mechanised 
or capital intensive, which is actually what 
most African governments yearn for in order 
to increase agricultural production. In other 
words, China’s presence in the agricultural 
sector in Africa mostly remains in the realm 
of individual entrepreneurship, a far cry from 
the ambition of empire.
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Zhao Liang’s recent film Behemoth (beixi 
moshou) is a cinematic meditation on the 
Anthropocene—the current geological epoch 
marking ‘a new phase in the history of the 
Earth, when natural forces and human forces 
become intertwined, so that the fate of one 
determines the fate of the other’ (Zalasiewicz 
et al. 2010, 2231). Composed from documentary 
footage of natural and human life in their 
devastated forms, Behemoth offers a dystopian 
view of our present reality based on a script 
written by Zhao Liang that is loosely adapted 
from Dante’s Divine Comedy. In an interview 
I conducted with the director via the popular 
Chinese social media platform WeChat this 
past July, taking a studied cynical tone, he 
described his art as a technique of making the 
ugly beautiful: ‘Most of the time, I take some 
ugly affair and make it “look beautiful” on film. 
But isn’t our world often packaged to appear 
beautiful in this way, especially politics?’
Zhao Liang’s aesthetic style is one of 
unflinching exposure, however, which shares 
little in common with the theatricality of state 
power and mystification of sovereign violence. 
The gorgeous cinematography of Behemoth 
creates a new perceptual field of planetary 
destruction in a way that is unavailable to the 
prose of scientific description and political 
argument. As the poet Rainer Maria Rilke 
famously wrote in his Duino Elegies, ‘For 
beauty is nothing but the beginning of terror, 
which we are still just able to endure, and we 
are so awed because it serenely disdains to 
destroy us. Every angel is terrifying’ (Rilke 
2009, 3). We follow the prophetic guide into 
the Inferno, but we do not come out the same. 
The narrative of Behemoth follows what 
Zhao Liang describes as a ‘supply chain’ 
(chanyelian) of urban construction.1 The 
From the earliest times, human civilization has been no more than a 
strange luminescence growing more intense by the hour, of which no one 
can say when it will begin to wane and when it will fade away.
W.G. Sebald
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film opens with a long-shot of an open-pit 
coal mine in Inner Mongolia, explosions are 
heard in the distance, coal ash rains from 
the sky into the frame, accompanied by the 
rasping of traditional Mongolian throat-
singing. The camera descends into coal mines, 
swelters in the heat of iron smelting furnaces, 
dispassionately gazes on coal miners in their 
dormitories and hospital beds, and finally 
sojourns in the utopian ‘ghost city of Ordos’ 
where the film ends. 
For those who are unfamiliar with 
the context, Ordos is a Prefecture-Level 
Municipality located in the Gobi Desert in 
Inner Mongolia. After a natural resource boom 
beginning in 2004, the Ordos government 
decided to invest its windfall revenue in the 
construction of a new administrative capital 
named Kangbashi in an area that was mostly 
desolate wasteland. Despite its modern 
architecture and urban trappings, Kangbashi 
has failed to attract residents, earning it the 
reputation of China’s most infamous ‘ghost 
city’ (gui chengshi) (Sorace and Hurst 2016). 
For some China watchers, it is a portent of 
the inevitable bursting of China’s real estate 
bubble inflated by political incentives and 
speculative land development. In Behemoth, 
Kangbashi is described as the ‘paradise of our 
dreams’—a perfect, clean, and empty city. 
 
Urbanisation and the extraction of coal, 
natural gas, and rare earth minerals contribute 
to the desertification of China’s grasslands, 
which has triggered massive sandstorms 
that have blown into Beijing and Tianjin. 
In Behemoth, we witness the scars of urban 
modernity: craters from open-pit coal mines, 
vegetation desiccated due to the consumption 
of surface water by mining operations, billowy 
clouds of pollution. According to Zhao 
Liang, filming ‘the shattered mountains and 
rivers and last gasps of life’ (posui de shanhe, 
canchuan de shengming) were the scenes that 
‘pierced’ (citong) him the most. 
Part of Behemoth’s visual power is its 
formal treatment of human bodies and natural 
landscapes as the same damaged matter. The 
bodies of coal miners belong to the landscape. 
The camera glides across their creased faces, 
blistered hands, and bodies covered in the 
‘inky make-up’  soot and sweat. In one scene, 
we hear the laboured breathing of a coal miner 
suffering from pneumoconiosis, hooked up 
to a respiratory apparatus, lying in bed. He is 
indifferent to the camera’s presence. Later, we 
see a woman holding up a funerary portrait of 
a man who may or may not have been him. 
Even though Behemoth is ostensibly a 
documentary, none of the miners are given a 
voice in the film. To some, this may appear 
as an additional layer of exploitation. For me, 
however, the decision to exclude biographical 
details and life trajectories from the film’s 
narrative content allows a different kind of 
speech to occur. 
The silent bodies and gazes of the miners 
speak of their expendability. A miner’s 
individual life, dreams, and medical records 
matter little to the coal mining boss, Party 
secretary, financial speculator, and middle 
class home-owner. From the standpoint of 
those who benefit from the urbanisation 
process, the miner’s life is valued as long as he 
is healthy enough to show up for work. When 
he can no longer work, he will be replaced. 
The decision not to give the miners a voice 
amplifies the singularity of each physical 
presence in the face of its precarity and serial 
interchangeability. 
Behemoth is about more than ‘the human 
and environmental costs of coal mining and 
consumption in China’ (Qin 2015) because the 
word ‘cost’ remains within a political economy 
of commensurability. A miner’s health is not 
the ‘cost’ of his need to survive. The destruction 
of the planet is not some unfortunate ‘price’ 
of modernisation but its suicidal involution. 
The Anthropocene has moved us beyond the 
calculation of cost-benefit equivalences into a 
The Other Side of 
Urbanisation
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world where new values, systems, and myths 
are needed (Burke et al. 2016).
As the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy put it, 
‘Yet we can oppose nothing to “growth” unless 
we can conceive of another civilization, a new 
sense of existence not enslaved to production 
but freed for itself. Which implies that this “for 
itself ” finds its own meaning, the meaning of 
its “own” fact of being’ (Nancy 2014, 47). The 
end of capitalism will only be the beginning of 
a life we have not yet imagined.
It is significant that Zhao Liang’s dystopian 
vision of reality takes place in post-socialist 
China. Twentieth century communism 
promised an end to exploitation, the 
emancipation of all human beings, and the 
liberation of our creative faculties. Instead 
of achieving these goals, it generated its own 
forms of lethal oppression and, in doing so, 
destroyed our ability to dream of a political 
solution to the inequalities of capitalism.2 
In a conversation that I had with him at his 
workshop in Beijing this past June, Zhao Liang 
referred to ‘humanity as a cancer of the earth’ 
(renlei shi diqiu de aizheng). When I asked him 
why he thought we are ‘incurable’ (meijiu), 
his answer was ‘original sin’ (yuanzui) which 
he defined as ‘the defect of boundless desire’ 
(yuwang de wuxianxing de quexian). He is also 
increasingly skeptical of the transformative 
power of art. In an interview from March 2016 
with Slant Magazine, the artist recalls feeling 
‘compelled by social responsibility’ when he 
first started making documentaries but ‘no 
longer’ sees his ‘work as a catalyst for creating 
social benefit’ (Suber 2016). When I asked 
what precipitated his abandonment of political 
optimism, his response was the ‘cruelty of the 
real world’ and ‘powerlessness’ to change it 
(xianshi shijie de cankuxing he wuligan). 
Although such arrant nihilism is modish in 
China’s art scene, it is not without historical 
basis. Zhao Liang’s pessimistic view of human 
nature raises important, unresolved, and 
unfashionable questions about the failure of 
China’s twentieth century communist project. 
To put it somewhat coarsely, for all of the 
Communist Party’s laudable as well as violent 
attempts to ‘change the human being in what is 
most profound’, they were unable to eradicate 
the venality, cruelty, and boundless desire of 
human nature (Badiou 2005, 482). 
A shot from Zhao Liang’s 
Behemoth
After the Promise of 
Communism
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As McKenzie Wark points out, ‘The 
unspeakable secret about climate change is 
that nobody really wants to think about it for 
too long. It’s just too depressing’ (Wark 2015, 
25). It is also cognitively impossible to grasp 
the totality of climate change’s complex non-
linear temporalities and uneven geographies. 
Instead, as Jodi Dean argues, it is much easier 
to circulate platitudes that generate enjoyment 
in moral outrage and self-exoneration (Dean 
2016). For these reasons, I suggest that art in 
the age of the Anthropocene has the power to 
convey scientific and political truths in images 
and sensory environments in ways that disturb 
our complacency, enjoyment, and ignorance. 
In China, several contemporary artists have 
been grappling with the problems posed by 
the Anthropocene, inventing new aesthetic 
forms, and creatively working with damaged 
materialities. In the series of photographs 
called New Landscapes, Yao Lu re-creates 
traditional Chinese landscapes of mountains 
and rivers using trash and debris from landfills 
(Phaidon 2013). He Xiangyu’s Cola Project 
required boiling thousands of litres of cola, 
which hardened into a coal-like substance that 
could be ground into ink and used for Song 
Dynasty-style landscape paintings (White 
Cube 2014). Cai Guo-Qiang’s 2014 exhibit 
The Ninth Wave included the manufacture 
of a contemporary Noah’s Ark ‘carrying 99 
fabricated animals in various states of decline’ 
which ‘sailed along the Huangpu River’ before 
docking at the Power Station of Art in Shanghai 
(Davis 2014; e-flux 2014). Cai’s ship of tattered 
stuffed animals followed the same course as 
16,000 dead pigs, which mysteriously floated 
down the river a year earlier in March 2013 
(Davison 2013). In these works, the mimetic 
relationship between art and nature becomes 
recursive as we are no longer able to discern 
human artifacts from natural processes. 
With unforgettable cinematography and 
soundscapes, Behemoth reveals the devastation 
of the Inner Mongolian grasslands due to fossil 
fuel extraction. The mobility of the camera 
enables it to traverse, and record, different 
scales and topographies of damaged matter. 
It brings into view a dystopian reality that we 
would otherwise be unable to visualise. 
This is not to suggest that art can save 
us from extinction. Perhaps Zhao Liang’s 
pessimism is correct and humanity is a ‘cancer’ 
that will metastasise until we have killed our 
host. I am not convinced. For me, Behemoth 
prophesises that it is time to dream of a new 
paradise that can mobilise the political energy 
and will to build a world in common from the 
ruins of the one we have destroyed. It may fail, 
but it is our only hope. 
    
[1] This description is from an advertisement on WeChat for 
a private screening of Behemoth in Beijing. The advertisement 
was ‘harmonised’, i.e., deleted, from WeChat and the screening 
was cancelled.
[2] Today, the Chinese Communist Party officially promises 
to engineer a ‘moderately prosperous society’ (xiaokang 
shehui), and the ‘China dream’ (Zhongguo meng) is deployed in 
the service of ‘social stability’ (weihu shehui wending), capitalist 
accumulation, and exploitation. They are a far cry from the 
dreams of universal emancipation and working class power.
Christian Sorace
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The Cow and the Goat Descend the 
Mountain: Fighting Modernity with 
Poems
Ivan Franceschini
A few years ago—it must have been towards 
the end of 2010—a big crowd had gathered 
in a loft in the Centre of Contemporary Arts 
in Shenzhen to enjoy the music of blind folk 
singer Zhou Yunpeng, an artist famous for 
his socially committed songs on issues such 
as child abuse, unemployment, sky-rocketing 
housing costs, and much more. Halfway 
through the concert, Zhou announced: 
‘Contemporaneity is helpless, antiquity will 
now make its entrance.’ Then time seemed 
to stop, while a flow of words from poets of 
different ages and places started chasing 
each other, softly accompanied by the music 
of Zhou’s guitar. Voices from the Tang era 
engaged in a lively conversation with bards 
from the Song and Qing ages. People who 
lived centuries apart borrowed Zhou’s 
voice to express exactly the same feeling: 
an acute longing for their families and their 
hometowns. 
Zhou was performing songs from his then 
recently released album, The Cow and the 
Goat Descend the Mountain (niuyang xiashan), 
a collection of ancient Chinese poetry set 
to music which appeals to a dimension of 
human life that transcends time and space. 
Listening to the lines of Du Fu (712–770) ‘it 
is almost as hard for friends to meet as for 
the morning and evening stars’ (ren sheng bu 
xiang jian, dong ru shen yu shang), or to Meng 
Jiao (751–814) lyrically describing how ‘the 
thread in the hands of a fond-hearted mother 
makes clothes for the body of her wayward 
boy; carefully she sews and thoroughly she 
mends, dreading the delays that will keep 
him late from home’ (ci mu shou zhong xian, 
you zi shen shang yi; lin xing mi mi feng, 
yi kong chi chi gui), it is easy to forget that 
such words were written centuries ago. The 
same happens with Li Bai (701–762) and his 
poem ‘The Moon over the Fortified Pass’ 
(guanshanyue), which recounts how soldiers 
marching through the Jade Gate under the 
moonlight ‘turn round, looking toward the 
border, and think of home, with wistful eyes 
and of those tonight in the upper chambers 
who toss and sigh and cannot rest’ (shu ke 
wang bian se, si gui duo ku yan; lou dang ci ye, 
tan xi wei ying xian),  or with the soldier in 
a poem by Nalan Xingde’s (1655–1685), who 
dreams of his peaceful home while encamped 
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the underlying feelings do not seem to have 
changed. 
Chinese language has two different words 
to express the concept of ‘nostalgia’: on the 
one hand, huaijiu, literally ‘embracing the 
old’; on the other, sixiang, ‘homesickness’. 
Yet, as Niuyang xiashan clearly demonstrates, 
these expressions are both sides of the same 
coin. Singing those ancient poems, Zhou 
Yunpeng recounts stories of a long lost 
bucolic idyll mixed with melancholic feelings 
of nostalgia for a distant hometown. The title 
of the album itself is an allusion that exudes 
sadness and nostalgia—‘the cow and the goat 
descend the mountain’ paraphrases a verse 
from ‘The Gentleman Serves in the Army’ 
(junzi yuyi), a poem in the Classic of Poetry 
(shijing) about the wailing wife of a soldier far 
away from home. In the evening, the family’s 
chickens are back in the henhouse, a yellow 
dog is sitting on the doorstep, even the cow 
and goat have come down from the mountain 
where they were grazing, only the husband is 
nowhere to be seen.
Ancient poetry is very much alive in today’s 
China. As Bill Porter writes in Finding Them 
Gone, a recent book about his pilgrimages to 
the graves of the greatest poets of Chinese 
antiquity:
The graves of the poets I’d been visiting 
were so different. Some were simple, some 
palatial, some had been plowed under by 
farmers, and others had been reduced to trash 
pits. Their poems, though, had survived. 
They were still fresh in the minds of cigar-
smoking farmers who most likely never 
attended high school. The same couldn’t be 
said for the pronouncements of the high and 
mighty. Poetry is transcendent. We carry it 
in our hearts and find it there when we have 
forgotten everything else. (Porter 2016)
The recurrence of these feelings of 
detachment and homesickness all through 
Niuyang xiashan is unsurprising, since 
nostalgia is everywhere to be found in Chinese 
traditional poetry. As James Liu explained 
in The Art of Chinese Poetry, Chinese poets 
seem to be perpetually bewailing their exile 
and longing to return home, a feature that he 
attributes to 
the vastness of China, the difficulties 
of communication that existed, the sharp 
contrast between the highly cultured life 
in the main cities and the harsh conditions 
in the remoter regions of the country, and 
the importance of the family in traditional 
Chinese society with the consequent deep 
attachment to the ancestral home. Moreover, 
being an agricultural people and a nation 
of landlubbers, the Chinese as a whole are 
noticeably lacking in Wanderlust. (Liu 1962, 
55)
But why sing these poems today, when 
distances in China, as elsewhere, have 
been dramatically shortened by improved 
communications? The simple answer is that 
this nostalgia is now more present than ever in 
the life of the Chinese people. Today’s China is 
still a country of people on the move. Farmers 
leave the countryside to look for jobs in urban 
areas, students move to bigger cities to gain 
access to a better education, merchants travel 
from town to town to pursue their businesses. 
Families often have no other choice than to 
split up: rural mothers leave their children 
behind in the villages—husbands, wives and 
sons live and work in completely different 
places. Most of them meet no more than once 
a year, during the Spring Festival. Once they 
were soldiers and exiled poets, now they are 
migrant workers, students, and businessmen. 
Their existence may appear less poetic, but 
Reminiscences from a 
Golden Age
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This holds particularly true for the 
selection of poetry included in Niuyang 
xiashan. All the poems performed by Zhou on 
this album belong to the collective memory 
of the Chinese people, and they therefore 
strike a chord with a Chinese audience from 
all walks of life. In an interview that I had 
with him in April 2012, Zhou explained that 
all those verses are reminiscences from his 
own childhood in the 1970s, when he had to 
learn them by heart at school: ‘These poems 
are among the most popular in China, they 
are like a souvenir in your backpack, an old 
photo. I have been in many places, I have lost 
many books, but these poems are always with 
me. When I am on the road or I am waiting 
for a car or a flight, I just go over them in 
my head. It is like a spiritual massage and in 
doing so my spirit becomes peaceful. I did not 
choose those poems, they just popped up in 
my mind, it was so natural.’ 
Zhou lost his sight when he was nine years 
old. In the following decades, in spite of all 
the hardships he was forced to endure, he 
became a tireless traveller and an insatiable 
reader. During our interview, he repeatedly 
used the verb ‘to look’ (kan) to describe his 
experiences on the road. Still, this ‘looking’ 
seems to go well beyond the realm of the 
sight he had lost, being more like an act 
of ‘contemplation’ (guanzhao). In Zhou’s 
own words: ‘Contemplating is more than 
looking, it means experiencing something 
with all your body and mind, with the optic 
nerve of your soul.’ Zhou believes that 
poetry has a fundamental role in this kind 
of contemplation: ‘Ancient poems are very 
visual. Every single poem has a lot of images of 
mountains, rivers, flowers, smokes, trees, and 
skies and this is very good for blind people. 
These verses give us another reality, a reality 
that can be seen through the eyes of people 
from other ages. Those are the skies and the 
water of the Tang Dynasty and through poetry 
we can experience that world.’ 
After many years of producing music 
that dealt critically with the plights of 
contemporaneity, one cannot but wonder 
whether Niuyang xiashan represent 
Zhou’s escape from the many hardships 
of contemporary society. However, this 
does not seem to be the case. According 
to Zhou, this album is not just a return to 
the past, since those ancient poems bear 
extraordinary resemblances to today’s social 
issues. As examples, during our interview he 
quoted two series of poems by Du Fu: ‘Three 
Functionaries’ (san li) and ‘Three Separations’ 
(san bie). In the first series, Du Fu writes 
about local cadres who press-gang all the 
able-bodied men into the army until only 
an old lady remains at home, and then also 
force this woman to join the army as a cook 
(Fu 2015, vol. 2, 82-97). According to Zhou, 
this story recalls today’s forced relocations. 
‘Three Separations’ instead tells the stories 
of elderly people without any kind of social 
security, and therefore with nothing to lose. 
From Zhou’s point of view, the similarity 
to the situation of many old people today is 
obvious. 
Neither ‘Three Functionaries’ nor ‘Three 
Separations’ are included in Niuyang xiashan, 
but contemporaneity still makes a few explicit 
appearances in this album. The first one is in 
the middle of ‘A Song of Spring’ (chunge), a 
composition that contains lines from three 
different poems by Wumen Shenshi (1183–
1260) and Liu Yuxi (772–842). After sketching 
a series of bucolic images, Zhou starts telling 
the story of Li Bai, who reportedly one day 
saved his friend Wang Lun from drowning in 
a river. All of a sudden, in the middle of the 
song, Zhou Yunpeng directly addresses Li 
Bai: ‘Comrade Li Bai, being an old Communist 
Party member from the Tang dynasty, what 
were you thinking when you dived into the 
water to save Wang Lun?’ And Li Bai answers 
An Escape from 
Modernity?
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with nonchalance, mixing plain language 
with pompous lines from one of his most 
famous poems: ‘Ah, purple mists rose from 
the Incense Peak in the sun, that day it was 
very hot; cascading from atop three thousand 
feet adown, I went to the river to bathe. 
While I was in the water I picked up Wang 
Lun.’ With this joke, originally inspired by a 
child he once met, Zhou candidly mocks the 
Party propaganda about Lei Feng and other 
‘miraculous’ model workers.
The second appearance of the modern 
age occurs in the last song, ‘Love Without 
Speaking’ (bu hui shuo hua de aiqing). This 
song, the only one on the album entirely 
written by Zhou Yunpeng, opens with a couple 
of verses of ancient flavour—‘You are tired of 
doing your embroidery, even the cow and the 
goat have come down from the mountain’ (xiu 
hua xiu de lei le ba, niu yang ye xia shang lo)—
then plunges into a love story full of hatred 
and regret. Zhou is particularly proud of this 
song, which he deems the best work he has 
ever done: 
‘Love Without Speaking’ is not a kind of 
pastoral sadness; it is a story of urban anxiety, 
that kind of anxiety, struggle, and hate that 
prominently feature in the life of people 
today, in a world dominated by material 
desires. I think that a love without hate would 
be incomplete. This is not only a love song, 
it is more a song about life in general. For 
instance, you can, at the same time, love and 
hate Beijing: your relationship with a place, a 
person, a time always has this kind of mixture 
of love and hate.  
And love and hate are what Zhou Yunpeng 
feels toward this age, with all its progress 
in the field of communications, which have 
weakened the bond between people and 
their homes; with the rapid expansion of the 
Internet, which has destroyed the pleasure 
of writing letters and appreciating the 
relationships with far away friends; and with 
the systematic destruction of significant parts 
of China’s cultural heritage. In the face of all 
this, the choice to recover these fragments of 
ancient poetry and give them new life through 
music seems to be more an act of resistance 
than an escape. As Zhou puts it: ‘In the 
contemporary world, nostalgia, distance, and 
homesickness are all luxuries which belong 
to a utopia. We can only experience them 
through the bodies of the people from ancient 
times. Their way of life has become an ideal, 
something that we can only find by accident 
but not seek out on purpose. That is the 
reason I love the people in Niuyang xiashan: 
they still can experience those feelings.’
The translations of the verses of Li Bai, Meng 
Jiao, and Du Fu quoted in the text are by Witter 
Bynner.
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The happiness of the Chinese people is one 
of the declared aims of the Chinese dream. 
An educational volume on social governance 
and welfare published by the official Red 
Flag Press titled Building a Happy China 
sums it up like this: ‘The process of the 
reinvigoration of the Chinese nation equates 
to the building of a happy China; without 
people’s affluence, development cannot be 
considered successful; without people’s 
happiness, the reinvigoration will not be 
complete’ (Shu 2013, I). The happiness of the 
Chinese people is not just an aim, but has also 
become a measure for the realisation of the 
Chinese dream. Put differently, being happy 
is the required spiritual state of the Chinese 
people in this new project of the Party-state. 
But what methods are available to the Chinese 
people to achieve happiness? In the following 
essay, I will briefly look at three different 
options from the field of psychology and 
psychotherapy—psychodynamic therapies, 
positive psychology, and Morita therapy—to 
discuss the chances for fulfilment of China’s 
dream of happiness.
Moving from a state of unhappiness to 
happiness requires a transformation at the 
Chinese Dreams of Happiness: What 
Are the Chances?
Gerda Wielander
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individual level, which—provided that enough 
individuals go through the same process—
then becomes a collective transformation. 
This is an evolutionary process guided by 
people’s ability to adapt their strategies to 
maximise happiness depending on needs and 
opportunities. When needs shift for many 
people at the same time (due to massive 
changes in their socio-political environment, 
for example), then similar adaptation 
strategies will be adopted. These, in turn, 
accumulate into collective trends, which have 
the potential to lead to social change (Welzel 
and Inglehart 2010).
The marketisation of most, if not all, 
aspects of the Chinese economy and the 
liberalisation of society have brought 
into existence a wide range of potential 
role models and ‘happiness maximisation 
strategies’ for the Chinese individual to 
choose from. In a radically changed economic 
and social environment, people’s readiness to 
choose and try out new strategies to maximise 
happiness has increased considerably. At the 
same time, today the government’s attempts 
at re-affirming normative expectations of 
behaviour and the ‘correct spirit’ around the 
values of socialism compete with alternative 
value systems derived from religions and 
different schools of thoughts that have been 
circulating among the population. Various 
schools of psychology also play a role in this.
Western culture in the twentieth century 
has grown up on the pervasive influence of 
Freudian concepts of the unconscious and 
tends to focus on the importance of individual 
transformation in isolation from the social. 
Only very few psychoanalytical schools 
offer perspectives on transformation that 
go beyond the individual. Otto Gross (1877–
1920), an Austrian psychoanalyst, could not 
conceive of transforming the self without the 
transformation of the socio-political context; 
to him factors outside the individual’s 
history needed to be taken into account in an 
individual’s unhappiness (Heuer 2003). More 
recently, the British Jungian analyst Andrew 
Samuels has argued that the inner world of 
emotion and fantasy about survival and status 
builds up in a ceaseless feedback loop with 
the outer world; and outer world problems in 
society gain emotional and fantasy elements 
within the individual (Samuels 2014). 
Hence—according to him—the economic (and 
political) and the psychological mutually 
irradiate.
Freudian ideas of the unconscious—
introduced to China in the 1920s—with 
their focus on sexual trauma never really 
suited Chinese culture, and interest in its 
application to the Chinese mind was limited, 
despite a brief ‘Freud fever’ in the 1980s. But, 
although the soul or the unconscious have 
never played a significant role in the Chinese 
concept of psychological transformation, 
China’s transformation into a ‘happy and 
prosperous socialist society’—a slogan 
used in the 1950s—always required the 
transformation of both the individual and the 
external circumstances. The overthrow of 
the existing social order or the redistribution 
of means of production alone were never 
considered enough to achieve happiness even 
in socialist China.
Psychodynamic therapies have developed 
from Freudian and Jungian ideas, and in 
essence are based on an engagement with 
one’s individual past and on working through 
trauma through verbal exchanges, often over 
a long period of time. It is an individualistic, 
non-directive, backward-looking process, 
which is painful, costly, and while often 
successful, results don’t appear quickly. It 
requires a willingness to critically engage and 
often break with one’s past before being able 
to move forward. Considering how important 
the tight control of all interpretations of 
China’s past is for the legitimacy of the ruling 
power and promoter of the Chinese dream, 
The Limits of Freudian 
Psychoanalysis
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the chances or even possibility of gaining 
closure, and hence happiness, by working 
through past traumas are nil.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
is, however, very much enamoured with 
positive psychology, a field of psychology 
that developed out of the behaviourist 
school, which focuses on ‘flourishing’, that 
is psychological functioning at its best. The 
central premise is that too much of psychology 
has been focusing on negativity, complexes, 
depression, and other shortcomings, while 
the needs of ‘normal people’ (not usually put 
in quotation marks in the Chinese literature) 
and the myriads of beautiful and positive 
things in the world have been neglected.
Positive psychology has developed out 
of humanistic psychology, which, in turn, 
responded to the limitations of psychodynamic 
approaches built on Freudian psychoanalysis. 
The philosophical foundations of humanistic 
psychology lie in existential philosophy, 
with its concern for human freedom, choice 
and responsibility, and search for meaning. 
However, despite this shared philosophical 
tradition there are fundamental differences 
between humanistic and positive psychology 
in relation to freedom, will, agency, personal 
responsibility, and determinism on the one 
hand, and the nature of phenomenological 
experience on the other. Existentialist 
philosophy holds that there are no absolute 
standards or criteria that can be used when 
making life decisions. Existentialists view 
experience as something inherently individual 
and thus inter-subjectivity is a problem that 
can be only partially resolved. Existential 
philosophy—and humanistic psychology—
consider communication, by necessity, 
unreliable. No existentialist philosopher—
and no humanistic psychologist—will tell an 
individual what to do (Waterman 2013).
Positive psychology, on the other hand, 
The Communist Party’s 
Love Affair with Positive 
Psychology
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places great emphasis on science, which in 
turn is founded on determinist assumptions 
and defined standards or criteria. As a 
consequence, positive psychology excludes 
certain things from scientific consideration. 
‘Uncaused causes’—that is matters without 
scientific explanation (like transcendence 
and the existence of God, for example)—
are not taken into consideration by positive 
psychology. In contrast to the long-term, in-
depth dialogue between the patient and the 
therapist with a focus on the unique history 
and context of each individual humanistic 
and psychodynamic psychology, positive 
psychology lends itself to ‘techniques’ 
and short-term optimisation of one’s 
psychological potential (Waterman 2013).
The basis for positive psychology’s 
popularity in China lies in the way it 
complements the socialist concept of 
jingshen or ‘spirit’, which in turn was shaped 
by an amalgamation of Chinese culture’s 
belief in self-improvement and the influx of 
psychological theories in the early twentieth 
century (Larson 2009). This socialist concept 
of jingshen encapsulates a rejection of the 
unconscious, an emphasis on human agency, 
and the belief in the individual’s ability for 
self-transformation. Positive psychology’s 
philosophical foundations in relation to 
ontology and epistemology are far more 
compatible with the Chinese socialist state 
project. Furthermore, the techniques of 
positive psychology are not dissimilar to 
traditional Chinese ‘self-reflection’ and the 
more coerced forms of ‘thought work’, which 
form part of the institutionally embedded 
management of jingshen, both of which put 
the onus on the individual to uncover and 
resolve internal struggles (Yang 2013).
Positive psychology makes very specific 
ontological assumptions about what 
constitutes human nature, the nature of the 
world humans inhabit, and how individuals 
experience the world and others. Positive 
psychology’s assumptions and associated 
methods not only suit the Chinese concept 
of jingshen with its emphasis on conscious 
individual effort and expectations of a ‘can 
do’ mentality, but also conforms to the 
Recent propaganda posters in China. The slogans read (from left to right): ‘China: move forward!’; ‘Good 
words provide a good inspiration’; ‘The good children of China’; ‘The Chinese dream, the spirit of a bull’; 
‘Loving China dearly’; ‘Bless the Fatherland’.
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mankind and nature (Kenji 2005).
Morita therapy focuses on present 
circumstance and does not believe in the 
value of digging into the past. Morita Shoma 
saw no therapeutic meaning in searching and 
bringing to consciousness certain traumatic 
incidents. On the contrary, in his view, the 
source of unhappiness lies in the nature 
of one’s disposition and in an excessively 
acute awareness of the reactions of one’s 
own mind and body—something that is of 
course encouraged, almost celebrated, in 
psychodynamic approaches. But Morita 
therapy also contradicts positive psychology 
or any other attempts to control and use our 
minds to relieve anxiety. Positive psychology 
shuns negative emotions and focuses the 
individual’s energy to change or avoid them, 
but in Morita therapy negative emotions are 
simply part of nature and not problematic; 
it is the decision to view them as negative 
and undesirable which creates the problem. 
By deciding that a certain emotional state is 
somehow negative in the context of one’s life, 
too much focus is placed on the reaction to the 
negative emotion, which in turn intensifies 
the emotional reaction, attracting the person’s 
attention to it even more. A destructive circle 
of obsession is thus created.
A photo portrait of Morita Shoma in old age. 
PC: Wikipedia.
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‘scientific outlook on development’ (kexue 
fazhan guan), which is a key aspect of 
contemporary Chinese socialist ideology. In 
terms of efficacy, positive psychology, like 
many other forms of cognitive behavioural 
therapy, can have great results in the short 
term, but do not tend to have a long-lasting 
effect. As such, China may be able to hit its 
happiness targets in the short run, but should 
expect a magnified wave of unhappiness to 
return in the mid-term (Burkeman 2016).
One of the main reasons why positive 
psychology does not help in the long run is 
that it does not provide any answers to the 
profound existential questions about the 
meaning of life, moral value, and the question 
of transcendence, which so many Chinese 
individuals are now contemplating as their 
livelihoods have been improved and middle-
class anxieties are growing. Nor is positive 
psychology interested in individual (hi)
stories or journeys and in-depth dialogue 
or engagement with individuals in the way 
psychodynamic or humanistic therapies and 
some religious practices are.
Xi Jinping pays great lip service to the 
importance of China’s indigenous religions 
when it comes to looking after the spiritual 
needs of the Chinese people. He may 
therefore be open to the approach taken by 
Morita therapy, which was developed in the 
first half of the twentieth century by a man 
called Morita Shoma. Building on Western 
psychiatric medicine without the influence 
of Freudian psychoanalytic concepts, and 
drawing on the concepts and practices of Zen 
Buddhism, Morita therapy is not concerned 
with technique or procedure, but with the 
enhancement of a philosophical view that is 
strongly rooted in the Buddhist and Daoist 
views of life, and of the relationship between 
Beyond Mind Control: 
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Acceptance
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The aim of Morita therapy is not to 
identify the cause of unhappiness, but the 
destruction of this vicious circle, which 
creates this obsession with negative emotion. 
Morita therapy strives for harmony between 
nature and ideas—where nature includes all 
emotions, desires and bodily feelings, and 
ideas are all theories substantiated by means 
of language. According to Morita therapy it 
is counter-productive to try to control one’s 
emotions. The starting point in the healing 
process is acceptance of suffering, its goal an 
awareness of the causes—always multiple—
of suffering, without seeking to control the 
suffering.
The ideal state of mind in Morita therapy 
is that of arugamama, which is the ability to 
accept things as they are:
When we can accept reality, then we 
become more obedient. In reality, there is 
no such thing as making great strides. To 
think that one suddenly becomes enlightened 
and becomes a better person is not based on 
object reality. It is an assessment based on 
moods. One becomes great by taking one step 
at a time. One should not take it for granted 
that one has become great. (Kenji 2005, 179)
Aspirational, utopian dreams rarely 
improve people’s lives, including their 
psychological lives. The German Chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt (1918–2015) famously 
advised: ‘Anyone who has visions should go 
to the doctor.’ Angela Merkel—who lived 
through thirty years of socialist utopia—and 
her Northern European counterparts are all 
famously down to earth and pragmatic, and 
yet their countries lead the world’s happiness 
rankings. So, to paraphrase Morita, and to 
return to the development targets of the 
Chinese dream, one should not take it for 
granted that one will become happy. The first 
obstacle on the road to China’s happiness is 
the articulation of the Chinese dream itself. 
Giving up the obsession with the dream will 
be the first step towards its fulfilment.
Pursuing Utopian Dreams
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